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ABSTRACT 
 
The regulation of insider trading - the act of trading in securities or other financial products while in 
possession of relevant non-public, price-sensitive information - is a controversial and complex area 
of corporate law.  Although there has been a marked increase in the number of individual offenders 
convicted of insider trading in recent years, there has never been a successful criminal prosecution 
of a corporation for insider trading in Australia, or even a successful set of civil penalty proceedings. 
 
This thesis will focus on corporate criminal liability for insider trading in Australia - a topic of great 
theoretical and practical significance.  Corporations are subject to the prohibition of insider trading 
under Australian law, yet the absence of any successful prosecution, and the dearth of cases 
concerning corporate defendants, means the law is untested on many relevant issues, complicated 
by conflicting views as to the proper application of insider trading laws to corporations. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is threefold: (i) to determine the manner in which insider trading laws apply 
to corporations in Australia; (ii) to critically examine the application of those insider trading laws and 
identify any associated difficulties or flaws; and (iii) to set out proposals for reform and a new model 
of corporate criminal liability for insider trading in Australia. 
 
This thesis will demonstrate that there are a number of specific problems which can be identified in 
the application of the elements of the insider trading offence to corporations.  In particular, there are 
many mechanisms, existing under both the general law and statute, which can be used to attribute 
the elements of the insider trading offence to corporations, although there is a lack of clarity as to 
their availability and application.  These different mechanisms also apply a variety of tests, many of 
which are conflicting, making it difficult to determine when a corporation will actually be regarded as 
engaging in insider trading.  The Chinese Wall defence for corporations also contains a number of 
gaps in its operation, creating additional uncertainty. 
 
This thesis critically analyses corporate criminal liability for insider trading in Australia.  Having regard 
to the need for legislative certainty and the ‘market integrity’ rationale underpinning Australia’s insider 
trading laws, this thesis recommends reforms to the existing regulatory regime in order to remedy the 
identified problems and to better apply the law to corporations.  Accordingly, a new model of direct 
corporate criminal liability for insider trading in Australia is proposed.  
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CHAPTER 1  
THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS FOR INSIDER TRADING IN 
AUSTRALIA: AN INTRODUCTION 
  
The regulation of insider trading is a controversial and complex area of corporate law.  In 
essence, insider trading is the act of trading in financial products (such as shares or other 
securities) while in possession of relevant non-public, price-sensitive information. 
 
Insider trading is generally acknowledged, if not universally accepted, as a significant threat 
to market integrity, which is widely regarded as an essential requirement for the proper, 
efficient functioning of securities markets.1  Indeed, the accepted rationale for prohibiting 
insider trading in Australia is to protect and maintain market integrity.2   However, regulators 
are regularly criticised for a perceived lack of enforcement action in relation to insider 
trading.  Indeed, although there has been a marked increase in the number of individual 
offenders convicted of insider trading in recent years, there has never been a successful 
criminal prosecution of a corporation for insider trading in Australia, or even a successful set 
of civil proceedings.   
 
In this thesis I will focus upon the criminal liability of corporations for insider trading in 
Australia, and in this chapter I will introduce my thesis topic, set out the purpose of this 
thesis, reveal the limitations of the current literature in this area, demonstrate the need for 
significant research on this topic, and describe the methodology adopted for my research.   
 
While commonly referred to as ‘insider’ trading, the prohibition under Australian law is not 
limited to those who might generally be classified as corporate insiders - such as directors, 
1 See, for example, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Consultation Paper 68: Competition for 
Market Services – Trading in Listed Securities and Related Data (2007); Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem 
Daouk, ‘The World Price of Insider Trading’ (2002) 57 Journal of Finance 75;  Laura Nyantung Beny, ‘Insider 
Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and 
Economics Debate’ (2007) 32 Journal of Corporation Law 237.   
2 This rationale was confirmed by the majority of the High Court in Mansfield and Kizon v R (2012) 87 ALJR 20.  
A detailed analysis of the various rationales for prohibiting insider trading is set out later in this chapter. 
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senior executives or other officers – as it encompasses trading (or related conduct) by any 
person who possesses non-public, price-sensitive information.  Therefore, in this thesis, I 
use the term ‘insider trading’ in this context.  Additionally, when writing this thesis, I have 
chosen to use the inclusive term ‘corporation’, rather than ‘company’ or ‘body corporate’.3   
 
Background 
 
Insider trading has been the subject of significant international attention and scrutiny over 
recent decades.  The United States of America (‘USA’) was the first country to formally 
prohibit insider trading.4  After the Second World War, Japan was pressured to adopt insider 
trading regulations modelled on the laws of the USA.5  Other countries gradually began to 
adopt laws regulating insider trading – in Australia, insider trading was first prohibited under 
statute in 19756 – and the vast majority of countries with securities markets now have 
legislation which prohibits insider trading.7  There appear to be a number of reasons for the 
rapid increase in the enactment of laws prohibiting insider trading.  Countries within the 
European Union were obliged to adopt insider trading laws as a result of a binding directive 
3 The definition of ‘corporation’ in s 57A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the ‘Corporations Act’) includes a 
company and other forms of body corporate. 
4 Franklin A Gevurtz, ‘The Globalisation of Insider Trading Prohibitions’ (2002) 15 Transnational Lawyer 63, 64. 
SEC rule 10b5-1 is the basis for the prohibition of insider trading in the USA and was first adopted in 1942 
pursuant to rule 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78a (1934).   
5 Lori Semaan, Mark Freeman and Michael Adams, ‘Is Insider Trading a Necessary Evil for Efficient Markets?: 
An International Comparative Analysis’ (1999) 17 Company and Securities Law Journal 220, 228. 
6 Insider trading was first prohibited by statute in Australia under amendments made in 1975 to the uniform 
Securities Industry Acts previously adopted by four States: Securities Industry Act 1970 (Qld); Securities 
Industry Act 1970 (NSW); Securities Industry Act 1970 (WA); Securities Industry Act 1970 (Vic), as noted in 
Gregory Lyon and Jean J du Plessis, The Law of Insider Trading in Australia (Federation Press, 2005) 5.  Lei 
and Ramsay state that the relevant amendments were made in 1971, but this predates the report of the Senate 
Select Committee on Securities and Exchange, known as the ‘Rae Committee’, which first recommended the 
introduction of statutory insider trading laws in Australia in 1974: Victor Lei and Ian Ramsay, ‘Insider Trading 
Enforcement in Australia’ (2014) 8 Law and Financial Markets Review 214, 216-217. 
7 Gevurtz, above n 4, 65. 
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of the European Council issued in 1989.8  Other nations enacted insider trading laws as they 
sought to make their stock exchanges more competitive internationally, often in response to 
the enactment of similar laws in other jurisdictions.9  Although the insider trading regimes of 
different countries do not have the same characteristics and the underlying reasons for the 
prohibition of insider trading vary,10 more than 90 countries now prohibit insider trading,11 
with all developed nations and 80 per cent of nations with emerging securities markets 
regulating this form of conduct.12  Additionally, the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions views the regulation of insider trading as a ‘cornerstone of securities trading 
laws’.13  
 
8 Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, OJ 1989 L 
334/30.  This directive was later superseded by the Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 28 January 2003 on Insider Dealing and Market Abuse, OJ 2003 l 96/16, which has now been 
replaced by the Regulation (EU) 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on 
Market Abuse (Market Abuse Regulation), and the Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, OJ 2014 L 173.179 (Market Abuse Directive). 
9 Gevurtz, above n 4, 67. 
10 The characteristics of the insider trading regimes of a number of other jurisdictions will be reviewed in 
chapter 2 and the various rationales for prohibiting insider trading are considered later in this introductory 
chapter. 
11 Laura Nyantung Beny, ‘The Political Economy of Insider Trading Laws and Enforcement: Law vs. Politics? 
International Evidence’, in Stephen M Bainbridge (ed), Research Handbook on Insider Trading (Edward Elgar, 
2013) 266, 287; Bhattacharya and Daouk, above n 1, 77; Gordon R Walker and Andrew F Simpson, ‘Insider 
Conduct Regulation in New Zealand: Exploring the Enforcement Deficit [2013] New Zealand Law Review 521, 
521-522. 
12 Gevurtz, above n 4, 67; Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, Insider Trading Discussion Paper 
(2001) [1.4].  Australia’s insider trading regime will be compared with those of other jurisdictions in chapter 2 of 
this thesis.    
13 Paul Latimer and Philipp Maume, Promoting Information in the Marketplace for Financial Services – 
Financial Market Regulation and International Standards (Springer, 2014) 68.  Of the 38 principles developed 
by the International Organisations of Securities Commissions to achieve its key objectives of securities 
regulation, principle 36 is that ‘regulation should be designed to detect and deter manipulation and other unfair 
market practices’: International Organisations of Securities Commissions, Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation, 2010. 
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Despite the widespread adoption of insider trading laws internationally, insider trading has a 
reputation as a notoriously difficult offence to successfully detect and prosecute, and the 
regulation of insider trading continues to be the subject of ongoing debate.  Some members 
of the financial services industry openly state that they believe insider trading is both rife and 
increasing, particularly when markets are volatile,14 and some commentators consider 
insider trading to be unavoidable and endemic to securities markets.15  Indeed, some 
anecdotal evidence appears to indicate that insider trading in shares in the period 
immediately prior to takeover announcements causes rises in share prices of, on average, 
10 per cent.16  Empirical evidence, both within Australia and overseas, seems to indicate 
that corporate insiders are able to earn abnormal profits and avoid abnormal losses through 
share trading.17   
 
14 See, for example, Peter Hunt, Chairman of Caliburn Partnership, as reported in Michael West, ‘Insider 
Trading Still on the Rise: Banker’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 20 February 2008; Professor Ian 
Ramsay, Director of the Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne, as 
reported in Vanessa Burrow, ‘ASIC on Insider Trading Hunt’, The Age (Melbourne), 21 March 2008. 
15 Leo Herzel and Leo Katz, ‘Insider Trading: Who Loses?’ [1987] Lloyds Bank Review 15; Phillip Anthony 
O’Hara, ‘Insider Trading in Financial Markets: Legality, Ethics, Efficiency’ (2001) 28 International Journal of 
Social Economics 1046, 1048; Stanislav Dolgopolov, ‘Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity in Complex 
Securities: The Impact of Insider Trading on Options Market Makers’ (2010) 15 Fordham Journal of Corporate 
and Financial Law 387. 
16 See, for example, Michael Sainsbury, ‘Insider Trading Rife in Australia’, The Australian (Sydney), 20 
February 2008.  
17 See, for example, H Negat Seyhun, ‘Insider Profits, Costs of Trading and Market Efficiency’ (1986) 16 
Journal of Financial Economics 189; Laura Nyantung Beny and H Nejat Seyhun, ‘Has Illegal Insider Trading 
Become More Rampant in the United States? Empirical Evidence from Takeovers’ in Stephen M Bainbridge 
(ed), Research Handbook on Insider Trading (Edward Elgar, 2013), 211; Mark A Freeman and Michael A 
Adams, ‘Australian Insiders’ Views on Insider Trading’ (1999) 10 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 148; 
Arturo Bris, ‘Do Insider Trading Laws Work’ (2005) 11 European Financial Management 267; Philip Brown, 
Mark Foo and Iain Watson, ‘Trading by Insiders in Australia: Evidence on the Profitability of Directors’ Trades’ 
(2003) 21 Company and Securities Law Journal 248, 260.  
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As at the date of this thesis, 42 people have been convicted of insider trading in Australia,18 
and two people have been found liable for insider trading in civil penalty proceedings.19  The 
18 R v Teh (District Court of Victoria, Kelly DCJ, 2 September 1991); R v Williams (District Court of NSW, 
Kinchington DCJ, 4 October 1996); R v Cribb (District Court of Western Australia, Hammond CJDC, 9 June 
1998); R v Firns (District Court of New South Wales, Sides DCJ, 14 April 2000) – the conviction was later 
overturned on appeal: R v Firns [2001] NSWCCA 191 (New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Mason P, 
Hidden J, Carruthers AJ, 21 May 2001); R v Hannes (District Court of New South Wales, Backhouse J, 17 
September 1999), a retrial was subsequently ordered: R v Hannes [2002] NSWSC 1182 (Supreme Court of 
New South Wales, James J, 13 December 2002); R v Rivkin [2003] NSWSC 447 (Supreme Court of New 
South Wales, Whealy J, 29 May 2003); R v MacDermott (District Court of Western Australia, Kennedy DCJ, 1 
August 2003);  R v Sweetman (District Court of Queensland, Shanahan DCJ, 17 December 2004); R v Doff 
[2005] NSWSC 50 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Barr J, 21 February 2005); R v Frawley (Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, Bell J, 24 June 2005); R v Hall [2005] NSWSC 890 (Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, Kirby J, 9 September 2005); R v McKay [2007] NSWSC 275 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, 
Whealy J, 30 March 2007); R v Reddell (District Court of Queensland, Martin DCJ, 26 July 2007); R v 
Woodland (County Court of Victoria, Friday, 16 November 2007); R v Panchal [2009] QDC 105 (Queensland 
District Court, Howell DCJ, 27 April 2009); R v O'Reilly [2010] VSC 138 (Supreme Court of Victoria, Forrest J, 
16 April 2010); R v Stephenson [2010] NSWSC 779 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Fullerton J, 16 July 
2010); R v Hartman [2010] NSWSC 1422 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, McClellan J, 2 December 
2010); R v De Silva [2011] NSWSC 243 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Buddin J, 31 March 2011); R v 
Dalzell [2011] NSWSC 454 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Hall J, 20 May 2011); R v Bateson [2011] 
NSWSC 643 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Buddin J, 24 June 2011); R v O’Brien [2011] NSWSC 1553 
(Supreme Court of New South Wales, Hoeben J, 14 December 2011); R v Rietbergen (District Court of New 
South Wales, 5 December 2012); R v Levi (District Court of New South Wales, 5 December 2012; R v 
Glynatsis [2012] NSWSC 1551 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Johnson J, 12 December 2012); R v 
Fysh [2012] NSWSC 1587 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, McCallum J,19 December 2012), although 
this conviction was overturned on appeal: Fysh v R [2013] NSWCCA 284  (New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal, Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL and Schmidt J, 20 November 2013); R v Zhu [2013] NSWSC 127 
(Supreme Court of New South Wales, Hall J, 15 February 2013); R v Hebbard (Supreme Court of Western 
Australia, Corboy J, 27 February 2013); R v Lindskog (County Court of Victoria, Parson J, 14 March 2013); R v 
Tan (District Court of New South Wales, Marien J, 17 April 2013); R v Gay (Supreme Court of Tasmania, 
Porter J, 23 April 2013); R v Graham (County Court of Victoria, Allen J, 22 May 2013); R v Ang (District Court 
of New South Wales, 7 June 2013); R v Khoo (District Court of New South Wales, 12 July 2013); R v Turner 
(District Court of New South Wales, 1 April 2014); R v Breen (District Court of New South Wales, 1 April 2014); 
R v Jordinson (District Court of New South Wales, 1 April 2014); Commonwealth Director of Public 
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first conviction for insider trading in Australia did not occur until 1991,20 and further 
convictions were obtained intermittently, with only four additional convictions for insider 
trading in the following ten years.  Since that time, the frequency and number of insider 
trading prosecutions and convictions has significantly increased, and greater enforcement 
action has been taken, particularly in recent years – since January 2010, 27 individuals have 
been convicted of insider trading.21  All convictions and findings of liability relate only to 
natural persons – there have been no successful criminal or civil penalty proceedings 
brought against a corporation for insider trading in Australia.  In 2007, the local regulator, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’), brought civil penalty 
Prosecutions v Hill and Kamay [2015] VSC 86 (Supreme Court of Victoria, Hollingworth J, 17 February 2015); 
R v Farris (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Hall J, 15 July 2015).  
19 ASIC v Petsas and Miot [2005] FCA 88.   
20 R v Teh (District Court of Victoria, Kelly DCJ, 2 September 1991). 
21 R v O'Reilly [2010] VSC 138 (Supreme Court of Victoria, Forrest J, 16 April 2010); R v Stephenson [2010] 
NSWSC 779 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Fullerton J, 16 July 2010); R v Hartman [2010] NSWSC 
1422 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, McClellan J, 2 December 2010); R v De Silva [2011] NSWSC 243 
(Supreme Court of New South Wales, Buddin J, 31 March 2011); R v Dalzell [2011] NSWSC 454 (Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, Hall J, 20 May 2011); R v Bateson [2011] NSWSC 643 (Supreme Court of New 
South Wales, Buddin J, 24 June 2011); R v O’Brien [2011] NSWSC 1553 (Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, Hoeben J, 14 December 2011); R v Rietbergen (District Court of New South Wales, 5 December 2012); 
R v Levi (District Court of New South Wales, 5 December 2012; R v Glynatsis [2012] NSWSC 1551 (Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, Johnson J, 12 December 2012); R v Fysh [2012] NSWSC 1587 (Supreme Court of 
New South Wales, McCallum J,19 December 2012), with the conviction overturned on appeal: Fysh v R  [2013] 
NSWCCA 284  (New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL and Schmidt J, 20 
November 2013); R v Zhu [2013] NSWSC 127 (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Hall J, 15 February 
2013); R v Hebbard (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Corboy J, 27 February 2013); R v Lindskog (County 
Court of Victoria, Parson J, 14 March 2013); R v Tan (District Court of New South Wales, Marien J, 17 April 
2013; R v Gay (Supreme Court of Tasmania, Porter J, 23 April 2013); R v Graham (County Court of Victoria, 
Allen J, 22 May 2013); R v Ang (District Court of New South Wales, 7 June 2013); R v Khoo (District Court of 
New South Wales, 12 July 2013); R v Turner (District Court of New South Wales, 1 April 2014); R v Breen 
(District Court of New South Wales, 1 April 2014); R v Jordinson (District Court of New South Wales, 1 April 
2014); Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Hill and Kamay [2015] VSC 86 (Supreme Court of 
Victoria, Hollingworth J, 17 February 2015); R v Farris (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Hall J, 15 July 
2015).  
6 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
proceedings for insider trading against a corporation, the Australian subsidiary of the global 
investment bank, Citigroup, but those proceedings were unsuccessful.22   
 
The Purpose of this Thesis and its Contribution to the Literature   
 
My purpose in undertaking this thesis is to critically examine the application of Australian 
insider trading laws to corporations and to recommend necessary legislative reform.  
Throughout this thesis, I will analyse the elements of the insider trading offence and relevant 
defences, consider their application to corporations, and identify the difficulties and problems 
which result.  Based upon this examination and review, I will set out proposals for law 
reform, to address the identified difficulties and problems, and to improve the application of 
Australian insider trading laws to corporations. 
 
Through this thesis, I make an original and significant contribution to the study of insider 
trading laws, as well as to Australian corporate law in general, for three reasons.  Firstly, this 
research is unique, as no such study has previously been undertaken.  The lack of a 
comprehensive, critical analysis of the application of insider trading laws to corporations, 
especially under Australian law, is a significant gap in the literature and this research is the 
first of its kind.  This thesis therefore seeks to make a major contribution to the knowledge in 
this area.  Secondly, as insider trading is acknowledged to be a problem which has major 
negative impacts upon securities markets globally, the application of insider trading laws to 
corporations is a significant issue warranting further research and attention, because of the 
potential to reduce insider trading and improve the ability of regulators to take appropriate 
enforcement action.  Thirdly, by proposing reforms to insider trading laws as they apply to 
corporations, this thesis offers Australia the opportunity to adopt laws of international 
significance, which would enable Australia’s securities markets to remain globally 
competitive.     
 
22 ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 160 FCR 35.  This case will be considered in detail 
in chapters 2 and 6 of this thesis. 
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Even though insider trading laws do apply to corporations, there has never been a 
successful set of proceedings for insider trading brought against a corporation.  There are a 
number of possible reasons for this: (i) corporations may not engage in insider trading – 
insider trading may only be engaged in by individuals in circumstances that would not result 
in a corporation having any liability for insider trading; (ii) corporations may engage in insider 
trading, but prosecutors and regulators may be reluctant to pursue insider trading cases 
against corporations due to uncertainties in the law and difficulties in applying insider trading 
laws to corporations; or (iii) corporations may engage in insider trading, but in circumstances 
where individuals associated with the relevant corporations may also have liability for insider 
trading, so that prosecutors and regulators elect to take action against those individuals, 
rather than to pursue the corporation. 
 
Although it might technically be possible that corporations do not engage in insider trading, 
the idea that insider trading is only engaged in by individuals in circumstances that would not 
result in a corporation having any liability is less than compelling.  Why would it be the case 
that individuals engage in insider trading and not corporations?  The majority of insider 
trading cases brought in Australia have involved conduct which occurred in a corporate 
context.  It can also be observed that in certain circumstances where an individual has been 
successfully prosecuted for insider trading, a corporation may also have had potential 
liability for the offence.23  Insider trading may occur in circumstances where a corporation 
could be found to have engaged in that conduct, but prosecutors and regulators may be 
reluctant to take enforcement action, or may prefer to take action against individual 
offenders instead.   Indeed, ASIC has noted, in the context of the general enforcement of 
corporate crime:  
 
We may take action against corporations, individuals, or both, depending on the 
circumstances of the case.  For example, taking action against individuals who are directly 
responsible or in charge, instead of corporations, may reduce the incentive for those 
23 For example, in R v Rivkin (2004) 184 FLR 365, Mr Rene Rivkin purchased and sold shares in Qantas 
through a private corporation which he controlled – it could be argued that the corporation, Rivkin Investments 
Pty Ltd, also engaged in insider trading but no action was taken against it. 
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individuals and others in similar positions to engage in like misconduct given the potential 
impact on their reputation and livelihood.  This approach is likely to have a greater 
deterrent effect.24  
 
Following ASIC’s defeat in ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (‘ASIC v 
Citigroup’),25 no further proceedings for insider trading have been brought against a 
corporation.  However, if the difficulties in the application of insider trading laws to 
corporations could be identified and resolved, appropriate insider trading enforcement action 
might be brought against corporations, increasing the general deterrent effect for all potential 
offenders. 
 
Australia is not the only country in which there has never been a successful action for insider 
trading brought against a corporation.  Even though the majority of jurisdictions with insider 
trading laws also apply those laws to corporations, there are no recorded instances 
worldwide of a corporation being convicted in a criminal prosecution or found liable for 
insider trading in civil proceedings.  Accordingly, the application of insider trading laws to 
corporations is a global issue.  Therefore, while in this thesis I do focus upon the position 
under Australian law, and propose reforms to Australia’s system of insider trading regulation, 
the research and resulting law reform proposals have the potential for significant global 
application.  Insider trading is acknowledged as a global problem affecting securities 
markets and there is regular co-operation between the various international regulators 
responsible for insider trading enforcement to confront issues in detecting and prosecuting 
insider trading in their respective jurisdictions.  By implementing reforms to insider trading 
laws as they relate to corporations, Australia has the opportunity not only to improve the 
application of its own laws, but also to adopt laws of international significance demonstrating 
‘best practice’ in the prohibition of insider trading.  Indeed, Australia’s existing regime of 
insider trading regulation has already served as a model for other jurisdictions – such as 
24 ASIC, Report 387: Penalties for Corporate Wrongdoing (2014) 9. 
25 (2007) 160 FCR 35.   
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Singapore26 and New Zealand.27  Accordingly, there is the potential for reforms in the 
application of insider trading laws to corporations to have great international relevance and 
significance, particularly in jurisdictions which prohibit insider trading on the same rationale 
as Australia – the protection and maintenance of market integrity.   
 
When corporations are bound by laws prohibiting insider trading, they must carry on 
business and conduct their activities within the ambit of that regulation.  When this occurs, 
all participants in our securities markets must have confidence that the application of those 
laws is appropriate, and that the system of regulation is neither unnecessarily burdensome 
nor inappropriately lax, that there is certainty in the operation and application of those laws, 
and that those laws give effect to their stated aims.   
 
As insider trading is prohibited in Australia in order to protect and maintain market integrity,28 
all investors and market participants must have confidence that those who might otherwise 
gain an unfair informational advantage from insider trading will be identified and 
appropriately sanctioned.   However, in order for such confidence to exist and for market 
integrity to be maintained, corporate insider traders must also be detected, not just individual 
offenders, and corporations found to have engaged in insider trading must be the subject of 
appropriate enforcement action.  Market integrity requires legislative certainty for regulators, 
market participants, potential investors in securities markets, and all corporations.  
Therefore, current uncertainties as to the operation of insider trading laws and their 
application to corporations threaten market confidence and, as a result, market integrity.  
This study into the application of insider trading to corporations, and the law reforms which I 
propose in this thesis, offer an opportunity to address this problem.        
 
26 Hse-Yu Chiu, ‘Australian Influence on the Insider Trading Laws in Singapore’ [2002] Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies 574. 
27 New Zealand Cabinet Economic Development Committee, Review of Securities Trading Law: Insider Trading 
(2004) 7; Walker and Simpson, above n 11, 547-548; Gordon R Walker and Andrew F Simpson, ‘Insider 
Trading Law in New Zealand’ in Stephen M Bainbridge (ed), Research Handbook on Insider Trading (Edward 
Elgar, 2013) 386, 396. 
28 The High Court in Mansfield and Kizon v R (2012) 87 ALJR 20, [45]. 
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Accordingly, through my analysis of the application of insider trading laws to corporations, I 
will demonstrate that the current Australian insider trading laws are flawed in three ways: (i) 
there is a significant lack of certainty regarding the manner in which insider trading laws 
apply to corporations, as there is confusion as to which mechanisms are to be used to 
attribute the various elements of the insider trading offence to corporations – this uncertainty 
exists because the relationship between the applicable statutory rules and general law is not 
clear, and also because there is uncertainty as to which are the applicable statutory rules; (ii) 
even when they are identified, the different mechanisms which may be used to attribute the 
different elements of the insider trading offence to corporations apply conflicting and varying 
tests – this leads to further uncertainty as to the circumstances in which corporations will be 
regarded as having engaged in insider trading; and (iii) the laws as currently drafted do not 
give effect to the stated rationale for prohibiting insider trading, being the maintenance and 
protection of market integrity. 
 
Major amendments are recommended to Australia’s insider trading laws to better reflect and 
recognise the rationale for the prohibition of insider trading, to protect and maintain market 
integrity, to ensure that the current system of regulation is both adequate and appropriate, 
and to provide a regulatory model of international significance.  I will propose that this area 
of the law be reformed by drafting a new set of statutory provisions to provide for the 
attribution of the elements of insider trading to corporations.  These provisions would 
operate as the exclusive mechanism for attributing the elements of insider trading to 
corporations and would expressly exclude the operation of the general law.  The new 
statutory provisions would be supplemented by an amended Chinese Wall defence.  The 
new statutory provisions would provide greater clarity, be more consistent with the market 
integrity rationale for the prohibition of insider trading, and offer increased certainty for all 
affected and interested parties as to the intended operation of the law.   
 
The Rationale for the Prohibition of Insider Trading 
 
Despite the fact that the vast majority of countries with securities markets prohibit insider 
trading, the underlying rationale for such regulation differs between nations.  In order to 
11 
 
understand the intended operation of insider trading laws, the reasons for its prohibition 
must also be considered.  There are four primary reasons variously identified as the possible 
bases for the prohibition of insider trading: (i) market fairness; (ii) market efficiency; (iii) 
fiduciary duty; and (iv) misappropriation. 
 
The ‘market fairness’ rationale, also referred to as an ‘equal access’ rationale, is based on 
the premise that it is not fair for some market participants to have access to price-sensitive 
information, and to be able to trade on the basis of that information, if it is not also available 
to all other market participants.29  Ideally, all market participants should have equal access 
to relevant information when making trading decisions and therefore be exposed to the 
same trading risks, but insiders with an ‘unerodable informational advantage’ are able to 
trade with a reduced risk, or almost no risk at all.30  Investor confidence in securities markets 
is reduced if some investors are believed to have the ability to use information which is not 
readily available.31  For this reason, market fairness requires insider trading to be prohibited 
to prevent those with access to inside information from exploiting that unfair advantage.32  
 
In circumstances where price-sensitive information is not released to the market in a timely 
manner, the prices of financial products cannot be said to accurately represent their true 
value, and therefore market inefficiencies exist.33  If those with access to price-sensitive 
information delay its release to the market to allow themselves time to trade, the efficiency of 
29 O’Hara, above n 15, 1053. 
30 Victor Brudney, ‘Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws’ (1979) 
93 Harvard Law Review 322, 346. 
31 See, for example, ASIC, Consultation Paper 68, above n 1; Bhattacharya and Daouk, above n 1;  Beny, 
above n 1.   
32 CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper, above n 12, [1.20]; Semaan, Freeman and Adams, above n 5, 
222.  Green takes another view and suggests that insider trading is in fact a form of cheating, noting that the 
‘stock market is viewed as a highly formalized, rule-governed game.  Confidence in the market depends on 
investors feeling that the game is being played fairly… Market participants who trade on undisclosed inside 
information… [are] cheaters’: Stuart P Green, Lying, Cheating and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar 
Crime (Oxford University Press, 2006) 235. 
33 Eugene F Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 Journal of 
Finance 383. 
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the market is eroded.34  Additionally, the participation of some investors in the market may 
be reduced, if those who hold and have access to price-sensitive information are perceived 
to have a trading advantage.35  Without investor confidence in market integrity, investors 
may choose alternative investments or demand a premium for assuming higher risks, which 
in turn increases the cost of capital to corporations.36  Thus, the ‘market efficiency’ rationale 
requires insider trading to be prohibited in order to maintain an efficient, effective market with 
the maximum possible participation.   
    
According to the ‘fiduciary duty’ rationale, a person who is in a legal relationship which 
imposes obligations of trust and confidence must not profit from that relationship or allow a 
conflict of interest to arise.  If a person who owes a corporation a fiduciary duty derives a 
personal benefit by using that corporation’s confidential information to trade, or if a person 
owes a fiduciary duty to the counterparty to a trade and does not disclose to that 
counterparty price-sensitive information which they possess, the fiduciary duty is breached 
and for that reason insider trading should be prohibited.37  This reasoning is only applicable 
where the insider trading prohibition applies to those who owe a fiduciary relationship to the 
corporation which ‘owns’ the relevant information, or to their trading counterparty, and not 
where there is no such relationship in existence.38  
 
34 Keith Kendall, ‘The Need to Prohibit Insider Trading’ (2008) 25 Law in Context 106. 
35 Bhattacharya and Daouk, above n 1; CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper, above n 12, [1.22].  It is 
also worth noting that some commentators consider that insider trading creates an efficient market by providing 
a mechanism for the distribution of information: see, for example, Michael Whincop, ‘The Political Economy of 
Corporate Law Reform in Australia’ (1999) 27 Federal Law Review 77; Michael Whincop, ‘Towards a Property 
Rights and Market Microstructural Theory of Insider Trading Regulation – The Case of Primary Securities 
Markets Transactions’ (1996) 7 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 212. 
36 Ashley Black, ‘The Reform of Insider Trading Law in Australia’ (1992) 15 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 214, 220.    
37 CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper, above n 12, [1.14]; Semaan, Freeman and Adams, above n 5, 
222. 
38 Jennifer Moore, ‘What is Really Unethical About Insider Trading?’ (1990) 9 Journal of Business Ethics 171, 
174. 
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The ‘misappropriation’ rationale is an extension of the ‘fiduciary duty’ rationale, being 
predicated on the basis that using confidential information to trade amounts to a misuse that 
is inconsistent with the proprietary rights of the true ‘owner’ of that information.39  Where the 
owner of the confidential information is the corporation to which the information relates, the 
use of that information to trade for personal profit amounts to a theft or misappropriation of 
that information, and for that reason insider trading should be prohibited.40 
 
In this context, it must also be noted that, although the vast majority of countries with 
established securities exchanges have chosen to prohibit insider trading, a number of 
commentators consider that insider trading should not be regulated.41  The views and 
contributions of those writers will be discussed below in the context of the limitations of the 
current literature, but this thesis is predicated on the basis that insider trading is a form of 
criminal conduct – regardless of the various underlying rationales – and I intend to propose 
law reforms which are aimed at ensuring that the manner in which insider trading laws apply 
to corporations reflects the ‘mischief’ which those laws are intended to remedy.  
 
In Australia, insider trading is prohibited on the basis of both the market fairness and market 
efficiency rationales,42 as both are considered necessary to maintain market integrity.43  In 
39 Lawrence E Mitchell, ‘The Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation Theory and the New Insider Trading 
Legislation: From Fairness to Efficiency and Back’ (1988) 52 Albany Law Review 775; Stephen M Bainbridge, 
‘Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud’ 
(1999) 52 Southern Methodist University Law Review 1589.  
40 CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper, above n 12, [1.18]; Alan Strudler and Eric W Orts, ‘Moral 
Principle in the Law of Insider Trading’ (1999) 78 Texas Law Review 375; Semaan, Freeman and Adams, 
above n 5, 222; Moore, above n 38, 175. 
41 Such writers include Manne, Fama, Leyland and Estrada and, within Australia, writers such as Whincop, 
Semaan, Freeman and Adams.  
42 Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, House of Representatives, Fair Shares for All: 
Insider Trading in Australia (1989) [3.34] to [3.36] (‘Griffiths Committee Report’); CAMAC, Insider Trading 
Discussion Paper, above n 12, [1.24], [1.34]-[1.35]. 
43 Griffiths Committee Report, above n 42, [3.34]-[3.36]; CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper, above n 
12, [0.20]. 
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1981 it was stated in the report of the ‘Campbell Inquiry’ that insider trading should be 
prohibited in Australia: 
 
to ensure that the securities market operates freely and fairly, with all participants having 
equal access to information.  Investor confidence… depends importantly on the 
prevention of the improper use of inside information.44   
 
A similar position was taken by the ‘Griffiths Committee’ in 1989, when it was stated that: 
 
insider trading damages an essential component in the proper functioning of the securities 
markets, that is investor confidence.45   
 
When the Corporations Law was amended by the Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 
1991 (Cth), the Explanatory Memorandum specifically stated that: 
 
 the Government’s policy view is… that it is necessary to control insider trading to protect 
investors and make it attractive for them to provide funds to the issuers of securities.46  
 
The underlying rationale for prohibiting insider trading has also been discussed in a number 
of Australian cases.  In Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros Halkerston & Partners 
Securities Ltd,47 Young J stated that the prohibition of insider trading48 was ‘to prevent one 
person having an unfair advantage from another’,49 and the Court of Appeal endorsed this 
comment on appeal.50  In Exicom Pty Ltd v Futuris Corporation Ltd,51 Young J again 
commented on the rationale for prohibiting insider trading and determined that it was only 
44 Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System, Australian Financial System: Final Report (1981) 
382 (‘Campbell Inquiry Report’). 
45 Griffiths Committee Report, above n 42, 17. 
46 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth), [307]. 
47 Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 462. 
48 At that time contained in s 128 of the Securities Industry Code. 
49 Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 462, 464. 
50 Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 157, 163. 
51 Exicom Pty Ltd v Futuris Corporation Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 404. 
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relevant where ‘an insider [was] making use of information in a market to gain an advantage 
over another.’52  In R v Firns,53 Mason P noted the various theories which have been offered 
as reasons for prohibiting insider trading, as well as arguments that insider trading is 
beneficial.54  His Honour stated that ‘market fairness… cannot be invoked as the sole 
basis’55 for prohibiting insider trading and confirmed that the current Australian system of 
regulation embodies both market fairness and market efficiency theories.56  In the first 
appeal in R v Mansfield and Kizon,57 Buss J also noted and discussed the four policy 
rationales which may underlie the insider trading prohibition58 and confirmed that the market 
fairness and market efficiency theories underlie Australia’s insider trading laws.59 
 
In 2012, the majority of the High Court confirmed that the prohibition of insider trading exists 
to protect and maintain market integrity, stating that the laws were intended to ensure that: 
 
the securities market operates freely and fairly, with all participants having equal access 
to relevant information.60  
 
Thus, it appears to be certain that a market integrity rationale, premised on a need for both 
market fairness and market efficiency, has been generally accepted as the basis for 
prohibiting insider trading in Australia.61   
52 Ibid 410. 
53 R v Firns (2001) 19 ACLC 1495. 
54 Ibid 1501. 
55 Ibid 1503. 
56 Ibid 1502. 
57 R v Mansfield and Kizon (2011) 251 FLR 286. 
58 Ibid 296-298. 
59 Ibid 312. 
60 Mansfield and Kizon v R (2012) 87 ALJR 20, [45], referring to statements in the Campbell Inquiry Report, 
above n 44, 382, and the Griffiths Committee Report, above n 42, 17.  As discussed in Juliette Overland, 'What 
is Inside “Information”? Clarifying the Ambit of Insider Trading Laws' (2013) 31 Company and Securities Law 
Journal 189, 200-201. 
61 See for example, former ASIC Chairman, Tony D’Aloisio, ASIC’s Approach to Market Integrity (speech 
delivered at the Monash Centre for Regulatory Studies and Clayton Utz Luncheon Lecture, Melbourne, 11 
16 
 
                                                 
 
Many other jurisdictions also base their insider trading laws on market fairness and market 
efficiency rationales.  In the European Union, the ‘Market Abuse Directive’,62 which sets out 
the legal framework for insider trading and market misconduct to be adopted in local 
legislation by the Member States of the European Union, specifically states that: 
 
 An integrated and efficient financial market requires market integrity.  The smooth 
functioning of securities markets and public confidence in markets are prerequisites for 
economic growth and wealth.  Market abuse harms the integrity of financial markets and 
public confidence in securities, derivatives and benchmarks.63  
 
Market fairness and market efficiency rationales are also accepted as the basis for 
prohibiting insider trading in the United Kingdom,64 Germany,65 Singapore,66 and New 
Zealand.67 
 
By contrast, in the USA, although concepts of market fairness and market efficiencies have 
previously been considered as appropriate bases for prohibiting insider trading,68 the 
fiduciary duty and misappropriation rationales are now both accepted as the appropriate 
March 2010) 4; former ASIC Chairman Tony D’Aloisio, Insider Trading and Market Manipulation (speech 
delivered at the Supreme Court of Victoria Law Conference, Melbourne, 13 August 2010) 3-4; CAMAC, Insider 
Trading Discussion Paper, above n 12, [1.34]; CAMAC, Insider Trading Report (2003) [1.4]; Commonwealth 
Treasury, Insider Trading Position and Consultation Paper (2007) 1; Black, above n 36, 220; Lyon and du 
Plessis, above n 6, 9.    
62 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Criminal Sanctions 
for Market Abuse, OJ 2014 L 173.179. 
63 Ibid (1). 
64 UK Financial Services Authority, Consultation Paper 59, Market Abuse: A Draft Code of Market Conduct 
(2000), [1.6]. 
65 German Federal Ministry of Finance, Our Stock Exchange and Securities System (2000) 39. 
66 Monetary Authority of Singapore, Insider Trading: Consultation Document (2001). 
67 Walker and Simpson, above n 27, 388. 
68 See, for example, Securities and Exchange Commission v Texas Gulf Sulfphur Co, 401 F 2d 833 (1968); 
Shapiro v Merrill Lynch, 495 F 2D 228 (2d Cir 1974).  
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reasons for the prohibition.69  This approach can be traced to the origin and source of the 
prohibition of insider trading in the USA, which is founded on the ‘anti-fraud’ provisions of 
SEC Rule 10b5-1.70  
 
Additionally, under the laws of the USA, a distinction is made between the liability of ‘primary 
insiders’ and ‘secondary insiders’, which focuses on the person’s relationship with the 
relevant corporation and the source of the inside information.71  Thus, primary liability is 
more easily attributed to those who are likely to owe duties to the relevant corporations, 
which makes the concepts of fiduciary relationships and misappropriation more relevant in 
these circumstances.  Australian law no longer makes such a fine distinction between 
different types of insider and applies the insider trading prohibition to all who trade on 
material information which is not generally available.   
 
Limitations of the Current Literature 
 
While the literature on the global phenomenon of insider trading regulation is extensive, both 
internationally and within Australia, there is little writing and no comprehensive, critical 
analysis of the application of insider trading laws to corporations, especially under Australian 
law.   
 
69 Whincop, ‘Towards a Property Rights and Market Microstructural Theory of Insider Trading Regulation – The 
Case of Primary Securities Markets Transactions’ above n 35; Justin J Mannolini, ‘Insider Trading – The Need 
for Conceptual Clarity’ (1996) 14 Company and Securities Law Journal 151; Strudler and Orts, above n 40.   
70 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated Rule 10b-5 pursuant to s 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78a (1934)  and a variety of judicial decisions have interpreted that 
rule as prohibiting insider trading: Stephen M Bainbridge, ‘An Overview of Insider Trading Law and Policy: An 
Introduction to the Research Handbook on Insider Trading’ in Stephen M Bainbridge (ed), Research Handbook 
on Insider Trading (Edward Elgar, 2013) 1-2. 
71 Dirks v Securities and Exchange Commission, 463 US 646 (1983); United States v O’Hagan, 521 US 642 
(1997); Marc I Steinberg, 'Insider Trading: A Comparative Perspective' (2003) 37(1) The International Lawyer 
153, 156. 
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Much of the international literature is jurisprudential and doctrinal, considering the nature of 
the prohibition of insider trading and whether it is appropriate to criminalise such conduct.  
Manne72 took the view that insider trading actually allows economic efficiencies, by moving 
the price of securities towards their real value more quickly.  This position was further 
advanced by others, such as Fama, who argued that share prices must reflect all available 
information in order that there be an efficient market,73 Leland, who further advanced the 
proposition that the prohibition of insider trading decreases the flow of information,74 and 
Estrada, who considered that securities prices are more likely to be accurate when insider 
trading is permitted.75  All are of the view that, if insiders can trade on inside information, 
price signaling will occur, causing the relevant share price to move more quickly towards 
equilibrium, creating a more accurate and efficient securities market.76   Manne has also 
argued that insider trading rewards innovation by allowing entrepreneurs to make additional 
profits on top of their ordinary salary and bonus arrangements.77  By contrast, Bainbridge 
argues that insider trading should be prohibited in order to properly protect the property 
rights in inside information,78 and also notes that much of the jurisprudence concerning 
insider trading relates to the laws of the USA, which was the first jurisdiction to prohibit 
insider trading, and the one with the largest capital markets in the world.79 Beny claims that 
securities markets are more liquid in jurisdictions where insider trading laws are more 
72 Henry G Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (The Free Press, 1966); Henry G Manne, ‘In Defence 
of Insider Trading’ (1966) 43 Harvard Business Review 113; Henry G Manne, ‘Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual 
Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark’ (2005) 31 Journal of Corporations Law 167. 
73 Fama, above n 33. 
74 Hayne E Leland, ‘Insider Trading: Should It be Prohibited?’ (1992) 100 Journal of Political Economy 859. 
75 Javier Estrada, ‘Insider Trading: Regulation, Deregulation and Taxation’ (1994) 5 Swiss Review of Business 
Law 209. 
76 Semaan, Freeman and Adams, above n 5, 225.   
77 Henry G Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, above n 72, 131; Henry G Manne, ‘Entrepreneurship, 
Compensation, and the Corporation’, in Stephen M Bainbridge (ed), Research Handbook on Insider Trading 
(Edward Elgar, 2013) 67. 
78 Bainbridge, above n 39; Stephen M Bainbridge, ‘Regulating Insider Trading in the Post-Fiduciary Duty Era: 
Equal Access or Property Rights?’ in Stephen M Bainbridge (ed), Research Handbook on Insider Trading 
(Edward Elgar, 2013) 80. 
79 Bainbridge, above n 70, 1. 
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stringent,80 whereas Bhattacharya and Daouk state that the mere adoption of insider trading 
laws has no effect on securities markets and the cost of equity, but the cost of equity 
decreases when insider trading enforcement action is taken.81   
 
Significantly, while there is an extensive body of international literature on various aspects of 
insider trading, there is an absence of international research on the application of insider 
trading laws to corporations, other than in the context of the Chinese Wall defence, as later 
discussed. 
 
As this thesis will focus primarily on the Australian legal position, the Australian literature 
must be considered.  A number of government bodies and committees have undertaken 
reviews of insider trading laws and the appropriate model of regulation for Australia.  The 
first such review was undertaken in the early 1970s by the Senate Select Committee on 
Securities and Exchange, which became known as the ‘Rae Committee’ after its chair, the 
Hon Peter Elliot Rae AO, and in 1974 it produced the first government commissioned-report 
into trading by insiders  in Australia.82  Following the collapse of the boom in mining shares, 
the Committee had been appointed to enquire into the proposed establishment of a National 
Securities Commission and the ‘functions necessary for such a commission to enable it to 
act speedily and efficiently against manipulation of prices, insider trading and such other 
improper or injurious practices.’83  This report was highly critical of the extent of securities 
trading by insiders in Australia and, in 1975, its recommendations resulted in the adoption of 
amendments to the existing State Securities Industry Acts, which included the first statutory 
prohibition of insider trading in Australia.  Under this regime, a person who had acquired 
specific information relating to a corporation, as a result of their association with the 
80 Beny, above n 1; Laura Nyantung Beny, ‘Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative 
Evidence’ (2005) 7 American Law and Economics Review 144.  
81 Bhattacharya and Daouk, above n 1. 
82 Senate Select Committee on Securities and Exchange, Parliament of Australia, Australian Securities Markets 
and Their Regulation (1974). 
83 Ibid v. 
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corporation, was prohibited from acting on that information to benefit themself or someone 
else.84 
 
The Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System, also referred to as the 
‘Campbell Inquiry’, was established in 1979 in order to undertake a broad review of the 
Australian financial system and banking regulation.85  This Committee also indirectly 
considered the issue of insider trading in Australia, confirming the prevailing view that insider 
trading should be prohibited in order to ensure market fairness and confidence.86  The 
Commonwealth Government enacted the Securities Industry Act 1980 (Cth), which 
contained an amended prohibition of insider trading in s 128, prohibiting dealing in the 
securities of a corporation if a person possessed material information that was not generally 
available as a result of a connection with the corporation.    
 
In 1986, the then National Companies and Securities Commission commissioned Canadian 
academic, Professor Philip Anisman, to undertake a review in order to determine whether 
reform to the current system of insider trading regulation was needed.  The resulting report87 
contained two primary conclusions relating to insider trading – that it was essentially a 
problem of non-disclosure requiring mandatory reporting by listed corporations, and that the 
requirement for a connection with the relevant corporation to which the inside information 
related hampered the effective regulation of insider trading.88   However, no immediate 
action was taken to incorporate these recommendations. 
 
Following the stock market crash in October 1987, the Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, known also as the  ‘Griffiths Committee’ after its chair, the Hon Alan 
84 See, for example, s 75A of the Securities Industry Act 1970 (NSW), later replaced by s 112 of the Securities 
Industry Act 1975 (NSW), s 112 of the Securities Industry Act 1975 (Vic) and s 112 of the Securities Industry 
Act 1975 (Qld). 
85 Campbell Inquiry Report, above n 44 (the Inquiry was chaired by Sir Keith Campbell). 
86 Ibid [21.123]. 
87 Philip Anisman, Insider Trading Legislation for Australia: An Outline of the Issues and Alternatives (National 
Companies and Securities Commission, 1986). 
88 Lyon and du Plessis, above n 6, 7.  
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Griffiths, conducted an inquiry into ‘the adequacy of existing legislative controls over insider 
trading and other forms of market manipulation’,89 and the resulting report released in 1989 
confirmed the widespread nature of insider trading in Australia and proposed further 
legislative reform, with a series of amendments made to the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth).  
One of the most notable reforms resulting from the recommendations of the Griffiths 
Committee was the removal of the requirement for a ‘person connection’ in insider trading 
laws, and the adoption instead of an ‘information connection’.  This meant that any person in 
possession of inside information, whether they had a connection with the relevant 
corporation or not, was subject to the same prohibition of insider trading.90  Statutory 
definitions for the terms ‘generally available’ information and ‘material’ information were also 
recommended and incorporated into the legislation at this time.91 
 
Acting on its own initiative, the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (‘CAMAC’) - 
previously known as the Company and Securities Advisory Committee - instigated a review 
of Australian insider trading laws in 2001, resulting in the release of a detailed report in 2003 
which contained recommendations for a further round of legislative amendments,92 but those 
recommendations have not yet been implemented.93  In 2007, the Commonwealth Treasury 
released its own Insider Trading Position and Consultation Paper, setting out the then 
Government’s position in relation to CAMAC’s recommendations and seeking further public 
input – the Commonwealth Treasury indicated that it accepted the majority of CAMAC’s 
89 Griffiths Committee Report, above n 42, xi.  
90 Ibid xv.  This was recommendation two in the Griffiths Committee Report. 
91 Lyon and du Plessis, above n 6, 8. 
92 CAMAC, Insider Trading Report, above n 61. 
93 The primary reforms recommended by CAMAC included restricting the on-selling exemption for underwriters; 
repealing the exemption for external administrators; clarifying the relevant time for liability when trading through 
an intermediary; extending the Chinese Wall defence to the procuring of trading; permitting bid consortium 
members to acquire financial products for the consortium under the ‘own intentions’ exemption; protecting 
uninformed procured persons from civil liability; extending the ‘equal information’ defence to civil proceedings; 
permitting the range of civil claimants to be extended; amending the test of ‘generally available’ information; 
permitting the exercise of physical delivery option rights: CAMAC, Insider Trading Report, above n 61.    
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recommendations but sought public submissions on a number of issues,94 although no 
further action was then taken.  Later, in 2009, in response to a request from the then Federal 
Minister for Superannuation and Corporate Law for advice on the effect of certain practices 
on the integrity of the Australian financial markets,95 CAMAC released a report on ‘Aspects 
of Market Integrity’.96  This report considered insider trading issues in the context of the 
market practices under review but made no recommendations for the reform of insider 
trading laws.   
 
Each of these various reviews and reports addressed insider trading in the context of the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of the relevant laws but, with the exception of the 
CAMAC Insider Trading Report, did not specifically consider the liability of corporations for 
insider trading.  CAMAC did consider whether identified complexities associated with the 
Chinese Wall defence could be alleviated by amending the law so that only individuals would 
be subject to the prohibition of insider trading,97 but ultimately CAMAC determined that such 
an amendment was not necessary or appropriate.98   
 
The first major review of Australian insider trading laws which was not commissioned or 
conducted by a government body or organisation was undertaken by Tomasic in 1991.99  
94 Issues on which public submissions were sought included whether the on-selling exemption for underwriters 
should be restricted; whether the exemption for external underwriters should be repealed; the manner in which 
the insider trading prohibition should apply to the exercise of options; whether the prohibition should apply to an 
entity making an individual securities placement; the manner in which the prohibition should apply to an issuer 
conducting a share buy-back; whether the prohibition should apply to information which is not required to be 
disclosed; and whether the test of ‘generally available’ information should be amended:  Commonwealth 
Treasury, Insider Trading Position and Consultation Paper (2007).  
95 The market practices which CAMAC was requested to consider were: the entry of directors into margin loans 
over shares in their own corporations; trading by directors during ‘black-out’ periods; the spreading of false or 
misleading information; and the corporate briefing of analysts. 
96 CAMAC, Aspects of Market Integrity Report (2009). 
97 CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper, above n 12, [1.45]-[1.56]. 
98 CAMAC, Insider Trading Report, above n 61, [3.2].  This issue will be returned to in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
99 Roman Tomasic (with the assistance of Brendan Pentony), Casino Capitalism? Insider Trading in Australia 
(Australian Institute of Criminology,1991).  
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This research, building upon an existing body of work in this area,100 was both empirical and 
qualitative, involving significant research into the attitudes and conduct of members of the 
securities industry and Tomasic’s work is widely referenced within the existing Australian 
literature on insider trading.  While very comprehensive in scope, the issue of the liability of 
corporations for insider trading is addressed primarily in the context of a consideration of the 
Chinese Wall defence available to corporations, and not in relation to the general application 
of insider trading laws to corporations.   
 
Since Tomasic’s contribution, insider trading has become a popular topic for Australian 
academic writers – indeed, the comment has been made that ‘there are many more journal 
articles discussing what [insider trading] should be than reported cases of what it is.’101  
However, Australian literature on insider trading largely focuses on a number of key areas: 
(i) the appropriateness and effectiveness of the prohibition of insider trading; (ii) the nature of 
the elements of the insider trading offence, including proposed reformulations of insider 
trading laws; and (iii) the difficulties in successfully enforcing insider trading laws and 
prosecuting suspected insider traders. 
 
In relation to the appropriateness and effectiveness of the insider trading prohibition, writers 
such as Semaan, Freeman and Adams102 adopt some of the arguments espoused by 
Manne and Fama noted above, and take the view that Australia has too readily embraced 
100 See, for example, Roman Tomasic and Brendan Pentony, ‘Crime and Opportunity in the Securities Markets: 
The Case of Insider Trading in Australia’ (1987) 7 Company and Securities Law Journal 186; Roman Tomasic 
and Brendan Pentony, ‘The Prosecution of Insider Trading: Obstacles to Enforcement’ (1989) 22 Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 65; Roman Tomasic and Brendan Pentony, ‘The Extent of Insider 
Trading in Australia: A Socio-Legal Account’ (1990) 23 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 
125; Roman Tomasic, ‘Corporate Crime: Making the Law More Credible’ (1990) 8 Company and Securities 
Law Journal 369; Roman Tomasic, ‘Insider Trading Law Reform in Australia’ (1991) 9 Company and Securities 
Law Journal 12; Roman Tomasic, Chinese Walls, Legal Principle and Commercial Reality in Multi-Service 
Professional Firms (Queensland University of Technology, 1991). 
101 Michael Gething, ‘Insider Trading Enforcement: Where Are We Now and Where Do We Go From Here?’ 
(1998) 16 Company and Securities Law Journal 607.  This comment was cited and endorsed by Mason J of the 
New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Firns (2001) 38 ACSR 223, 234.     
102 Semaan, Freeman and Adams, above n 5, 222. 
24 
 
                                                 
the prohibition of insider trading, and that the resulting system of regulation actually operates 
to reduce, rather than promote, market efficiency.  Some, such as Whincop,103 have taken 
this position even further, arguing that the existence of insider trading is fundamental to 
achieving accurate price setting in securities markets.   However, writers such as Kendall104 
argue that prohibiting insider trading leads to greater market participation by removing 
obstacles to investment and Black notes that the courts have strenuously rejected the notion 
that insider trading is a ‘victimless crime’.105 
 
The existence of a large body of work on the nature of the elements of the insider trading 
offence, and proposed reformulations of insider trading laws, is evidenced by the varied 
writings of Black,106 Mannolini,107 Jacobs,108 North,109 Kendall and Walker,110 and 
O’Connell.111  Each of these writers addresses a variety of issues relevant to the Australian 
insider trading prohibition, but without a particular focus on the application of the relevant 
laws to corporations. 
103 Whincop, ‘The Political Economy of Corporate Law Reform in Australia’, above n 35; Whincop, ‘Towards a 
Property Rights and Market Microstructural Theory of Insider Trading Regulation – The Case of Primary 
Securities Markets Transactions’, above n 35. 
104 Keith Kendall, ‘The Need to Prohibit Insider Trading’ (2008) 25 Law in Context 106. 
105 Ashley Black, ‘Insider Trading and Market Misconduct’ (2011) 29 Company and Securities Law Journal 313, 
318. 
106 Ibid; Black, above n 36; Ashley Black, ‘Policies in the Regulation of Insider Trading and the Scope of 
Section 128 of the Securities Industry Code’ (1988) 16 Melbourne University Law Review 663. 
107 Mannolini, above n 69.  
108 Adam Jacobs, ‘Time is Money: Insider Trading from a Globalisation Perspective’ (2005) 23 Company and 
Securities Law Journal 231. 
109 Gil North, ‘The Insider Trading Generally Available and Materiality Carve-outs: Are They Achieving Their 
Aims?’ (2009) 27 Company and Securities Law Journal 234; Gil North, ‘The Australian Insider Trading Regime: 
Workable or Hopelessly Complex?’ (2009) 27 Company and Securities Law Journal 310. 
110 Keith Kendall and Gordon Walker, ‘Insider Trading in Australia and New Zealand: Information that is 
Generally Available’ (2006) 24 Company and Securities Law Journal 343; Keith Kendall and Gordon Walker, 
‘Insider Trading in Australia’ in Stephen M Bainbridge (ed), Research Handbook on Insider Trading (Edward 
Elgar, 2013) 365. 
111 Ann O’Connell, ‘Are We There Yet? The Journey of the Insider Trading Provisions’ (2008) 26 Company and 
Securities Law Journal 460.  
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Debate on the difficulties in enforcing insider trading laws and successfully prosecuting 
suspected insider traders has lead to much writing on the topic of a civil penalty regime for 
insider trading, endorsed by writers such as Rubenstein112 and Goldwasser,113 but criticized 
by Qu.114  Other writers, such as Gething115 and Duffy,116 focus their research on the 
practical reasons for the difficulties in successfully enforcing and prosecuting insider trading 
laws.   
 
While almost all corporate law textbooks devote a chapter, or part of a chapter, to the topic 
of insider trading regulation,117 most only address the application of insider trading laws to 
corporations in a description of the operation of the Chinese Wall defence, and only a few 
analyse the attribution of the elements of the offence to corporations.118  Lyon and du 
112 Simon Rubenstein, ‘The Regulation and Prosecution of Insider Trading in Australia: Towards Civil Penalty 
Sanctions for Insider Trading’ (2002) 20 Company and Securities Law Journal 89. 
113 Vivien Goldwasser, ‘CLERP 6 – Implications and Ramifications for the Regulation of Australian Financial 
Markets’ (1999) 17 Company and Securities Law Journal 206. 
114 Charles Zhen Qu, ‘The Efficacy of Insider Trading Civil Liability Regime in the Corporations Act’ (2002) 14 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 161. 
115 Gething, above n 101. 
116 Michael J Duffy, ‘Insider Trading: Addressing the Continuing Problems of Proof’ (2009) 23 Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 149. 
117 See, for example, Robert P Austin and Ian M Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 16th ed, 2014) [9.600]; Philip Lipton, Abe Herzberg and Michelle Welsh, Understanding Company 
Law (Lawbook, 17th ed, 2014) chapter 19; Roman Tomasic, Stephen Bottomley and Rob McQueen, 
Corporations Law in Australia (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) chapter 20; Jason Harris, Anil Hargovan and 
Michael Adams, Australian Corporate Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2014) chapter 21; Russell Hinchy 
and Peter McDermott, Company Law (Pearson, 2nd ed, 2009) chapter 15; Paul Redmond, Company and 
Securities Law: Commentary and Materials (Thomson Reuters, 5th ed, 2009) chapter 15; Paul Redmond, 
Company and Financial Markets Law (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2013) chapter 11; Tony Ciro and Christopher 
Symes, Corporations Law in Principle (Thomson Reuters, 9th ed, 2012) chapter 22; Robert Baxt, Ashley Black 
and Pamela Hanrahan, Securities and Financial Services Law, (LexisNexis, 8th ed, 2012), chapter 17; J P 
Hambrook, ‘Market Misconduct and Offences’ in LexisNexis, Australian Corporations Law Principles and 
Practice [7.13.0145].  
118 See, for example, Austin and Ramsay, above n 117, [9.600]; J P Hambrook, above n 117, [7.13.0145]. 
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Plessis119 have written the only Australian monograph which focuses solely on insider 
trading laws.  This monograph comprehensively describes insider trading cases, the history 
and application of the relevant legislative provisions, and the developments which have 
occurred in this area of the law.  Due to the authors’ focus on all aspects of Australian 
insider trading laws, the analysis of the liability of corporations for insider trading is thorough 
but necessarily concise.  The authors’ discussion of the attribution of the elements of the 
insider trading offence to corporations and the Chinese Wall defence will be addressed 
throughout this thesis.   
   
It is therefore apparent that there is very little literature concerning corporate criminal liability 
for insider trading.  Qu has considered the application of insider trading laws to corporations, 
but focuses only on civil liability.120 The topic of the Chinese Wall defence to insider trading 
is one of the few topics relevant to the application of insider trading laws to corporations 
which has been the subject of a body of research.  Internationally, writers such as Lipton and 
Mazur121 and Poser122 have focused on the availability of the Chinese Wall defence for 
corporations, particularly in relation to its origins and the difficulties associated with the 
practical usage of such arrangements within large organisations.  These works are of 
particular relevance to this thesis and will be considered in detail in chapter 6.  Goldwasser 
has also undertaken a study of the local operation of the Chinese Wall defence,123 which is 
currently the most detailed of its kind in Australia.  As noted above, Tomasic’s research has 
119 Lyon and du Plessis, above n 6.  
120 Charles Zhen Qu, ‘How Statutory Civil Liability is Attributed to a Company: An Australian Perspective 
Focusing on Civil Liability for Insider Trading by Companies’ (2006) 32 Monash Law Review 177.  Notably, this 
article predates the decision in ASIC v Citigroup (2007)160 FCR 35. 
121 Martin Lipton and Robert B Mazur, ‘The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflicts Problems of Securities Firms’ 
(1975) 50 New York University Law Review 459.  
122 Norman Poser, ‘Conflicts of Interest Within Securities Firms’ (1990) 16 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 
111; Norman Poser, ‘Chinese Wall or Emperor's New Clothes? Regulating Conflicts of Interest of Securities 
Firms in the U.S. and the U.K.’ (1988) 9 Michigan Journal of International Law 91.   
123 Vivien Goldwasser, ‘Recent Developments in the Regulation of Chinese Walls and Business Ethics – In 
Search of a Remedy for a Problem That Persists’ (1993) 11 Company and Securities Law Journal 227. 
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also examined Chinese Walls in an Australian context.124  Other writers, such as Black125 
and Ziegelaar,126 address the Chinese Wall defence briefly within larger works on insider 
trading, which focus primarily on wider issues not relating solely to the application of the 
insider trading prohibition to corporations.  Additionally, while there is also a large body of 
writing about the use of Chinese Walls in other contexts – for example, for the avoidance of 
conflicts of interest within professional service organisations, such as law firms and 
accounting firms127 - those works are not necessarily of direct relevance to insider trading 
and corporations.   
 
Further, while a number of these works on the Chinese Wall defence and insider trading 
address issues which are relevant to the topic to be explored by this thesis,128 these works 
do not address other important topics which must also be examined to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the application of insider trading laws to corporations.  For 
example, these works do not consider the manner in which corporations can be regarded as 
having possession of relevant inside information, the manner in which corporations may be 
regarded as having the necessary knowledge that certain information is inside information, 
or the manner in which corporations may be regarded as having engaged in the prohibited 
124 Tomasic, Chinese Walls, Legal Principle and Commercial Reality in Multi-Service Professional Firms, above 
n 100. 
125 Black, above n 36. 
126 Michael Ziegelaar, ‘Insider Trading Law in Australia’ in Gordon Walker, Brent Fisse and Ian Ramsay (eds), 
Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand (Lawbook, 2nd ed,1998) 554. 
127 See, for example, Jonathan Middleburgh, ‘Chinese Walls in the Law Firm: Locked Door or Open Sesame?’ 
(1993) 1 Journal of Financial Crime 171; Lee Aitken, ‘Chinese Walls and Conflicts of Interest’ (1992) 18 
Monash University Law Review 91; Charles Hollander and Simon Salzedo, Conflicts of Interest and Chinese 
Walls (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000); Sandra Goubran, ‘Conflicts of Duty: The Perennial Lawyers' Tale’ (2006) 30 
Melbourne University Law Review 88; Adrian Evans, ‘The Business of Conflicts’ (2000) 74 Law Institute 
Journal 23;  Cosmas Moisidis, ‘Conflicts of Interest’ (2000) 74 Law Institute Journal 61; Margaret Castles, 
‘Possibilities for Multidisciplinary Collaboration in Clinical Practice: Practical Ethical Implications for Lawyers 
and Clients’ (2008) 34 Monash University Law Review 116; Philip Bender, ‘Ethics in Law: Lawyers' 
Responsibility and Accountability in Australia’ (2001) 20 University of Tasmania Law Review 246. 
128 These works will be reviewed and analysed within chapter 6 of this thesis, which explores the application of 
the Chinese Wall defence for corporations.  
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conduct.  For these reasons, there still remains a significant gap in the literature and 
knowledge on this topic, which is not addressed by these existing pieces of research.   
 
As insider trading is a criminal offence, it is also necessary to consider the literature which 
addresses the criminal liability of corporations.  The general law has developed sets of rules 
for determining the circumstances in which criminal liability can be imposed on corporations, 
most commonly through what has become known as ‘organic theory’ or the ‘identification 
doctrine’, or through the adoption of principles of vicarious liability.  Separately, statute law 
has addressed the issue of corporate criminal liability by imposing various models of liability, 
often through codified acts.129  Some of the earliest writing on the issue of corporate criminal 
liability was by Winn130 and Wolff,131 and the means by which corporations may be liable for 
criminal offences has continued to be the subject of much academic research, both local132 
and international.133  In Australia, Fisse and Braithwaite134 have written extensively on 
129 See, for example, the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
130 C R N Winn, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Corporations’ (1929) 3 Cambridge Law Journal 398. 
131 Martin Wolff, ‘On the Nature of Legal Persons’ (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review 494. 
132  See, for example, Ross Grantham, ‘Attributing Responsibility to Corporate Entities: A Doctrinal Approach’ 
(2001) 19 Company and Securities Law Journal 168; Ross Grantham, ‘Corporate Knowledge: Identification or 
Attribution’ (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 732; Neil Andrews, ‘Bad Company? The Corporate Form in an 
Uncertain Law’ (1998) 19 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 39; Simon Chesterman, ‘The Corporate Veil, 
Crime and Punishment’ (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 1064; Jennifer Hill and Ronald Harmer, 
‘Criminal Liability of Corporations – Australia’ in H De Doelder and K Tiedemann (eds), Criminal Liability of 
Corporations (Kluwer Law International, 1994) 71; Brent Fisse, ‘The Attribution of Criminal Liability to 
Corporations: A Statutory Model’ (1991) 13 Sydney Law Review 277; Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, ‘The 
Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability’ (1988) 11 
Sydney Law Review 468; Lim Win Ts’ai, ‘Corporations and the Devil’s Dictionary: The Problem of Individual 
Responsibility for Corporate Crimes’ (1990) 12 Sydney Law Review 311 .  
133 See, for example, G R Sullivan, ‘The Attribution of Culpability to Limited Companies’ (1996) 55 Cambridge 
Law Journal 515; Eric Colvin, ‘Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability’ (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum 1; 
John C Coffee, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility’ in Sanford H Kadish (ed), Encyclopedia of Crime and 
Justice (Free Press,1983) 253; John C Coffee, ‘No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry 
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment’ (1981) 79 Michigan Law Review 386; John C Coffee, ‘Corporate 
Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions’ (1980) American 
Criminal Law Review 419; James Gobert, ‘Corporate Criminality: Four Models of Fault’ (1994) 14 Legal Studies 
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various aspects of corporate criminal responsibility, and Clough and Mulhern135 have 
produced useful commentary on issues relevant to general corporate criminal liability under 
Australian law, pursuant to both statutory and general law.  Odgers136 has described and 
analysed the application of the provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and, in 
particular, those sections specifically relating to corporate criminal responsibility.  However, it 
is important to note that there has not, to date, been any detailed academic review of the 
specific application of principles of corporate criminality, under the general law or statute, to 
the liability of corporations for insider trading. 
 
Thus, as is demonstrated above, a significant body of research has been dedicated to 
exploring a variety of topics concerning insider trading, both internationally and within 
Australia.  However, although many aspects of insider trading regulation have been 
addressed and examined through such writing, there has to date been no fully 
comprehensive, critical analysis of the application of insider trading laws to corporations, 
especially under Australia law.  Further, while concepts of corporate criminal liability are 
extensively addressed in many important works, the issue of corporate criminal liability for 
insider trading remains relatively unexplored.  The purpose of this thesis is to address these 
gaps in the literature and to make a unique and novel contribution on this issue of the 
criminal liability of corporations for insider trading in Australia.  It will be demonstrated in this 
thesis that significant reform is needed in the area of corporate criminal liability for insider 
trading because of the great uncertainty which arises in the application of Australian insider 
trading laws to corporations, and because the current operation of these laws does not truly 
reflect the accepted rationale for prohibiting insider trading in Australia and, as a result, 
393; James Gobert, ‘Corporate Criminality: New Crimes for the Times’ [1994] Criminal Law Review 722; 
Meaghan Wilkinson, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability – The Move Towards Recognising Genuine Corporate Fault’ 
(2003) 9 Canterbury Law Review 142; Eilis Ferran, ‘Corporate Attribution and the Directing Mind and Will’ 
(2011) 127 Law Quarterly Review 239.  
134 See, for example, Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); Fisse and Braithwaite, above n 132; Fisse, above n 132. 
135 Jonathan Clough and Carmel Mulhern, The Prosecution of Corporations (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
136 Stephen Odgers, Principles of Federal Criminal Law (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2015). 
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imposes significant direct and indirect costs on corporations, and therefore all market 
participants. 
 
Methodology 
 
Due to the nature of the thesis topic, a primarily doctrinal methodology has been utilised, 
which focuses on the reading and analysis of primary materials (legislation and case law) 
and secondary materials (journal articles, monographs and the reports of government 
agencies and law reform bodies).   
 
Doctrinal legal research generally contains an exposition of legal rules, an analysis of those 
rules, an explanation of areas of difficulty and predictions of future developments.137  
However, doctrinal legal research is not merely a matter of identifying applicable legislation 
and relevant cases and making comments about the state of the law.  It also requires an 
understanding of the relevant social context and interpretation.138  Thus, as a primary 
purpose of this thesis is to consider not only what the law is, but whether it is appropriate 
and requires amendment, it has also been necessary to adopt, in part, a comparative 
approach, to consider the nature of the laws of other jurisdictions and the reasons for 
differences between the positions adopted in those jurisdictions and those existing under 
Australian law.  Additionally, it has also been relevant and appropriate to consider the 
underlying policy reasons giving rise to the laws themselves, in order to determine if they are 
being appropriately reflected in the state of the legislation, or if amendment is required to 
better reflect the demonstrated legislative intention and to correct the identified ‘mischief’ 
which the laws are intended to remedy. 
 
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters.  In this chapter I have introduced the thesis 
topic, set out the purpose and contribution of my thesis, discussed the rationale for the 
prohibition of insider trading, demonstrated the limitations of the current literature and 
137 Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (Lawbook, 3rd ed, 2010) 9. 
138 Michael McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 
22. 
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described the methodology adopted for my research.  In the subsequent chapters I will 
provide the necessary regulatory background in order to understand the operation of 
Australian insider trading laws, the manner in which insider trading laws currently apply to 
corporations in Australia, and the challenges in attributing criminal liability to corporations.  I 
will then examine the specific elements of the insider trading offence, and relevant defences, 
in order to demonstrate the manner in which they are currently attributed and applied to 
corporations, and to analyse the problems and difficulties which arise in that context.  I will 
then propose amendments and reforms to the law, so that insider trading laws can be better 
applied to corporations, in a manner consistent with the market integrity rationale for 
prohibiting insider trading, and to ensure that Australian law provides an effective regulatory 
model within the international sphere.                   
 
In chapter 2, I will provide an overview of the key features of Australian insider trading laws, 
describing and analysing the elements of the insider trading offence – that a person 
possesses certain information; that the information is not generally available; that if the 
information were generally available, it would be material; that the person knows, or ought 
reasonably to know, that the information is not generally available and that, if it were, it 
would be likely to be material; and the person trades in relevant financial products, procures 
another person to engage in such trading, or communicates the information to another 
person likely to do so.  This chapter will provide an appropriate background and necessary 
context for the further chapters of the thesis. 
   
The manner in which insider trading laws apply generally to corporations will be considered 
in chapter 3.  The manner in which a corporation, as a legal person, is caught by the insider 
trading prohibition will be discussed, and international comparisons will be made, looking at 
whether insider trading laws apply to corporations in other jurisdictions.  The historical and 
theoretical basis for applying insider trading laws to corporations will be reviewed, as will the 
Australian cases which have focused on insider trading issues concerning corporations.  
This chapter will conclude with a consideration of the reasons why corporations should 
remain subject to the prohibition of insider trading.  
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Then, since the act of engaging in insider trading is a criminal offence, chapter 4 will review 
theories of corporate criminal responsibility and consider the manner in which corporations 
can be found to be liable for crimes.  This chapter will consider the various general law and 
statutory rules which have been developed in order to apply principles of criminal liability to 
corporations - vicarious liability, direct liability through the identification doctrine, the 
aggregation doctrine, organisational fault, and discuss the most appropriate model for 
corporate criminal liability for insider trading in Australia.   
 
Chapter 5 will examine the specific elements of the insider trading offence and the manner in 
which they can be attributed to corporations – possessing inside information (the 
‘possession element’), having the relevant knowledge that the information is inside 
information (the ‘knowledge element’) and engaging in the conduct of trading, or the 
procuring of trading, in relevant financial products, or tipping (the ‘trading element’).  In 
particular, it will be demonstrated in this chapter that there are a number of different statutory 
and general law mechanisms that can be used to attribute these elements to corporations 
and that the various, conflicting tests which are relevant to each mechanism create 
significant uncertainty when attempting to determine when a corporation engages in insider 
trading, thus necessitating reform of Australia’s insider trading laws. 
 
Then, chapter 6 will explore the application of the Chinese Wall defence to insider trading, 
which can be used by a corporation to avoid liability for insider trading in some 
circumstances.  This chapter will consider the requirements for an effective Chinese Wall 
and identify and discuss the difficulties in using and relying upon this defence under 
Australian law, which give rise to additional uncertainty in relation to corporate liability for 
insider trading. 
   
Having then examined the application of insider trading laws to corporations throughout the 
preceding chapters of this thesis, chapter 7 will set out proposals for law reform in this area 
and suggested legislative amendments to give effect to those proposals – the proposed 
reforms will include the express exclusion of the general law from the statutory regime 
applying insider trading laws to corporations, the development of a new set of statutory 
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provisions to apply insider trading laws to corporations, and the redrafting of the Chinese 
Wall defence. These proposals will respond to the problems and difficulties which have been 
identified, having regard to the underlying rationale for the insider trading prohibition under 
Australian law, the need for clarity and certainty in this area, and a desire to develop a 
regulatory model which is of international significance, allowing Australia’s securities 
markets to remain globally competitive. 
 
The thesis also contains three Appendices, in order to provide an easy means of reference 
for the reader.  The first contains extracts from the current Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), 
reproducing the prohibition of insider trading and related sections; the second contains 
legislative extracts from other jurisdictions referred to throughout this thesis; and the third 
lists the journal articles which I have published during my candidature. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN AUSTRALIA 
 
While this thesis focuses on the application of insider trading laws to corporations, in order to 
undertake such a review it is necessary to first consider the key features of the Australian 
insider trading regulatory regime, so that the nature and scope of the relevant laws can be 
clearly understood.  This chapter will provide an overview and analysis of the primary 
elements of Australian insider trading laws, in order to provide the necessary background 
and context for the central issues and arguments to be advanced throughout this thesis.   
 
The Key Features of Australian Insider Trading Laws 
 
It was noted by Jacobson J in ASIC v Citigroup1 that the statutory offence of insider trading 
was first created in Australia under the uniform Securities Industry Acts,2 which provided that 
insider trading occurred: 
 
where a person, through his or her association with a corporation or body, had 
“knowledge of specific information relating to the corporation” and acted on that 
information to the benefit of himself or herself or to enable another person to gain an 
advantage by using that information.3 
 
Despite the passage of 40 years since insider trading was first prohibited under statute in 
Australia, the legislative framework which regulates insider trading is, unfortunately, 
regarded as particularly complex and unclear.4  Indeed, when discussing the complexity of 
1 (2007)160 FCR 35. 
2 As noted in chapter 1, insider trading was first prohibited by statute in Australia under amendments made in 
1975 to the uniform Securities Industry Acts previously adopted by four States: Securities Industry Act 1970 
(Qld); Securities Industry Act 1970 (NSW); Securities Industry Act 1970 (WA); Securities Industry Act 1970 
(Vic). 
3 (2007)160 FCR 35,104. 
4 See, for example, Michael Whincop, ‘Towards a Property Rights and Market Microstructural Theory of Insider 
Trading Regulation – The Case of Primary Securities Markets Transactions’ (1996) 7 Journal of Banking and 
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the insider trading regulatory regime, many commentators5 have quoted Rolfe J’s critical 
comments in Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Trading Co (Canberra) Ltd:6 
 
  [I]t is a matter of concern that legislative provisions, which create serious criminal offences 
… should provide not only difficulties of interpretation because of the language used, but 
because of apparent internal inconsistencies.  I would respectfully suggest that 
reconsideration be given to these provisions.  They are intended to have a beneficial 
commercial effect.  It is unfortunate that they should be couched in language which is 
difficult of understanding and application.7  
  
These sentiments were echoed by McLure P of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia in 
R v Mansfield and Kizon:8 
 
The insider trading provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ... are devilishly difficult 
to construe.  It is difficult to discern an entirely coherent, internally consistent statutory 
framework.  Thus, it is difficult to be entirely confident as to their proper construction.9  
 
The present prohibition of insider trading is contained in s 1043A(1) of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) (the ‘Corporations Act’), which provides as follows: 
 
Finance Law and Practice 212; Roman Tomasic, ‘Corporate Crime: Making the Law More Credible’ (1990) 8 
Company and Securities Law Journal 369, 380. 
5 See, for example, Robert P Austin and Ian M Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 16th ed, 2014) [9.640]; Gil North, ‘The Australian Insider Trading Regime: Workable or Hopelessly 
Complex?’ (2009) 27 Company and Securities Law Journal 310, 311; Adam Jacobs, ‘Time is Money: Insider 
Trading from a Globalisation Perspective’ (2005) 23 Company and Securities Law Journal 231, 236; Simon 
Rubenstein, ‘The Regulation and Prosecution of Insider Trading in Australia: Towards Civil Penalty Sanctions 
for Insider Trading’ (2002) 20 Company and Securities Law Journal 89, 105.  
6 (1996) 20 ACSR 649. 
7 Ibid 658. 
8 (2011) 251 FLR 286. 
9 Ibid 289. As discussed in Juliette Overland, 'What is Inside “Information”? Clarifying the Ambit of Insider 
Trading Laws' (2013) 31 Company and Securities Law Journal 189, 190. 
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Subject to this subsection, if:  
 
(a) a person (the insider) possesses inside information; and  
 
(b) the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the matters specified in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of inside information in section 1042A are 
satisfied in relation to the information; 
 
the insider must not (whether as principal or agent):  
 
(c) apply for, acquire or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products, or enter into an 
agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products; or 
 
(d) procure another person to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial 
products, or enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant 
Division 3 financial products. 
 
There is also an additional prohibition in s 1043A(2) of the Corporations Act, which prohibits 
tipping and which provides that an insider must not: 
 
directly or indirectly, communicate the information, or cause the information to be 
communicated, to another person if the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that 
the other person would or would be likely to:  
 
(d) apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products, or enter into an 
agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products; or  
          
(e) procure another person to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial 
products, or enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant 
Division 3 financial products. 
 
It is not easy at first glance to determine the precise meaning or operation of the prohibition, 
particularly as it is necessary to consider the definitions in a number of other sections of the 
Corporations Act in order to understand the content of several elements of the offence.  
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However, in Mansfield and Kizon v R,10 which is to date the only insider trading case to be 
considered by the High Court, the majority neatly summarised the nature of insider trading 
as follows: 
 
The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) prohibits trading in securities by persons who possess 
information that is not generally available and know, or ought reasonably to know, that, if 
the information were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a 
material effect on the price or value of the securities.11 
 
Insider trading can therefore be broadly described as having the following elements: (i) a 
person possesses certain information; (ii) the information is not generally available; (iii) if the 
information were generally available, it would be material information; (iv) the person knows 
(or ought reasonably to know) that the information is not generally available and that, if the 
information were generally available, it would be material information; and (v) while in 
possession of the information, the person trades in relevant financial products or procures 
another person to do so, or communicates the information to another person likely to do so. 
 
Each of these elements will be considered in turn, so that the nature of the insider trading 
offence can be more fully understood. 
 
Element One - A Person Possesses Certain Information 
 
The first element of the insider trading offence is that a person possesses certain 
information, which in turn must be ‘inside information’.  This element is derived from s 
1043A(1)(a) of the Corporations Act, which requires that ‘a person (the insider) possesses 
inside information’.  Therefore, to understand the requirements of this element of the 
offence, two concepts need to be considered – what is meant by each of the terms 
‘information’ and ‘possesses’?  
   
10 (2012) 87 ALJR 20. 
11 Ibid 21.  As discussed in Overland, above n 9, 191. 
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The Nature of Information 
 
Section 1042A of the Corporations Act defines ‘information’ to include: 
 
(a) matters of supposition and other matters that are insufficiently definite to warrant 
being made known to the public; and 
 
(b) matters relating to the intentions, or likely intentions, of a person.  
 
This definition was first used in the Corporations Law12 and was intentionally drafted to 
enable the word ‘information’ to be interpreted as broadly as possible.13  It is clear that the 
information does not need to be specific or precise.14  The absence of such a requirement 
means that rumours and speculation can amount to information caught by the insider trading 
prohibition,15 as information ‘may include a rumour that something has happened with 
respect to a corporation which a person neither believes nor disbelieves.’16  In Mansfield and 
Kizon v R,17 it was made clear that information does not need to be ‘truthful’ or based on a 
‘factual reality’.18 
 
Information can also include knowledge obtained from a hint or suggestion,19 or a 
12 This definition was inserted by the Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 1991 (Cth) which contained 
many amendments resulting from the recommendations of the report of the Griffiths Committee: Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, House of Representatives, Fair Shares for All: Insider Trading 
in Australia (1989). 
13 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth), 90. 
14 Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Trading Co (Canberra) Ltd (1996) 20 ACSR 649, 658 (Rolfe J). 
15 ASIC, Consultation Paper 118: The Responsible Handling of Rumours (2009); CAMAC, Insider Trading 
Report (2003) [3.7]; CAMAC, Aspects of Market Integrity Report (2009) 116. 
16 Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 462, 468 
(Young J); ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35, 105 (Jacobson J). 
17 (2012) 87 ALJR 20. 
18 Ibid 25. 
19 Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Green [1978] VR 505, 511 (McInerney J); ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 
FCR 35, 105 (Jacobson J); Hannes v DPP [2006] NSW CCA 373, [410] (Barr and Hall JJ). 
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supposition made from non-specific information received from another.20  An inference 
drawn from words or conduct can also amount to information, so long as those words or 
conduct are communicated or observed in some way.21   
 
In ASIC v Citigroup,22 a set of civil penalty proceedings brought against a corporation for 
insider trading, the issue arose as to whether an ‘uncommunicated thought process’ was a 
supposition that could amount to inside information.  Toll Holdings Limited was proposing to 
takeover Patrick Corporation Limited and had retained the Investment Banking Division of 
the investment bank, Citigroup, to provide it with advice on the takeover.  ASIC had alleged 
that, on the day prior to the announcement of the takeover bid, Mr Manchee (a Citigroup 
employee who was engaged in proprietary share trading – that is, trading on Citigroup’s own 
behalf rather than for its clients) purchased over one million Patrick shares.  This trading was 
noticed by personnel within the Investment Banking Division.  An executive in the 
Investment Banking Division then asked Mr Manchee’s manager, Mr Darwell, whether he 
knew who was undertaking the trading and, when told, stated words to the effect that ‘we 
may have a problem with that.’  Mr Darwell then took Mr Manchee outside and told him to 
stop buying Patrick shares.  After that conversation, Mr Manchee returned to the office and 
began selling Patrick shares.   
 
In subsequent insider trading proceedings brought against Citigroup, ASIC alleged that the 
proprietary trader possessed inside information, being a supposition that he allegedly made 
when told to stop buying Patrick shares, that Citigroup must be acting on Toll’s behalf in 
relation to a takeover of Patrick.  In its defence, Citigroup argued that, as that supposition (if 
it had been made) had not actually been communicated to the proprietary trader but was 
simply a deduction he may have made, it was an ‘uncommunicated thought process’ and 
could not amount to information.  Citigroup’s arguments were not accepted by Jacobson J of 
the Federal Court, who determined that an uncommunicated supposition could amount to 
20 ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35, 105-106.  
21 Ibid 105. 
22 Ibid.  
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‘information’, as can inferences or suppositions drawn from words or conduct.23   
 
The year after the decision in ASIC v Citigroup, Mr Simon Hannes sought special leave to 
appeal to the High Court in relation to an earlier conviction for insider trading.24   The 
argument underlying the application for special leave was that the information he had 
allegedly possessed about a proposed takeover was not ‘information’ as defined in the 
Corporations Act because it was only a supposition he had made, not information 
communicated to him.  Although special leave to appeal was refused on the basis that there 
were insufficient prospects of success, Gummow ACJ did note that the question as to 
whether there are any limitations on the concept of ‘information’ for the purposes of s 1043A 
of the Corporations Act had not, at that time, been considered by the High Court and was a 
question of public importance.25   
 
The meaning of the term ‘information’ in the context of insider trading did come before the 
High Court in 2012 in Mansfield and Kizon v R.26  In that case, the High Court determined 
that information does not have to be true, it does not have to originate from the corporation 
to which it relates, and it need not be confidential information which can be said to belong to 
that corporation.  Mansfield and Kizon v R concerned the purchase of shares in a listed 
corporation, where the corporation’s managing director had made false, but positive, 
statements to prospective investors about the corporation’s expected profits and turnover.  
When two of those investors were later charged with insider trading, they argued that a false 
statement could not properly amount to ‘information’ within the meaning used in the 
Corporations Act.  However, the majority of the High Court27 stated that the word 
‘information’ should be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning and in 
accordance with that meaning: 
23 Ibid 106.  However, on the facts, Jacobson J was not satisfied that the proprietary trader had in fact actually 
made such a supposition.  As discussed in Juliette Overland, 'Back to the Future? The Impact of Financial 
Services Reform on Insider Trading in Australia' (2008) 5 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 179, 192–193. 
24 Hannes v R [2008] HCA 224. 
25 Ibid. 
26 (2012) 87 ALJR 20. 
27 Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ delivered a joint judgment, with a separate judgment from Haydon J. 
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the word “information” … is not understood to be confined to knowledge communicated 
which constitutes or concerns objective truths.  Knowledge can be conveyed about a 
subject-matter… and properly be described as “information” whether the knowledge 
conveyed is wholly accurate, wholly false or a mixture of the two.  The person conveying 
that knowledge may know or believe that what is conveyed is accurate or false, whether in 
whole or part, and yet, regardless of that person’s state of mind, what is conveyed is 
properly described as “information”.28     
 
Although the provenance of information does not matter for the purposes of this element of 
the offence,29 information may also include the source of the underlying state of affairs which 
has been communicated.  For example, in R v Rivkin,30 the relevant information that Mr 
Rivkin possessed was that the executive chairman of Impulse Airline had stated that there 
was a proposed ‘merger’ deal between Impulse Airlines and Qantas.  Of course, vague or 
imprecise information may have little material value, but this consideration is more relevant 
to whether the information is likely to be material than whether it can be categorised as 
information.31   
 
Thus, a number of Australian cases have demonstrated that information may come in many 
forms, such as: (i) non-specific details about a proposed merger of two corporations, given 
verbally by the executive chairperson of one of the corporations;32 (ii) a court decision 
presented in open court in a foreign country;33 (iii) details of a press release about the 
discovery of a high-grade nickel deposit;34 and (iv) details of a proposed takeover, gleaned 
from office documents and discussions with staff advising on the proposed takeover.35  
28 Mansfield and Kizon v R (2012) 87 ALJR 20, 25.  As discussed in Overland, above n 9, 193. 
29 Gregory Lyon and Jean J du Plessis, The Law of Insider Trading in Australia (Federation Press, 2005) 19. 
30 (2004) 184 FLR 365. 
31 Ibid 389-390. 
32 Ibid; R v Doff (2005) 23 ACLC 317. 
33 R v Kruse (District Court of New South Wales, O’Reilly DCJ, 2 December 1999); R v Firns (2001) 19 ACLC 
1495. 
34 R v Evans & Doyle (Supreme Court of Victoria, McDonald J, 15 November 1999). 
35 R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; ASIC v Petsas & Miot [2005] 23 ACLC 269. 
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While these different examples can be variously described as facts, details, data or gossip, 
all have been considered to amount to ‘information’.  The manner in which they exist – 
whether in documentary form, electronic form or as a topic of conversation - has no bearing 
on their status as information and the form of the information is obviously of little 
consequence.36  
 
The current position under Australian law, which does not require information to be specific 
or precise, can be contrasted with that of a number of overseas jurisdictions, which have 
laws providing that insider trading will only occur as a result of trading on specific or precise 
information.37  It appears that the primary reason that such a position is adopted in some 
other countries is to exclude rumours from the definition of inside information, so that trading 
on the basis of rumours will not amount to insider trading in those jurisdictions.38  CAMAC 
revisited this issue when undertaking its review of Australian insider trading laws in 2001-
2003, but determined that it would not be appropriate to amend the law to impose a 
requirement that information be ‘specific’ because it would ‘unduly narrow the application of 
the legislation and create artificial distinctions between what does and what does not 
constitute inside information.’39  This view was confirmed again by CAMAC in the 2009 
report on ‘Aspects of Market Integrity’.40  ASIC has also indicated in its consultation paper on 
36 As discussed in Juliette Overland, ‘Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Assessing Recent Developments in 
the Fight Against Insider Trading' (2006) 24 Company and Securities Law Journal 207, 208-209. 
37  For example, in Germany, inside information must be ‘specific information’ – Securities Trading Act (WpHG), 
s 13; in the European Union, inside information must be ‘information of a precise nature’ – chapter 2, Article 7.1 
(a) of the Regulation (EU) 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Market 
Abuse (Market Abuse Regulation); in the United Kingdom, inside information must be ‘information of a precise 
nature’ – Criminal Justice Act 1993 (UK) c 36, s 56(1)(b); in South Africa, inside information must be ‘specific or 
precise information’ – Financial Markets Act 2012 (South Africa), s 77; and in Hong Kong, inside information 
must be ‘specific information’ – Securities and Futures Ordinance (Hong Kong) cap 571, s 245.   
38 See, for example, Patrick Osode, ‘The New South African Insider Trading Act: Sound Law Reform or 
Legislative Overkill?’ (2000) 44 Journal of African Law 239, 243; CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper 
(2001) 45.   
39 CAMAC, Insider Trading Report, above n 15, [3.7]. 
40 CAMAC, Aspects of Market Integrity Report, above n 15, 116. 
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the ‘Responsible Handling of Rumours’41 that it takes the view that trading on the basis of 
rumours can clearly amount to insider trading.42  Despite this, almost all convicted insider 
traders in Australia have traded on the basis of information which appears to be quite 
specific.  The two notable exceptions are Mr Rene Rivkin43 and Mr Bart Doff44 who traded on 
the comparatively vague (and not quite correct) information that Qantas and Impulse Airlines 
were about to ‘merge’, as conveyed to them by the executive chairperson of Impulse 
Airlines.  The definition of information, and whether or not it includes information that is not 
specific or precise, does not have any particular bearing on the application of insider trading 
laws to corporations, but it is clearly important that all market participants, investors and 
regulators understand the nature and  scope of the forms of information which are caught by 
this term.     
 
The Possession of Information   
   
Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act45 which contains the prohibition of insider trading in s 
1043A, does not contain a definition of the words ‘possess’ or ‘possession’.  However, s 86 
of the Corporations Act, contained in Part 1.2,46 does provide some guidance on the 
meaning of the term ‘possession’, as it states that: 
 
A thing that is in a person’s custody or under a person’s control is in the person’s 
possession. 
 
However, this definition is not particularly helpful in interpreting the elements of the insider 
trading offence, as it is not clear if ‘information’ is intended to be a ‘thing’ and the definition of 
‘information’ in s 1042A of the Corporations Act does not assist in this respect.  The 
41 ASIC, Consultation Paper 118, above n 15.  
42 Ibid 10. 
43 R v Rivkin (2003) 198 ALR 400. 
44 R v Doff (2005) 23 ACLC 317. 
45 Part 7.10 is titled ‘Market Misconduct and Other Prohibited Conduct Relating to Financial Products and 
Financial Services’. 
46 Part 1.2 is titled ‘Interpretation’. 
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definition of possession in s 86 does not import any notion of awareness, and requires only 
custody or control.  As Steel47 notes in relation to the concept of ‘possession’: 
 
 The legal meaning of possession is complex, largely due to its long use in the common 
law and its wide adoption in statutory offences.  This means courts have felt compelled to 
caution that: ‘the term “possession” … always giv[es] rise to trouble, and … in each case 
its meaning must depend on the context in which it was used.’48 
 
In He Kaw Teh v R,49 the High Court considered whether awareness was necessary in 
connection with criminal offences concerning the possession of prohibited drugs, and in 
doing so made pronouncements about the general nature of possession under the criminal 
law.  In particular, Dawson J stated that the concept of possession would ordinarily  import a 
notion of awareness but that ‘the degree of knowledge required may vary according to 
context.’50  It was also stated by Brennan J that possession is ‘a state of affairs… proved by 
various acts varying with the nature of the subject matter’.51 
 
Certainly, in respect of criminal offences which relate to tangible property, the element of 
possession is generally satisfied where a person has either physical control or custody of 
that property.52   Within the Corporations Act, the concept of the possession of information 
for the purposes of the prohibition of insider trading is not the only context within which the 
notion of possession arises - for example, s 419 of the Corporations Act is concerned with 
controllers taking possession of a corporation’s property.  It is certainly conceivable that the 
s 86 definition, concerned with custody and control rather than awareness, is intended to 
relate to provisions such as s 419 and not necessarily s 1042A.  However, without a 
47 Alex Steel, ‘The True Identity of Australian Identity Theft Offences: A Measured Response or an Unjustified 
Status Offence?’ (2010) 33 University of New South Wales Law Journal 503, 513-514. 
48 Warner v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1969] 2 AC 256, 304 (Lord Pearce) citing Towers & Co 
Ltd v Gray [1961] 2 QB 351, 361 (Lord Parker CJ). 
49 (1985) 157 CLR 523. 
50 Ibid 601.   
51 Ibid 564, citing Isaacs J in Moors v Burke (1919) 26 CLR 265, 271. 
52 Steel, above n 47, 516. 
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separate definition of possession in Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act, this issue remains 
unclear.  
 
The discussion above on the nature of information does indicate that it may come in a 
variety of forms.  Those various forms of information could potentially be possessed in many 
different ways.  For example: (i) information may be possessed in a tangible, physical sense 
– for example, information may be possessed by means of physical custody of the paper or 
documents on which the relevant information is contained in written form; (ii) information 
may be possessed in an intermediate physical sense – for example, information may be 
possessed by means of physical custody of computer disks or equipment which enable the 
information to be accessed electronically, such as via email; and (iii) information may be 
possessed in non-tangible, non-physical sense – for example, information may be 
possessed by a person because they know or are aware of the information, without any 
physical evidence of such possession. 
 
Only information possessed in a non-tangible, non-physical sense requires any actual 
knowledge of the content of the information by the person who possesses it.  Where there is 
possession in a tangible, physical sense or an intermediate physical sense, the person may 
have physical custody or control of the information or the means by which the information 
can be accessed, but it is possible that they may not necessarily be aware of the actual 
existence of the relevant information or its content.  Of course, knowledge and physical 
custody may exist simultaneously, but that is not necessarily the case.  Is knowledge, or 
physical custody and control, or both, necessary for there to be ‘possession’ of information 
for the purposes of the prohibition of insider trading?  This issue is of particular importance 
when considering the position of corporations as potential insider traders, and when 
determining how a corporation may possess inside information, as it is possible for one 
person within a corporation to have physical custody and control of information without 
awareness of the content of the information, for another person to have awareness without 
physical custody or control  of the information, and for a third person within the corporation 
to engage in the act of trading in relevant shares without awareness or physical custody or 
control of the information.  Accordingly, the definition of possession in this context will 
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significantly impact on the circumstances in which a corporation might be considered to 
engage in insider trading.53   
 
Fortunately, despite the lack of clarity existing under the provisions of the Corporations Act, 
case law provides useful guidance on this critical issue.  Following his earlier conviction for 
insider trading, Mr Simon Hannes appealed to the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal.54  One of the numerous grounds of the appeal was that the trial judge erred when 
giving directions to the jury in relation to the requirement that the defendant ‘possess’ 
information.  The defendant alleged that there was an error of law in that case in failing to 
distinguish between physical possession and awareness of information.  Although the 
appeal was ultimately allowed and a direction given for a retrial, this particular ground of the 
appeal was rejected.  In this context, the judgment of Spigelman CJ confirmed that in order 
for information to be possessed, there must be ‘an element of awareness’55 of the relevant 
information.   
 
This means that mere physical possession of documents or the means to access information 
electronically would not be sufficient to constitute possession without an awareness or 
knowledge of the content of the relevant information.56  Steel notes that the result of such a 
decision is that ‘…“possession”’ in this context approaches a synonym for knowledge’.57  
This position has also been implicitly confirmed by the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal in Fysh v R.58  While the Court did not explicitly state that there is a requirement for 
actual awareness of information in order for there to be possession for the purposes of 
53 As discussed in Juliette Overland, 'There Was Movement at the Station for the Word had Passed Around: 
How Does a Company Possess Inside Information under Australian Insider Trading Laws?' (2006) 3 Macquarie 
Journal of Business Law 241, 245-246.  The manner in which corporations may possess inside information is 
discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
54 R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359. 
55 Ibid 398. 
56 As discussed in Juliette Overland, ‘The Possession and Materiality of Information in Insider Trading Cases' 
(2014) 32 Company and Securities Law Journal 353, 357. 
57 Steel, above n 47, 518. 
58 [2013] NSWCCA 284 (20 November 2013). 
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insider trading laws, when overturning Dr Fysh’s conviction for insider trading, it was made 
clear that Dr Fysh could not be regarded as having possession of all the information alleged, 
due to the Crown’s inability to prove that all the relevant information had been discussed 
with him or provided to him.  Even though Dr Fysh might briefly have had physical 
possession or access to the information in written form, the Crown’s inability to prove that he 
had an opportunity to examine that information also meant that he was not considered to 
have possessed it for the purposes of Australian insider trading laws.59       
 
Of course, if a person cannot be shown to have knowledge or awareness of information, it 
will likely be difficult to prove the other elements of the insider trading offence, which will 
require proof that a person knew (or ought reasonably to have known) that the relevant 
information was not generally available and was likely to be material.  However, that may 
only be the case for individual offenders.  For corporations, the different elements of the 
insider trading offence may be attributed to a corporation as a result of the knowledge and 
conduct of different people within the organisation.  So, depending on the applicable rules of 
attribution, it might be possible that the person who has possession of inside information is 
not the person who engages in the relevant trading in financial products.  For this reason, it 
is particularly important in the context of corporate offenders to be able to understand the 
precise requirements of each of the elements of the offence. 
 
There is no requirement that a person believe the relevant information to be true60 or to have 
received the information in confidence.61  There is also no need to prove that a person ‘used’ 
59 Commentators have offered some additional, if conflicting, assistance on this topic - Austin and Ramsay 
suggest that it is possible for a person to have possession of inside information, within the meaning of s 1043A 
of the Corporations Act, even if the person has temporarily forgotten it or has not read it: Austin and Ramsay, 
above n 5, [9.650].  However, Lyon and du Plessis state that a person cannot be considered to possess inside 
information without proof that the person knows and is aware of the information: Lyon and du Plessis, above n 
29, 23.  In this context, the view of Lyon and du Plessis must be preferred, due to its consistency with the 
judicial statements made in R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359 and Fysh v R [2013] NSWCCA 284 (20 
November 2013).  As discussed in Overland, above n 56, 357.  
60 Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 462. 
61 R v Rivkin (2004) 184 FLR 365, 390.   
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or relied on the information when deciding to engage in the prohibited conduct and it is no 
defence that the person did not rely on the inside information (for example, because they 
had already planned to trade prior to coming into possession of the information, or that they 
based their decision to trade on alternative information which was not inside information).62  
This position differs from that of many overseas jurisdictions, some of which either require 
that the ‘use’ of the relevant inside information be demonstrated, or have a defence of ‘non-
use’ available, which requires the alleged offender to prove that he or she would still have 
engaged in the relevant conduct, with or without the information.63  These differences can be 
explained in a number of ways.  Jurisdictions which prohibit insider trading on the basis of a 
‘breach of fiduciary duty’ or ‘misappropriation’ rationale are essentially prohibiting the misuse 
of inside information.  In that context, it makes sense that the actual use of the information 
must be demonstrated before there is liability.  However, in jurisdictions relying on ‘market 
efficiency’ or ‘market fairness’ rationales, investor confidence requires that market 
participants with access to inside information should not have advantages over ordinary 
market participants, rendering them unable to trade in affected securities at any time when 
they possess inside information.  When conducting its review of insider trading laws, 
CAMAC did consider whether it would be appropriate to introduce a ‘use’ requirement to 
Australian law, but determined that this would unnecessarily make the offence harder to 
62 CAMAC, Insider Trading Report, above n 15, [3.4]. 
63 For example, in Germany, it must be shown that an alleged insider trader ‘made use’ of the inside 
information:  Securities Trading Act (WpHG), s 14(1); in the European Union, it must be shown that an alleged 
insider trader ‘used’ the inside information: Article 8.1 of the Regulation (EU) 596/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Market Abuse (Market Abuse Regulation), although there is a 
rebuttable presumption of use if the insider is in possession of inside information: Case C-45/08, Spector Photo 
Group, 2009 ECR I-12073, as noted in Katja Langenbucher, ‘The “Use or Possession” Debate Revisited – 
Spector Photo Group and Insider Trading in Europe’ (2010) 5 Capital Markets Law Journal 452, 466; in the 
United Kingdom, insider trading only occurs where it is ‘on the basis of’ the relevant inside information: Criminal 
Justice Act 1993 (UK) c 36, s 53.  In the USA, it must be shown that the alleged insider trading occurred ‘on the 
basis of’ the inside information.  However, a person will be regarded as trading on the basis of information if the 
person ‘was aware of the material, nonpublic information when the person made the purchase or sale’: SEC 
Rule 10b5-1, SEC Release No 33-788. 
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prove and enable potential offenders to more easily offer plausible excuses for illegal 
activity.64   
 
Element Two - The Information Is Not Generally Available  
 
The second element of the insider trading offence requires that the information that the 
person possesses is not generally available.  This element comes from the first limb of the 
definition of ‘inside information’ in s 1042C of the Corporations Act.  Section 1042C provides 
that ‘inside information’ means information in relation to which the following paragraphs are 
satisfied: 
 
(a)   the information is not generally available; and 
 
(b)   if the information were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a 
material effect on the price or value of particular Division 3 financial products.  
 
The term ‘generally available’ is also defined in s 1042C of the Corporations Act, which 
provides that information is generally available if: 
 
(a) it consists of readily observable matter; or  
 
(b)   both of the following subparagraphs apply:  
 
(i) it has been made known in a manner that would, or would be likely to, bring it to 
the attention of persons who commonly invest in Division 3 financial products of 
a kind whose price might be affected by the information; and 
 
(ii) since it was made known, a reasonable period for it to be disseminated among 
such persons has elapsed; or 
 
64 CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper, above n 38, [2.150]-[2.152].  
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(c) it consists of deductions, conclusions or inferences made or drawn from either or both of 
the following: 
 
(i) information referred to in paragraph (a); 
 
(ii) information made known as mentioned in subparagraph (b)(i).  
 
It is therefore necessary to consider what each of the three limbs of the definition of the term 
‘generally available’ mean: what is ‘readily observable information’, what is ‘publishable 
information’, and what are ‘deductions, conclusions or inferences’? 
 
Readily Observable Information 
  
The term ‘readily observable’ is not defined in the Corporations Act, but according to the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth), which 
first inserted the term into the Corporations Law, ‘readily observable’ is intended to mean 
‘facts directly observable in the public arena.’65  It appears that it does not matter how a 
person actually observes the information (or, indeed, if any person does actually observe it) 
so long as it would be possible for a person to observe it.66  Observation can occur by 
various means – for example, with the use of the ‘unaided human senses’ and with the 
assistance of devices such as the ‘telephone, telex, facsimile, television and the internet.’67   
 
There has previously been some confusion as to whether or not information must be readily 
observable in Australia or if it is sufficient if it is readily observable in an overseas 
jurisdiction.  In R v Firns,68 an employee of a mining corporation, Carpenter Pacific 
Resources NL, received notification in Australia that the corporation had been successful in 
proceedings brought in the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea in relation to a mining 
licence dispute.  The employee then telephoned his son and, after passing on the 
65 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth), [328]. 
66 R v Firns (2001) 19 ACLC 1495.  
67 Ibid 1507 (Mason J).  
68 District Court of New South Wales, Sides J, 4 November 1999. 
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information, asked him to buy shares in the corporation, which his son then arranged.  The 
issue arose as to whether the information about the judgment delivered in open court in 
Papua New Guinea was readily observable and therefore generally available.  The trial 
judge, Sides J, stated that the relevant information was readily observable overseas but not 
in Australia so was therefore not ‘generally available’ and the defendant was convicted of 
insider trading.   
 
There was, however, a different outcome in R v Kruse,69 which resulted from a very similar 
set of facts.  In that case, another employee of Carpenter Pacific Resources NL, who was 
actually present in the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea when the judgment about the 
mining licence was handed down, bought shares in the corporation just after the judgment 
was given, while still in Papua New Guinea.  The trial judge, O’Reilly J, found that 
information can be generally available even if it is only readily observable overseas, and the 
defendant in that case was not convicted of insider trading.70  The conviction in R v Firns 
was then overturned on appeal by the New South Wales Court of Appeal,71 with the majority 
of the Court72 finding that information need only to be readily observable in an overseas 
jurisdiction to be considered ‘generally available’.73  
69 District Court of New South Wales, O’Reilly DCJ, 2 December 1999. 
70 The decisions of the trial judges in R v Firns and R v Kruse proved difficult to reconcile, although Walker was 
able to distinguish the two cases on their facts, effectively arguing that the relevant provisions providing for 
extra-territorial application of the laws meant that where the relevant conduct occurred overseas (as was the 
case in R v Kruse) the information need only be readily observable in that location, but where the relevant 
conduct occurred in Australia (as was the case in R v Firns) the information must be readily observable in 
Australia: Gordon Walker, ‘Insider Trading in Australia: When is Information Readily Available?’ (2000) 18 
Company and Securities Law Journal 213, 215-216. The subsequent appeal in R v Firns (2001) 19 ACLC 
1495, overturning the original decision, meant that this argument was not judicially tested. 
71 R v Firns (2001) 19 ACLC 1495. 
72 Carruthers AJ delivered a strong dissenting judgment. 
73 When reviewing Australian insider trading laws in 2001-2003, CAMAC proposed a reformulation of the 
definition of ‘generally available’ information, under which information would only be generally available if it:  
(a) is accessible to most persons who commonly invest in Division 3 financial products of a kind 
whose price or value might be affected by the information; or 
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Accordingly, under Australian law, it appears that information that is readily observable will 
be considered to be generally available, including information that is only observable 
overseas.  Of course, now that electronic media easily enables information to be 
communicated globally in an almost instantaneous manner, it is much less likely that 
information observable overseas would not also be considered to be observable in Australia.       
 
Publishable Information 
 
Information is also generally available if it has been made known in a manner that would, or 
would be likely to, bring it to the attention of persons who commonly invest in Division 3 
financial products, and a reasonable period for it to be disseminated has elapsed, pursuant 
to paragraph (b) of the s 1042C definition of ‘generally available’ information.  This limb of 
the definition is often referred to as the ‘publishable information’ test.74    
 
This limb of the definition appears to apply to information that has been made available to 
those investors who would be likely to invest in the financial products to which the 
information relates.  Section 1042A of the Corporations Act defines ‘Division 3 Financial 
Products’ very widely as: 
 
(a) securities; or 
(b)   derivatives; or  
(b) consists of deductions, conclusions or inferences made or drawn from information referred to in 
paragraph (a).  
This proposal, which was contained in CAMAC’s Insider Trading Report, above n 15, [4.7.4], has not been 
accepted or adopted by Parliament and does not represent the current state of Australian law.  However, 
although this proposal would certainly remove any remaining confusion about the term ‘readily observable’, a 
similar debate could erupt over the meaning of the term ‘accessible to’.  While the proposal does provide that 
the information must be accessible to ‘persons who commonly invest’ in the relevant securities, there may still 
be doubt as to whether events occurring overseas or information being released overseas are ‘accessible’ to 
such persons.  Accordingly, the implementation of such a proposal could lead simply to the substitution of one 
contentious issue with another. As discussed in Overland, above n 36, 209-210. 
74 Martin K Earp and Gai M McGrath, Listed Companies – Law and Market Practice (Lawbook, 1996) 309. 
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(c)   interests in a managed investment scheme; or  
(ca)   debentures, stocks or bonds issued or proposed to be issued by a government; 
or  
(d)   superannuation products, other than those prescribed by regulations made for 
the purposes of this paragraph; or  
(e)   any other financial products that are able to be traded on a financial market.  
 
The amendments made to the Corporations Act by the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 
(Cth) changed the nature of the relevant financial products caught by the insider trading 
prohibition.  Prior to the implementation of the Financial Services Reform Act, insider trading 
was only prohibited in relation to ‘securities’.75  Thus certain ‘financial products’ which were 
not previously subject to insider trading laws have now been brought within the ambit of the 
prohibition.  The reasoning behind this reform was the desire to ensure that conduct which 
amounts to an offence in relation to certain financial products should not, from a policy 
perspective, be permissible in relation to other financial products - especially given that it 
was an aim of the Financial Services Reform Act to regulate ‘functionally similar’ financial 
products in a similar manner.76  All financial products that are tradable on a market (and 
some which are not) are now subject to the prohibition of insider trading.77  
 
It appears that the manner in which information would need to be disseminated in order to 
bring it to the attention of those likely to invest in the financial products has been intentionally 
75 Section 1002A of the previous Corporations Law provided that ‘securities’, in relation to a body corporate, 
means any of the following: 
(a) shares in the body corporate; 
(b) debentures (including convertible notes) issued by the body corporate; 
(c) interests in a managed investment scheme made available by the body corporate; 
(d) units of shares referred to in paragraph (a); 
(e) an option contract under which a party acquires from another party  an option or right, exercisable at or 
before a specified time, to buy from, or sell to, that other party a number of securities  of a kind referred to 
in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) at a price specified in, or to be determined in accordance with, the contract; 
but does not include a futures contract or an excluded security. 
76 Explanatory Memorandum, Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 (Cth), [2.76]. 
77 As discussed in Overland, above n 23, 182. 
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left open.78  Where the relevant financial products are listed on an exchange, information 
may be made known to those who invest via continuous disclosure mechanisms, and the 
release of information to the exchange.  This concept is more difficult to apply to non-listed 
entities.  However, information is made known in a manner that would bring it to the attention 
of people who commonly invest in the relevant financial products if the information is 
admitted into evidence in open court.79 
 
The intention of this requirement is to allow potential investors time to absorb the impact of 
the relevant information, so that someone who already possesses the information prior to its 
publication does not receive an unfair trading advantage.80  There is no guidance given as to 
what amounts to a reasonable time, so it will necessarily depend on the circumstances as to 
how long must be allowed, which will also be influenced by the manner of dissemination of 
the information.81  It is also apparent that a class of investors who ‘commonly invest’ in 
securities is ‘broader than current’ shareholders and ‘encompasses potential investors.’82  
 
Deductions, Conclusions and Inferences 
 
The third limb of the definition of ‘generally available information’ enables a diligent 
researcher who is able to interpret other generally available information to act in accordance 
with the results of that research.83  Information will be considered to be generally available if 
it consists of deductions, conclusions or inferences drawn from readily observable matter or 
78 Keith Kendall and Gordon Walker, ‘Insider Trading in Australia and New Zealand: Information that is 
Generally Available’ (2006) 24 Company and Securities Law Journal 343, 349. 
79 ICAL Ltd v Country Natwest Securities Australia Ltd (1988) 13 ACR 129. 
80 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth), [328]. 
81 Michael Ziegelaar, ‘Insider Trading Law in Australia’ in Gordon Walker, Brent Fisse and Ian Ramsay (eds), 
Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand (Lawbook, 2nd ed, 1998) 554, 573; Lyon and du Plessis, 
above n 29, 32; Kendall and Walker, above n 78, 348. 
82 Kendall and Walker, above n 78, 348; Keith Kendall and Gordon Walker, ‘Insider Trading in Australia’ in 
Stephen M Bainbridge (ed), Research Handbook on Insider Trading (Edward Elgar, 2013) 365, 375. 
83 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth), [326]. 
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publishable information.  However, research which is based on non-public information will 
not be protected, even if it is obtained as a result of the researcher’s own efforts.84   
 
Element Three - If the Information were Generally Available, it would be Material  
 
The third element of the insider trading offence requires that, if the relevant information was 
generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a material effect on the 
price or value of particular Division 3 financial products.  This element comes from the 
second limb of the definition of ‘inside information’ in s 1042A of the Corporations Act.  As 
noted above, s 1042A provides that ‘inside information’ means information in relation to 
which the following paragraphs are satisfied: 
 
(a)   the information is not generally available; and 
 
(b)   if the information were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a 
material effect on the price or value of particular Division 3 financial products.  
 
Section 1043D of the Corporations Act assists in determining when a reasonable person 
would expect information to have a material effect by providing that: 
 
a reasonable person would be taken to expect information to have a material effect on the 
price or value of Division 3 financial products if (and only if) the information would, or 
would be likely to, influence persons who commonly acquire Division 3 financial products 
in deciding whether or not to acquire or dispose of the first-mentioned financial products. 
 
It is also useful to consider the provisions concerning continuous disclosure laws for listed 
corporations, as very similar concepts are used to determine when ‘material’ information 
concerning a corporation needs to be disclosed to an exchange.  Section 674(2) of the 
Corporations Act provides as follows: 
84 CAMAC, Insider Trading Report, above n 15, 49; Lyon and du Plessis, above n 29, 54; Kendall and Walker, 
above n 78,349; Michael Gething, ‘Insider Trading Enforcement: Where Are We Now and Where Do We Go 
From Here?’ (1998) 16 Company and Securities Law Journal 607, 613. 
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  If:  
(a) this subsection applies to a listed disclosing entity; 
(b) the entity has information that those provisions require the entity to notify to the 
market operator; and  
                      (c)  that information:  
                              (i) is not generally available; and  
(ii)   is information that a reasonable person would expect, if it were 
generally available, to have a material effect on the price or value of ED 
securities of the entity;  
the entity must notify the market operator of that information in accordance with those 
provisions.  
  
Section 677 of the Corporations Act then provides, in language that is almost identical to s 
1042F of the Corporations Act, that: 
 
a reasonable person would be taken to expect information to have a material effect on the 
price or value of ED securities of a disclosing entity if the information would, or would be 
likely to, influence persons who commonly invest in securities in deciding whether to 
acquire or dispose of the ED securities.85  
 
As was noted in Hannes v DPP (No 2),86 ‘…materiality is concerned with investor conduct 
and … the capacity of information to influence investor behaviour which, in turn, has a 
material effect on price or value of securities.  Accordingly, materiality is concerned with 
information which might be said to be price sensitive.’ 87 
 
85 The ASX considers that the reference in s 677 of the Corporations Act to ‘persons who commonly invest in 
securities’ means ‘persons who commonly buy and hold securities for a period of time, based upon their view 
of the inherent value of the security,’ thereby excluding high frequency traders seeking to take advantage of 
very short term price fluctuations: ASX Listing Rules Guidance Note 8, Continuous Disclosure: Listing Rules 
3.1 – 3.1B, July 2015, 10.  
86 (2006) 165 A Crim R 151. 
87 Ibid [384]. 
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The materiality of information may be demonstrated by the following methods: (i) expert 
evidence from financial specialists as to whether they would consider certain information to 
be likely to raise or lower the relevant share price once it becomes publicly known;88 and (ii) 
tracking the actual movement in share prices once the relevant information does become 
generally available.89 
 
Assessing the materiality of information solely by reference to its impact on short term 
movements in a corporation’s share price is generally considered to be a ‘simplistic’ 
approach.90  In the context of continuous disclosure obligations, it has been stated that the 
materiality of information should be assessed on an ‘ex ante’ and not an ‘ex post’ approach 
– that is, the materiality of information is to be determined as a ‘forward, not backward, 
looking exercise.’91   However, the ability to later consider the ultimate effect of the release 
of certain information, such as a retrospective inquiry into movements in share prices, is 
certainly still considered useful to test the reasonableness of a determination that 
information was material.92   Such ‘ex post’ enquiries are a common reference point for 
determining the materiality of information in Australian insider trading cases, as can be 
demonstrated below. 
 
R v Rivkin:93 It was argued on appeal, following a conviction for insider trading at first 
instance, that a reasonable person could not have considered the relevant information that 
Mr Rivkin received from the executive chairman of Impulse Airlines about a proposed 
88 For example, R v Rivkin (2003) 198 ALR 400. 
89 Gething, above n 84, 619-620.  For example, ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35. 
90 See, for example, Gil North, ‘The Insider Trading Generally Available and Materiality Carve-Outs: Are They 
Achieving Their Aims?’ (2009) 27 Company and Securities Law Journal 234, 250-251; Gething, above n 84, 
619; David Pompilio, ‘On the Reach of Insider Trading Law’ (2007) 25 Company and Securities Law Journal 
467, 473. 
91 ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (2009) 264 ALR 201, [474]-[475].  
92 Rivkin Financial Services Ltd v Sofcom Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 486 [113]-[116]; Jubilee Mines NL v Riley (2009) 
253 ALR 673 [33], [130], [134]; ASIC v Macdonald (No 11) 256 ALR 365 [1067]; ASIC v Fortescue Metals 
Group Ltd (2009) 264 ALR 201 [477]. 
93 (2004) 184 FLR 365. 
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‘merger’ with Qantas to be ‘material’ information, because its content was uncertain and 
indefinite, and a potential investor would have regarded the information as being unreliable.  
The Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales rejected this argument, although it did 
recognise that the source of information may have an impact on its materiality.94  That is, the 
more reliable the source is considered to be, the more likely it is that the information may be 
considered to be reliable and therefore likely to have a material effect on the price or value 
of securities.  The fact that the source of the information was the executive chairperson of 
Impulse Airlines might make the information more likely to be reliable than if the same 
information had been received from an unrelated source.  Accordingly, the source of the 
information could affect the materiality of the information because investors might consider 
some sources to be more credible or reliable than others.  In that case, an upward 
movement in the price of Qantas Airways Limited shares, once it was publicly announced 
that Qantas was to acquire Impulse Airlines (after a period of speculation that the national 
airline industry could not support the four airlines operating at the time) was considered to 
assist in demonstrating the materiality of the information possessed by Mr Rivkin: ‘the fact of 
the price rise, after the announcement, meant the market had not factored in the 
disappearance of one of the players’.95  
 
R v Hannes:96 The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal considered the impact of a 
takeover announcement on the increase in the share price of the target corporation, TNT 
Limited.  Mr Hannes had allegedly purchased options in TNT with knowledge that a takeover 
was proposed and, when the takeover was later formally announced, the TNT share price 
rose.  Mr Hannes argued that it was not appropriate to regard the information he possessed 
when he purchased the TNT options as material because, at that time, the takeover was 
merely a ‘prospect’, whereas when the takeover was later announced it had become more 
certain.  Spigelman CJ stated that ‘…no doubt the effect on the price of securities of a mere 
prospect was less than the actuality, but that does not mean that what actually happened 
94 Ibid 390. 
95 Ibid 399. 
96 (2000) 158 FLR 359. 
59 
 
                                                 
was irrelevant to an assessment of the materiality of the prospect.’97  Clearly, a certain event 
is more likely to affect a corporation’s share price than an uncertain event, but the possibility 
of an uncertain event occurring may still have some effect.  
 
Fysh v R:98 The question arose as to whether the materiality of information is a matter of 
fact to be determined by a jury or whether it must be the subject of expert evidence.  In this 
case, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal stated that ‘the question of materiality 
must be measured against both reasonableness and some knowledge of the market’,99 as 
determining the materiality of information is partly a question of ‘common sense’ but ‘could 
also be the subject of specialised knowledge’.100  Accordingly, depending upon the particular 
circumstances of a case, a jury may be able to themselves determine whether information is 
likely to influence persons who commonly acquire the relevant financial products, or they 
may need to rely on expert evidence in order to make such an assessment.  In Fysh v R, the 
increase in a corporation’s share price was not in itself considered to be evidence of 
materiality of certain information because there were other factors which may also have 
contributed to the increase, including the release of another unrelated announcement.101  
 
ASIC v Petsas & Miot:102 The relevant inside information in this case concerned 
confidential merger negotiations between BRL Hardy Ltd and Constellation Brands.  It was 
stated by Finkelstein J of the Federal Court, that ‘Mr Petsas and Mr Miot knew that if the 
information about the merger discussions became public it would affect the price of BRL’s 
shares’.103  The materiality of the information was also determined by reference to a rise in 
the BRL share price when the merger was later announced. 
 
97 Ibid 409. 
98 [2013] NSWCCA 284 (20 November 2013). 
99 Fysh v R [2013] NSWCCA 284 (20 November 2013), [208] (Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL and Schmidt J). 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 [2005] 23 ACLC 269. 
103 Ibid [7]. 
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ASIC v Citigroup:104 Jacobson J of the Federal Court found in relation to one charge of 
insider trading that, at the time Citigroup’s proprietary trader traded in Patrick shares, the 
relevant information concerning the proposed takeover of Patrick Holdings Ltd by Toll 
Holdings Ltd was unlikely to be material because the ‘share price had already moved to a 
price which reflected a substantial likelihood of a takeover’.105  However, on a separate 
charge of insider trading, Jacobson J relied on an upward movement in the price of Patrick 
shares at an earlier time to demonstrate that information about the timing of the bid would 
have been material at that stage: 
 
It seems to me to be likely that information as to the timing of the bid would have been 
price sensitive within the test stated in s 1042D of the Corporations Act.   This seems to 
me to be borne out by the fact that Patrick shares opened on the day of the 
announcement at AUD$7.15, being 10.9% above the closing price on Friday 19 August 
2005, and, during the course of very heavy trading on 22 August 2005, rose to 
AUD$7.38.106  
 
It can therefore be seen that, even though the legislation prescribes a test of the ‘reasonable 
person’ or ‘reasonable investor’ in order to determine the level of materiality of particular 
information, and the time for determining whether that information would be material to such 
an investor is the time at which the alleged insider trader trades in relevant financial 
products, courts regularly consider later movements in share price caused by the release of 
the information sometime after that relevant trading has occurred when determining whether 
the information was material at that earlier time.      
 
104 (2007) 160 FCR 35.  The facts of this case are set out earlier in this chapter. 
105 Ibid 109. 
106 Ibid 110.  As discussed in Overland, above n 56, 360. 
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Element Four – The Person Knows, or Ought Reasonably to Know, that the 
Information is not Generally Available and that, if it were, it would be Likely to be 
Material 
 
The fourth element of the insider trading offence is that the person knows, or ought 
reasonably to know, that the relevant information is not generally available and that, if it were 
generally available, it would be likely to be material.  This element comes from the 
requirement in s 1043A(1)(b) of the Corporations Act that: 
 
the person knows or ought reasonably to know, that the matters specified in paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of the definition of inside information in s1042A are satisfied in relation to the 
information. 
 
It has long been recognised that this ‘knowledge element’ of the insider trading offence is the 
most difficult to prove, and that this difficulty appears to create one of the greatest obstacles 
to the successful prosecution of insider trading cases.107   
 
As noted above, the definition of inside information in s 1042C of the Corporations Act 
provides that ‘inside information’ means information in relation to which the following 
paragraphs are satisfied: 
 
(a)   the information is not generally available; and 
 
(b)   if the information were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a 
material effect on the price or value of particular Division 3 financial products.  
 
107 Explanatory Memorandum, Financial Services Bill 2001 (Cth), [2.78]-[2.79]; CAMAC, Insider Trading Report, 
above n 15, [2.139]; Roman Tomasic, Casino Capitalism? Insider Trading in Australia (Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 1991) 115-126.  As has been noted by the former Chair of ASIC, Alan Cameron, ‘proving that a 
person had knowledge is often harder than it sounds unless there is smoking-gun type of evidence’: Alan 
Deans, ‘The Fetter of the Law’, The Bulletin (Sydney), 28 November 2000, 52; Rubenstein, above n 5, 106.   
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A careful examination of this element of the insider trading offence reveals that it must be 
proved that either: (i) the alleged insider trader knew that the relevant information was not 
generally available and that a reasonable person would have expected the information to be 
material; or (ii) the alleged insider trader ought reasonably to have known that the relevant 
information was not generally available and that a reasonable person would have expected 
the information to be material. 
 
It was stated by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Rivkin108 that, when 
considering what an alleged insider trader ‘ought reasonably to have known’, the question is 
subjective to the particular defendant, having regard to all of the relevant circumstances.109 
This means that one does not consider whether the theoretical reasonable person ought to 
have had certain knowledge, but whether the particular defendant in question ought to have 
had such knowledge, bearing in mind subjective factors such as his or her particular level of 
knowledge, experience, level of business and commercial expertise and any other relevant 
personal characteristics.   
 
This means that it must be proved either that the alleged insider trader knew what a 
reasonable person would have expected, or ought to have known what a reasonable person 
would have expected, in relation to the materiality of the information.  Therefore, it seems 
that one must really consider: Did the person know that a reasonable person would have 
expected the information to have a material effect? If not (or if it cannot be proved), should 
the person have known that a reasonable person would have had that expectation?110  The 
effect of s 1043D of the Corporations Act, in providing when a reasonable person is taken to 
expect information to be material, is that the reasonable person in question is not 
108 (2004) 184 FLR 365 (Mason P, Wood CJ at CL and Sully J). 
109 The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal cited the case of Boughey v Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10, 28-
29, as authority for that proposition and noted that it was accepted by both counsel for Mr Rivkin and the 
Crown: R v Rivkin (2004) 184 FLR 365, 384. 
110 As discussed in Juliette Overland, ‘The Possession and Materiality of Information in Insider Trading Cases' 
(2014) 32 Company and Securities Law Journal 353 and in Juliette Overland, 'Corporate Liability for Insider 
Trading: How Does a Company Have the Necessary 'Mens Rea'?' (2010) 24 Australian Journal of Corporate 
Law 266, 270-271. 
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necessarily taken to be in the position of the alleged insider trader.  It must therefore be 
shown that the alleged insider trader knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the 
‘information would, or would be likely to, influence persons who commonly acquire Division 3 
financial products in deciding whether or not to acquire or dispose of’ those products.111  
Accordingly, knowledge of what would be likely to influence the trading decisions of persons 
who commonly acquire the relevant financial products is necessary, resulting in a 
complicated set of tests.   
 
As this element of the insider trading offence is recognised as one of the most difficult to 
prove, the introduction of civil penalty proceedings under the Financial Services Reform Act 
2001 (Cth), which came into effect on 11 March 2002, was much vaunted.  The availability of 
civil penalty proceedings was intended to assist in overcoming perceived difficulties in 
prosecuting insider trading by providing an alternative regime with a lower standard of proof, 
based on the balance of probabilities and using civil rules of evidence.  Indeed, it was stated 
in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 (Cth) that: 
 
 [A] major problem that exists in relation to the market misconduct and insider trading 
provisions, is the difficulty ASIC has in successfully prosecuting a breach of the 
provisions.  As the existing provisions are offence provisions, the criminal burden of proof 
(beyond reasonable doubt) applies.  ASIC has found it difficult to prove elements of the 
offences beyond reasonable doubt, as many elements refer to the defendant’s state of 
mind.  This difficulty may result in cases not being pursued even where there has been a 
breach of the provisions.  This is undesirable as it casts the law into disrepute, and also 
threatens the integrity of financial markets.  It is therefore proposed to make the market 
misconduct and insider trading provisions civil penalty provisions.  The application of the 
civil burden of proof (balance of probabilities) will facilitate the bringing of actions for 
breaches of the provisions.  The application of civil penalties is likely to act as a deterrent 
to market misconduct.112    
 
111 Corporations Act, s 1043D. 
112 Explanatory Memorandum, Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 (Cth), [2.78]-[2.79]; Corporations Act, ss 
1317L and 1332.  As discussed in Overland, above n 23, 185. 
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The elements of the offence remained unchanged under the introduction of the civil penalty 
regime to insider trading, but the standard of proof was lowered when civil penalty 
proceedings were utilised.  However, there have been very few civil penalty proceedings for 
insider trading undertaken since they became available – most notably the unsuccessful civil 
proceedings in ASIC v Citigroup113 and the case of ASIC v Petsas and Miot,114 in which the 
respondents admitted liability.  Thus civil penalty proceedings have hardly provided the fillip 
which may have been expected - the level of the burden of proof has perhaps not been the 
major obstacle to the successful prosecution of insider trading cases, but rather the 
existence of appropriate evidence to prove the elements of the offence.   Indeed, the case of 
ASIC v Citigroup demonstrated that, even with the availability of civil penalty proceedings, 
the complexities and technicalities associated with pursuing alleged insider traders remain – 
the challenges in detecting incidents of insider trading; the complexity of insider trading laws 
and resulting interpretational difficulties; the limited judicial consideration of insider trading 
laws; and, in particular, the obstacles to proving the knowledge element of the offence.115   
 
The knowledge element is particularly contentious when considering the liability of 
corporations for insider trading, as the question of proving what a corporation knew, or ought 
reasonably to have known, is more complex than for a natural person.  Accordingly, these 
issues will be explored in detail in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
 
Element Five - The Person Trades in Relevant Financial Products, Procures another 
Person to Engage in Trading, or Communicates the Information to Another Person 
Likely to Do So 
 
The final ‘trading element’ of the insider trading offence requires that the alleged insider 
trader, while in possession of information which they know or ought reasonably to know is 
113 (2007) 160 FCR 35. 
114 (2005) 23 ACLC 269. 
115 See, for example, Rubenstein, above n 5;  Roman Tomasic and Brendan Pentony, ‘The Prosecution of 
Insider Trading; Obstacles to Enforcement’ (1989) 22 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 65; 
Tomasic, above n 107, 115-126; Lyon and du Plessis, above n 29, 163-168. 
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inside information, either trades in the relevant financial products,116 procures another 
person to do so,117 or communicates the information to another person likely to either trade 
or procure trading in relevant financial products (commonly known as ‘tipping’).118 
 
‘Procure’ is defined in s 1042F(1) of the Corporations Act as follows: 
 
For the purposes of this Division, but without limiting the meaning that the expression 
procure has apart from this section, if a person incites, induces, or encourages an act or 
omission by another person, the first-mentioned person is taken to procure the act or 
omission by the other person. 
 
Section 9 of the Corporations Act also provides that ‘“procure” includes cause.’ 
 
The ‘tipping’ aspect of the offence is satisfied where a person, while in possession of 
information which they know or ought reasonably to know is inside information, 
communicates the information, or causes it to be communicated to another person, when 
the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the other person would or would be 
likely to trade in relevant securities, or procure another person to do so. 
  
In general, the trading element is one of the least contentious of the insider trading offence 
and it will usually not be in doubt, if the other elements have been satisfied, whether or not a 
person has traded, or procured another to trade in financial products, or tipped.  However, in 
R v Evans and Doyle,119 charges of insider trading were dismissed due to a failure to make 
out this element.  The defendants in that case had placed instructions with a broker to 
purchase securities prior to certain inside information becoming generally available.  The 
116 That is, applies for, acquires, disposes of or enters into an agreement to apply for, acquire or dispose of the 
relevant securities: Corporations Act, s 1043A(1)(c).  Previously, under the repealed s 1002G(2), the relevant 
conduct was subscribing for, purchasing, selling or entering into an agreement to subscribe for, purchase or 
sell the relevant securities. 
117 Corporations Act, s 1043A(1)(d), previously s 1002G(2).  
118 Corporations Act, s 1043A(2). 
119 Supreme Court of Victoria, McDonald J, 15 November 1999. 
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trade was not actually effected by the broker until later that day, after a public release of the 
relevant information.  The defendants were prosecuted for insider trading on the basis that 
they had ‘entered into an agreement to purchase securities’ while in possession of inside 
information.  However, McDonald J determined that an agreement to purchase securities 
was not actually entered into until the broker had effected the trade, by which time the 
information had become generally available, so no offence was committed.120  The 
Corporations Act has now been amended so that a similar result would not occur in the 
future, as the relevant conduct now includes applying for, acquiring and disposing of 
securities, or entering into an agreement to do so,121 which would appear to include 
instructing a broker to buy (or sell) securities or other financial products.122        
 
No offence is committed if a person who had been intending to trade in securities comes into 
possession of  ‘inside information’ and then, as a result, decides not to trade after all.  
Additionally, a person in possession of inside information may pass that information onto 
others to convince them not to trade.  The proscribed conduct does not encompass either of 
these forms of activity, or non-activity.  When undertaking its review of Australian insider 
trading laws, CAMAC considered whether it would be appropriate for an offence to occur in 
these circumstances, but recommended that this aspect of insider trading law remain 
unchanged123 as, since there is no other party to a trade, there is no party who is actually 
disadvantaged by that action or inaction.124   
 
Contentious Aspects of the Elements of the Insider Trading Offence 
 
It has been shown throughout this chapter that there are many contentious aspects to 
Australia’s insider trading laws.  In particular, (i) the legislation does not make it clear what is 
meant by the phrase ‘possesses inside information’ in s 1043A(1)(a) of the Corporations Act 
120 Ibid [51]. 
121 Corporations Act, s 1043A(1) (emphasis added). 
122 As discussed in Overland, above n 23, 183.  
123 CAMAC, Insider Trading Report, above n 15, [3.5]. 
124 As discussed in Juliette Overland, 'The Future of Insider Trading in Australia: What did Rene Rivkin Teach 
Us?' (2005) 10 Deakin Law Review 708, 727. 
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and judicial interpretation must be relied upon in order to determine the nature of the level of 
possession required; (ii) the tests for determining when, pursuant to s 1042D of the 
Corporations Act, a reasonable person would expect information to have a ‘material’ effect 
are unclear; and (iii) the tests for determining when a person ‘ought reasonably to know’ that 
certain information is inside information, in accordance with s 1043A(1)(b) of the 
Corporations Act, are clumsy and convoluted.  While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
further address or attempt to resolve the difficulties that these issues of contention create in 
the general enforcement of insider trading laws, these problems highlight the difficult nature 
of the current legislative framework and serve as examples of the inherent uncertainties 
which exist when attempting to understand the general application of Australia’s insider 
trading laws.          
 
Having now considered the system of regulation of insider trading in Australia, which 
provides a solid foundation for the examination of the central issues relevant to this thesis, I 
will now analyse the manner in which insider trading laws apply to corporations in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 THE APPLICATION OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS TO CORPORATIONS 
 
This chapter will consider the theoretical basis for applying insider trading laws to 
corporations.  I will do this by first considering the manner in which Australian insider trading 
laws apply to corporations and, in particular, whether a corporation is a ‘person’ caught by 
the prohibition of insider trading.  A comparative review of the positions taken in other 
jurisdictions will also be undertaken.  Australian cases which have focused on insider trading 
issues relevant to corporations will be discussed.  This chapter will also consider the 
historical and theoretical bases for applying insider trading laws to corporations, as well as 
whether it is appropriate for corporations to continue to be subject to the prohibition of 
insider trading in Australia. 
 
Is a Corporation a ‘Person’ Caught by the Prohibition of Insider Trading? 
 
The elements of insider trading have already been considered in detail in chapter 2 of this 
thesis, but it is important to recall that under s 1043A of the Corporations Act it is an offence 
for a ‘person’ to engage in insider trading.  The Corporations Act does not state whether a 
‘person’ includes a corporation, as the term is not defined.  However, there are several 
factors which make it clear that corporations are intended to be regarded as persons subject 
to the prohibition of insider trading – firstly, the operation of applicable principles of statutory 
interpretation; and secondly, the content of other relevant provisions within the Corporations 
Act which specifically refer to corporations. 
 
General principles of statutory interpretation can assist in this context, as s 2C(1) of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) clearly states as follows: 
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 In any Act, expressions used to denote persons generally (such as "person", "party", 
"someone", "anyone", "no-one", "one", "another" and "whoever"), include a body politic or 
corporate as well as an individual.1 
 
Despite a difficult legislative history for corporations legislation in Australia, the Corporations 
Act is quite clearly a Commonwealth statute, aided by the referral of powers to the 
Commonwealth by State Parliaments.  Additionally, s 5C of the Corporations Act specifically 
states that the provisions of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) apply to the Corporations 
Act. Thus, when the term ‘person’ is used in the Corporations Act, it will include a 
corporation (as a body corporate), unless a contrary intention is indicated.   
 
Such a contrary intention is not indicated in the Corporations Act as, while the term ‘person’ 
is not defined, and the sections of the Corporations Act which specifically provide for the 
offence of insider trading do not expressly refer to corporations, it is clear from the nature 
and scope of other provisions of the Corporations Act that the prohibition of insider trading is 
intended to apply to corporations as well as natural persons.  This is evident for the following 
three reasons: 
 
Firstly, there are specific exceptions to the insider trading offence which are relevant only to 
corporations: for example, s 1043F of the Corporations Act provides an exception for bodies 
corporate which enter into Chinese Wall arrangements,2 and s 1043I of the Corporations Act 
provides a specific exception for a corporation in relation to ‘knowledge of its own intentions’ 
when proposing to acquire or sell shares in another corporation. 
 
Secondly, s 1042G of the Corporations Act specifically sets out circumstances in which a 
corporation will be considered to possess information that is possessed by an officer of the 
corporation.3 
1 Emphasis added.  Of course, the overall context is a relevant consideration and a presumption that the term 
‘person’ includes a body corporate can be rebutted if a court finds that there is a contrary legislative intention: D 
C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th ed, 2014) 305.  
2 The application of s 1043F of the Corporations Act is considered in detail in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
3 The application of s 1042G of the Corporations Act is considered in detail in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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Thirdly, the maximum penalty which may be imposed under the Corporations Act for insider 
trading differs between corporations and natural persons.4  Five years ago, the maximum 
penalties were increased as a result of amendments made to the Corporations Act  by the 
Corporations Amendment (No 1) Act 2010 (Cth) – the maximum penalty for a corporation is 
a fine of $45,000 penalty units (currently $4,950,000),5 three times the total value of the 
benefits obtained that are reasonably attributable to the offence, or 10% of the corporation’s 
annual turnover for the twelve month period in which the offence occurred, whichever is the 
greater;6 the maximum penalty for a natural person is ten years’ imprisonment, or a fine of 
the greater of $4,500 penalty units (currently $495,000) or three times the total value of the 
benefits obtained that are reasonably attributable to the offence, or both.7  
 
The existence of such provisions indicates that corporations are intended to be ‘persons’ 
subject to the prohibition of insider trading and that there is no ‘contrary intention’ in the 
Corporations Act, which might otherwise provide evidence that the broad definition of 
‘person’ in the Acts Interpretation Act was not intended to apply.  Thus, these provisions 
offer support for the adoption of that definition in the context of insider trading.  Therefore, 
under the current regulatory regime, the Australian prohibition of insider trading contained in 
the Corporations Act applies equally to corporations and natural persons.   
 
International Comparisons 
 
It is useful when considering potential law reform to review the legal position adopted in 
other jurisdictions, as a comparison of Australian insider trading laws with those of other 
jurisdictions offers an opportunity to determine if there are common approaches taken in 
regulating this type of conduct, or if there are substantial differences in the system of 
4 Set out in item 310 of Schedule 3 of the Corporations Act. 
5 Each penalty unit equals $170.00: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 4AA. 
6 Previously, the maximum penalty for a corporation was a fine of 10,000 penalty units ($1,700,000.00). 
7 Previously, the maximum penalty for a natural person was a fine of 2,000 penalty units ($340,000.00) or 
imprisonment for 5 years or both. 
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regulation that would offer opportunities for appropriate amendment.  While Australia’s 
insider trading laws do not mirror those of any other jurisdiction in their application to 
corporations, it will be seen that there is no one uniform model amongst other jurisdictions in 
relation to the manner in which insider trading laws are to be applied to corporations, or the 
availability or requirements of a Chinese Wall defence to insider trading.  While deficiencies 
and problems may be identified in the application of insider trading laws to corporations in 
Australia, such deficiencies and problems are unlikely to be rectified by simply importing the 
legal position adopted in another jurisdiction.  However, some aspects of the approach taken 
in other jurisdictions may afford suggestions for improvement for the Australian position.  A 
significant difficulty arises when attempting to compare the application of insider trading laws 
to corporations in a variety of jurisdictions – there is a notable absence of applicable case 
law or corporate prosecutions on which to base any resulting analysis.  The wording of the 
legislation can be compared and contrasted, but without judicial interpretation of the various 
provisions, it is more difficult to make meaningful or informed comparisons.   
 
Although, as has been noted, almost all countries with securities exchanges prohibit insider 
trading,8 there is no uniform application of such a prohibition to corporations.  Of the 
jurisdictions reviewed in detail in this thesis,9 all prohibit insider trading,10 and all apply the 
8 Franklin A Gevurtz, ‘The Globalisation of Insider Trading Prohibitions’ (2002) 15 Transnational Lawyer 63, 65-
66; as discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis. 
9 It is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the laws of every regulatory regime which prohibits 
insider trading – accordingly, I have conducted a review of the laws of a number of jurisdictions - the European 
Union, Germany, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the USA.  I 
have chosen to focus on these countries and jurisdictions because they represent a variety of nations with 
securities markets, with varying characteristics and attributes, in an attempt to ensure a degree of diversity - 
they include common law jurisdictions (the United Kingdom, South Africa, the USA, New Zealand, Hong Kong 
and Singapore) and civil law jurisdictions (Germany) - thus ensuring the laws do not all have the same common 
source; they include countries with well-developed securities markets which have long prohibited insider 
trading (the United Kingdom, South Africa, the USA, Hong Kong and Singapore) and those whose securities 
markets have only relatively recently criminalised or prohibited insider trading (Germany and New Zealand); 
and they include countries from a variety of continents and regions – Europe, the Americas, Asia and 
Australasia, and Africa.  A number of these jurisdictions were analysed by CAMAC when it undertook a review 
of Australian insider trading laws, as set out in CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper (2001), although the 
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prohibition to corporations, as well as to natural persons, as either a civil or criminal offence, 
or both.  Indeed, the United Kingdom is the only jurisdiction to apply only civil liability for 
insider trading to corporations.11  All the other jurisdictions examined apply criminal liability 
for insider trading to corporations as well as natural persons.12     
laws in several of the examined jurisdictions have changed significantly since that time.  The insider trading 
laws of these jurisdictions will be regularly referred to, where appropriate, throughout this thesis. For ease of 
reference, the relevant provisions of the insider trading laws of these jurisdictions discussed are also set out in 
full in Appendix 2 to this thesis. 
10 In the European Union, Regulation (EU) 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 on Market Abuse (Market Abuse Regulation) and the Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, OJ 2014 L 173.179 (Market Abuse 
Directive) set out a legal framework to be adopted by the Member States of the European Union as local 
legislation, prohibiting activities such as insider trading.  As at the date of this thesis, the Member States of the 
European Union are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  In Germany, insider 
trading is prohibited under s 14 of the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (Securities Trading Act) (WpHG).  In Hong 
Kong, insider trading (commonly referred to in that jurisdiction as ‘insider dealing’) is regulated under the Parts 
XIII and XIV of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Hong Kong) cap 571.  Section 241 of the recently 
implemented Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (NZ) prohibits insider trading.  Division 3 of Part XII of the 
Securities and Futures Act 2001 (Singapore) makes insider trading an offence in Singapore.  In South Africa, 
insider trading is prohibited under the Financial Markets Act 2012 (South Africa).  In the United Kingdom, 
insider trading (commonly referred to in that jurisdiction as ‘insider dealing’) is prohibited as a criminal offence 
under Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (UK) c 36 and as a civil offence under Part VIII of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) c 8.  In the USA, the anti-fraud provisions in SEC rule 10b-5, promulgated 
under s 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78a (1934) gives rise to the insider trading 
prohibition under USA law. 
11 Kern Alexander, ‘UK Insider Dealing and Market Abuse Law: Strengthening Regulatory Law to Combat 
Market Misconduct’ in Stephen M Bainbridge, Research Handbook on Insider Trading (Edward Elgar, 2013) 
407, 412.  In the United Kingdom, the criminal offence of ‘insider dealing’ applies only to ‘individuals’ under s 52 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (UK) c 36, thus limiting the application of the criminal offence to natural 
persons only, with no direct criminal liability for a corporation for insider trading.  However, s 118B of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) c 8 defines ‘insiders’ to include ‘any person’, and therefore 
applies the civil prohibition to corporations: schedule 1 of the Interpretation Act 1978 (UK) c 30.  It appears that 
in the United Kingdom, the original rationale underlying the limitation on the application of criminal insider 
trading laws to natural persons was to specifically avoid the difficulties large corporations (such as merchant 
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However, while all the jurisdictions examined apply insider trading laws to corporations as 
well as to natural persons in some form, there is no uniform manner in which those laws are 
banks) would face if they were subject to insider trading laws, and not because it was thought generally 
undesirable to make corporations criminally liable for insider trading: Paul Davies, Gower & Davies: Principles 
of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 458.  However, this reasoning now seems somewhat 
incongruous given that corporations can still be subject to civil liability for insider trading, which therefore still 
necessitates merchant banks implementing Chinese Walls and other such arrangements in order to avoid 
conflicts of interest and prevent the flow of information.    
12 In South Africa, insider trading is prohibited as both a criminal and civil offence under the Financial Markets 
Act 2012 (South Africa), and s 78 of that Act provides that a person who is an ‘insider’ is prohibited from 
engaging in insider trading.  Although previous legislation in South Africa limited the application of insider 
trading laws to natural persons - under the Insider Trading Act 1998 (South Africa) – the current definition of 
‘insider’ has been extended to include natural persons, legal persons and other entities: Financial Markets Act 
2012 (South Africa), s 77.  In the European Union, the Market Abuse Directive provides in recital (18) that 
Member States should extend liability for the offences provided for in this Directive to legal persons.  In 
Germany, both natural persons and legal persons are subject to the prohibition of insider trading contained in 
the Securities Trading Act (WpHG): The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Comparative 
Implementation of EU Directives (I) – Insider Dealing and Market Abuse (2005) 41.  In Hong Kong, the insider 
dealing provisions of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Hong Kong) cap 571 apply to any ‘person’ who is 
‘connected with’ a corporation under s 270, which includes both natural and legal persons, such as 
corporations: s 3 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Hong Kong) cap 1. Section 247(2) of 
the Ordinance also expressly states that a corporation can be a person connected with another corporation.  
Section 241 of the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (NZ) prohibits insider trading by any ‘information 
insider’, which is defined in s 234 of that act to be a ‘person’ in possession of inside information.  The reference 
to a person includes both natural persons and legal persons, such as corporations: Interpretation Act 1999 
(NZ), s 29.  Section 234(2) of the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (NZ) also provides that ‘a listed issuer 
may be an information insider of itself.’  Section 218 of the Securities and Futures Act 2001 (Singapore) 
prohibits a ‘person’ from engaging in insider trading, which includes both natural and legal persons: 
Interpretation Act 1965 (Singapore), s 2.  In the USA, the insider trading prohibition applies to natural and legal 
persons, as evidenced by the applicable penalties under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement 
Act of 1988 P.L.100-704 - the maximum fine for insider trading by legal persons such as corporations is 
$USD25 million, although a further penalty representing three times the profit made or loss avoided can also be 
imposed.  Additionally, the first case brought against a corporation for insider trading was the case of Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968) in the USA. This case will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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applied.  As will be discussed in detail in chapter 5 of this thesis, Australia has a set of 
statutory provisions in the Corporations Act which specifically set out the manner in which 
the elements of the insider trading laws are to be applied to corporations.  However, most of 
the examined jurisdictions do not have such statutory provisions within the relevant 
legislation prohibiting insider trading and, as a result, the general principles of corporate 
criminal liability which are applicable in the relevant jurisdiction must be relied upon to 
determine the manner in which corporations may be found liable for insider trading.13  The 
exceptions are South Africa,14 where the relevant statute provides that principles of vicarious 
liability are to be used to determine corporate liability for insider trading, and Singapore,15 
where the relevant statute adopts specific statutory rules to apply the elements of the insider 
trading offence to corporations.16  Additionally, even though corporations are subject to 
13 Jurisdictions which do not have statutory provisions specifically providing for the application of the insider 
trading prohibition to corporations include the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA, New 
Zealand and Hong Kong. 
14 Section 82(8) of the Financial Markets Act 2012 (South Africa) states that, in connection with liability for 
insider trading, ‘the common law principles of vicarious liability apply’. 
15 Section 226(1) of the Securities and Futures Act 2001 (Singapore) specifically provides that:  
(a) a corporation is taken to possess any information which an officer of the corporation possesses 
and which came into his possession in the course of the performance of duties as such an officer; 
and  
(b) if an officer of a corporation knows or ought reasonably to know any matter or thing because he is 
an officer of the corporation, it is to be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the corporation 
knows or ought reasonably to know that matter or thing. 
Section 236B of the Securities and Futures Act 2001 (Singapore) also provides that:  
(1) Where an offence of contravening any provision in this Part is proved to have been 
committed by an employee or an officer of a corporation (referred to in this section as the 
contravening person) — 
(a) with the consent or connivance of the corporation; and 
(b)  for the benefit of the corporation, 
the corporation shall be guilty of that offence as if the corporation had committed the contravention, 
and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 
16 These provisions will be returned to in chapter 5 when the application of insider trading laws to corporations 
in Australia is analysed in detail. 
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insider trading laws in most jurisdictions, a Chinese Wall defence for corporations17 is not 
available in all jurisdictions – there is no Chinese Wall defence to insider trading in the 
European Union, Germany or South Africa.   A number of jurisdictions do have a Chinese 
Wall defence available for corporations in respect of liability for insider trading,18 but as will 
be seen in chapter 6, those defences are similar to the Chinese Wall defence found in s 
1043F of the Corporations Act, but with a number of points of departure.    
 
The Historical and Theoretical Basis of the Application of Insider Trading Laws to 
Corporations  
 
In Australia, it was originally unclear as to whether insider trading laws were intended to 
apply to corporations.  The original prohibition of insider trading under the State Securities 
Industry Acts focused on a ‘person-connection’ rather than an ‘information-connection’, with 
primary liability for insider trading depending on a person being ‘connected with a body 
corporate’.  This approach resulted in a distinction between ‘primary insiders’ - those who 
possessed inside information and had a connection with the relevant corporation (such as 
directors, officers, substantial shareholders, and those who had some form of business or 
professional relationship with the corporation) - and ‘secondary insiders’ - generally tippees 
who knowingly received the inside information from a primary insider.   
 
One of the very first Australian cases to consider the application of insider trading laws to 
corporations and the operation of the relevant provisions, at that time contained in s 128 of 
the Securities Industry (NSW) Code, was Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros 
Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd.19  This case concerned a proposed issue of shares in 
Email Ltd to a number of parties pursuant to an underwriting agreement.  Hooker 
17 The Chinese Wall defence to insider trading will be examined in detail in chapter 6.  
18 United Kingdom: Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) c 8, s 147, in conjunction with SYSC 
10.2.3R of the Financial Conduct Authority Handbook; New Zealand: Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 
(NZ), s 261; Hong Kong: Securities and Futures Ordinance (Hong Kong) cap 571, s 271(2); Singapore: 
Securities and Futures Act 2001, s 226(2); the USA: rule 10b5-1c(2)(ii), promulgated pursuant to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78a (1934), s 10(b).    
19 (1986) 10 ACLR 462.  
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Investments, an existing shareholder of Email Ltd, sought an injunction to restrain the issue 
of shares to Baring Bros, one of the underwriters, on the basis that an employee of Baring 
Bros, a corporation, had come into possession of inside information about the financial and 
corporate affairs of Email Ltd.  Accordingly, it was alleged that the receipt of the issue of 
shares in Email Ltd under the underwriting agreement would amount to insider trading by 
Baring Bros.   
 
At that time, s 128(1) of the Securities Industry (NSW) Code provided that a person 
‘connected with a body corporate’ must not deal in any of its securities ‘if he is in possession 
of information that is not generally available and if it were likely materially to affect the price 
of those securities’.20  Section 128(8) then set out the circumstances in which a person could 
be so connected.  Young J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales determined that the 
circumstances set out in s 128(8) could relate only to natural persons, and that the provision 
was exhaustive rather than inclusive so, as a result, His Honour found that only a natural 
person could be regarded as being ‘connected with a body corporate’.  As a result, s 128 of 
the Securities Industry (NSW) Code could only apply to a natural person, so that a 
corporation could not have primary liability for insider trading.21  A corporation could have 
liability as a secondary insider if it received information from a primary insider, but the 
relevant employee of Baring Bros did not fit within the definition of a primary insider, 
because his position could not ‘reasonably be expected’ to give him access to inside 
information (even if it actually did).  Thus, there was no liability for insider trading as a result 
of the issue of shares to Baring Bros.  The correctness of this aspect of the decision has 
since been questioned judicially in Brockley Investments Ltd v Black,22 despite the fact that 
the result and reasoning were approved on appeal by the Court of Appeal.23  However, there 
is now a specific exception for underwriters in s 1043C of the Corporations Act, to allow the 
20 Ibid 465. 
21 Ibid 466. 
22 (1991) 9 ACLC 255. 
23 Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 157 (Kirby 
P, Glass and McHugh JJA). 
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purchase of shares by underwriters pursuant to underwriting agreements to occur without 
any liability arising for insider trading.   
 
These issues also arose in the case of Brockley Investments Ltd v Black,24 which concerned 
the operation of s 128 of the Securities Industry (WA) Code.  Mr Black was a director of two 
corporations.  Brockley Investments Ltd bought shares in one of those corporations 
(Western Reefs Limited) from the other corporation (to be referred to as the ‘selling 
corporation’, as it was not referred to by name in the decision).  Brockley Investments Ltd 
later alleged that Mr Black and the selling corporation possessed inside information which 
would preclude them both from dealing in the securities of Western Reefs Limited.  Basing 
its argument on the reasoning in Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros Halkerston & 
Partners Securities Ltd, the selling corporation asked for the claim against it to be struck out, 
on the basis that the insider trading prohibition applied only to natural persons and not to 
corporations.  Master White did not agree with the relevant reasoning of Young J in Hooker 
Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd, determining as a 
matter of statutory interpretation that it was not necessary for a corporation to be a person 
‘connected with a body corporate’ in order for the prohibition of insider trading in s 128(3) of 
the Securities Industry Code to apply.  Accordingly, Master White accepted that both natural 
and legal persons could have primary liability for insider trading, and the application to strike 
out the relevant claim was not successful.   
 
The divergence between these two decisions result from differing interpretations of the loose 
drafting of the relevant provisions of the Securities Industry Codes.  General provisions 
prohibit ‘persons’ from engaging in insider trading, with other later provisions applying the 
prohibition to ‘bodies corporate’ in certain specific circumstances, such as where an officer 
of the body corporate possessed inside information.  The ultimate results of the two 
decisions can be reconciled on their facts, on the basis that, although a corporation could 
potentially be liable for insider trading, in Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v Baring Bros 
Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd there could be no such liability because the relevant 
employee who possessed the information was not sufficiently senior for that information to 
24 (1991) 9 ACLC 255. 
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be regarded as being in the corporation’s possession.  However, in Brockley Investments 
Ltd v Black, due to the fact that a director possessed the relevant information, such 
information could be attributed to the corporation.25  Regardless, it is no longer necessary to 
be concerned with the conflicting nature of these decisions, as in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth) it was specifically 
noted that the insertion of a definition of ‘person’ would include corporations and would 
therefore overcome the effect of the decision in Hooker Investments v Baring Bros 
Halkerston & Partners Securities Ltd.26  The previous distinction between primary and 
secondary insiders was abolished at this time, to focus only on an ‘information connection’ 
rather than a ‘person connection’,27 so that any person in possession of material information 
was then prohibited from insider trading.  Thus, while these two decisions highlight the 
ambiguity that had previously existed as to the application of insider trading laws to 
corporations, that uncertainty has now been resolved.       
 
The next case to consider the application of insider trading laws to corporations was Ex 
Parte Sun Securities Ltd.28  This case concerned the application of the Securities Industry 
(WA) Code, which at that time provided, in s 128(6), that: 
 
 …a body corporate shall not deal in any securities at a time when any officer of that body 
corporate is precluded… from dealing in those securities. 
 
Section 128(1) of the Securities Industry (WA) Code also provided that: 
 
 A person who is, or any time in the preceding 6 months has been, connected with a body 
corporate shall not deal in any securities of that body corporate if by reason of his so 
25 The attribution to a corporation of information possessed by employees, officers and others is considered in 
detail in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
26 Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth), [346]; Michael 
Ziegelaar, ‘Insider Trading Law in Australia’ in Gordon Walker, Brent Fisse and Ian Ramsay (eds), Securities 
Regulation in Australia and New Zealand (Lawbook, 2nd ed,1998) 554, 565. 
27 Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth), [37]. 
28 (1990) 1 ACSR 588. 
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being, or having been, connected with that body corporate he is in possession of 
information that is not generally available but, if it were, would be likely materially to affect 
the price of those securities. 
 
Mr Smith, an officer of Sun Securities Ltd, was alleged to have been connected with another 
corporation, Australian Shipbuilding Industries Ltd, and to have been in possession of inside 
information concerning a proposed takeover of Australian Shipbuilding Industries.  Mr Smith 
was also alleged to have negotiated and concluded the purchase of shares in Australian 
Shipbuilding Industries by Sun Securities while he possessed that inside information.  As a 
result, action was brought against both Mr Smith and Sun Securities, with Sun Securities 
being the first corporation to be charged with insider trading.29  Mr Smith and Sun Securities 
applied for an order nisi for writs of mandamus and prohibition, and for further and better 
particulars of the offences contained in the charge, but these applications were dismissed at 
first instance and on appeal.30   
 
When first hearing these applications, Kennedy J of the Supreme Court of Western Australia 
rejected a submission that for a corporation to commit the offence of insider trading ‘it 
requires the element of fault or knowledge by the company to be proved.’31  In this context, 
His Honour appears to have accepted clearly, without detailed analysis, that a corporation 
could be liable for insider trading under these provisions, but the proceedings against Sun 
Securities were ultimately discontinued after a jury acquitted Mr Smith of the insider trading 
charges at trial in February 1991.32      
 
Exicom Pty Ltd v Futuris Corporation Ltd33 was the next case to consider the application of 
insider trading laws to corporations, but the relevant statutory provision in this case was s 
1002G of the Corporations Law.  Exicom Pty Ltd wished to raise funds and sought the 
29 Tomasic, Casino Capitalism? Insider Trading in Australia (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1991) 17. 
30 Sun Securities v National Companies and Securities Commission (1990) 2 ACSR 796.  
31 Ex Parte Sun Securities Ltd (1990) 1 ACSR 588, 594. 
32 Roman Tomasic, ‘Insider Trading Law Reform in Australia’ (1991) 9 Company and Securities Law Journal 
121, 122. 
33 (1995) 13 ACLC 1758. 
80 
 
                                                 
assistance of a number of potential investors, disclosing certain information to them as a 
result.  The first investor later proposed to buy shares in Exicom on the open market.  
Exicom was able to obtain an interim order to restrain this purchase on the basis that the 
investor possessed inside information acquired as a result of the initial investment 
discussions with Exicom and the later purchase might amount to insider trading.  Exicom 
and the second investor then entered into an agreement for the second investor to subscribe 
for shares in Exicom, thereby enabling Exicom to raise some necessary funds.  The first 
investor applied for an order to prevent Exicom from issuing the shares to the second 
investor, on the basis that it would also amount to insider trading by Exicom, but the issue as 
to whether it would amount to insider trading by the second investor was not raised.    
 
It was clearly accepted that the insider trading prohibition in s 1002G of the Corporations 
Law could apply equally to corporations as to natural persons, but the application from the 
first investor was dismissed on the basis that a corporation cannot be considered an ‘insider’ 
in relation to its own shares or in respect of information that relates to its own securities.  
The reasoning behind the decision was based on the notion that insider trading laws rely on 
the existence of a fiduciary duty and that, since a corporation cannot owe a fiduciary duty to 
itself, it cannot be regarded as an ‘insider’ in relation to its own information or in relation to its 
own shares.34  As it is now well established that Australian insider trading laws are based 
not on a concept of fiduciary obligation but on a desire to maintain and protect market 
integrity and efficiency,35 the basis of this decision has since been heavily criticised.36  
 
Since that time it has been accepted without question that insider trading laws apply equally 
to corporations as to natural persons.  In the case of Westgold Resources NL v St George 
Bank Ltd,37 it was alleged that a corporation which held a put option over certain shares 
34 Ibid 1763 (Young J).  
35 A detailed discussion of this issue, and the rationale for the prohibition of insider trading, is contained in 
chapter 1 of this thesis. 
36 See, for example, Gregory Lyon and Jean J du Plessis, The Law of Insider Trading in Australia (Federation 
Press, 2005) 16; Robert P Austin and Ian M Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 16th ed, 2014) [9.650]; CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper (2001) [2.110].   
37 [1988] WASC 352. 
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could not lawfully exercise the option because it possessed inside information about the 
corporation over whose shares the option related, so that the exercise of the put option 
would amount to insider trading.  While it was clearly accepted in this case that the insider 
trading prohibition applied to that corporation, the application to restrain the exercise of the 
put option was refused due to the application of s 1015A of the Corporations Law, which 
exempted a bank or financial institution from the application of the insider trading prohibition 
where the relevant transaction amounted to an exercise of security or other activity 
conducted by a bank in the ordinary course of its banking business.38 
 
Similarly, in Ampolex Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Company (Canberra) Ltd (No 2),39 the 
application of insider trading laws to corporations was clearly accepted without argument. 
This case involved a dispute, resulting from a drafting error, over the terms of convertible 
notes which Ampolex Ltd had issued.  The convertible notes had been sold to a group of 
brokers and investors and they made an announcement to the ASX, stating what they 
believed to be the correct conversion ratio under the convertible notes.  Ampolex Ltd 
claimed that those parties had engaged in insider trading because knowledge of the content 
of the forthcoming ASX announcement amounted to inside information.  All the parties to the 
trade were aware of the relevant information and the group of brokers and investors applied 
for a summary dismissal of the action.  However the application was refused on the basis 
that a defence that the counterparty to a trade also possessed the relevant inside 
information (then contained in s 1002T(2)(b) of the Corporations Act, and now in s 
1043M(2)(b) of the Corporations Act) could only be relied on in a criminal prosecution and 
not in civil proceedings. 
 
38 A similar, but not identical, exemption exists under the current Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth): 
Regulation 9.12.01(e) provides that s 1043A(1) of the Corporations Act does not have effect in relation to…  
(e)    a sale of financial products under: 
(i) a mortgage or charge of the financial products; or 
(ii) a mortgage, charge, pledge or lien of documents of title to the financial products. 
39 (1996) 14 ACLC 1514. 
82 
 
                                                 
In Rivkin Financial Services Ltd v Sofcom Ltd,40 a set of civil proceedings brought by Rivkin 
Financial Services, a publicly-listed corporation related to Mr Rene Rivkin,41 against three 
corporations related to Mr Farooq Khan, the Court clearly accepted that corporations are 
subject to the prohibition of insider trading.  Mr Khan had wished to significantly increase his 
holding in Rivkin Financial Services and, if possible, to gain control of the board, and as a 
result he bought a large parcel of shares through three corporations which he controlled.  
Rivkin Financial Services brought a civil action against Mr Khan and the three corporations 
which alleged, amongst other things, that as a result of those purchases the three 
corporations had engaged in insider trading.  Rivkin Financial Services argued that the fact 
that Mr Khan wished to increase his shareholding and control its board was inside 
information and that the three corporations possessed that information through Mr Khan, 
who was the managing director of each corporation.  Emmet J of the Federal Court did find 
that the information about Mr Khan’s intentions was to be attributed to each of the three 
corporations,42 but determined that there had in fact been no insider trading as the 
information was not material.43  The application of insider trading laws to corporations was 
accepted without question in this case, but the manner in which the information was 
possessed by the three corporations was not analysed.  
 
The facts of ASIC v Citigroup44 were set out in some detail in chapter 2 of this thesis.  In this 
set of civil penalty proceedings for insider trading brought against the Australian subsidiary 
of a global investment bank, it was clearly accepted that the insider trading prohibition 
applies to corporations.  Even though there was an eventual finding that Citigroup had not 
actually engaged in insider trading - due to the fact that the relevant information was not 
considered to be material; the relevant employee did not actually possess inside information; 
the corporation was not taken to possess the alleged information since the employee was 
not an officer of the corporation; and the corporation was found to have an effective Chinese 
40 (2004) 51 ACSR 486. 
41 Mr Rivkin was convicted of insider trading in an unrelated set of criminal proceedings in 2004: R v Rivkin 
(2004) 184 FLR 365. 
42 Rivkin Financial Services Ltd v Sofcom Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 486, 517. 
43 Ibid 516. 
44 (2007) 160 FCR 35. 
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Wall in place - the applicability of insider trading laws to Citigroup, as a corporation, was 
never in question.         
 
The change in position which can be observed when reviewing the cases above – from 
circumstances in which it was unclear whether Australian insider trading laws applied to 
corporations to those where it is now readily accepted they do – is attributable primarily to 
the adoption of a new regulatory regime and legislative modification.  The law has moved 
from a requirement that a ‘primary insider’ must be a ‘person connected with a body 
corporate’, to a system which no longer distinguishes between primary and secondary 
‘insiders’ and applies the prohibition of insider trading more broadly to any ‘person’.  Even 
though there are in fact very few Australian insider trading cases which relate to 
corporations, those cases that do exist evidence the current clear acceptance that the 
insider trading regime applies to legal persons such as corporations, as well as to natural 
persons.  However, all existing convictions and findings of liability relate only to natural 
persons – there have been no successful criminal or civil penalty proceedings brought 
against a corporation for insider trading in Australia.   When considering the topic of this 
thesis – the criminal liability of corporations for insider trading in Australia – the absence of 
such proceedings produces a number of challenges.  The dearth of cases means that the 
opportunity to consider the judicial interpretation of the relevant provisions is extremely 
limited, and it is therefore not a topic addressed at length in the literature.   However, that 
absence does not reduce the importance of the thesis topic – indeed, the fact that there 
have been no successful proceedings brought against a corporation could potentially be 
remedied if the reforms suggested in this thesis were to be adopted, as the proposed 
reforms are aimed at better applying the insider trading laws to corporations and ensuring 
that there is certainty as to their operation.     
 
Why Should Corporations Be Liable for Insider Trading? 
 
Having determined that corporations are subject to the prohibition of insider trading in 
Australia, it is important to consider whether it is appropriate for corporations to continue to 
be caught by that prohibition.  If the application of insider trading laws to corporations is to 
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be analysed and reforms proposed where appropriate, it is imperative that it be determined 
whether it is fitting for those laws to apply to corporations at all. 
 
It has been noted above that it was originally unclear, after insider trading was first 
prohibited by statute in Australia, whether insider trading laws were intended to apply to 
corporations.  However, this uncertainty has now been overcome and the prohibition of 
insider trading clearly extends to corporations as well as to natural persons.  It has also been 
noted above that other jurisdictions apply insider trading laws to corporations as well as 
natural persons, with the United Kingdom being the only country to apply only civil liability for 
insider trading to corporations, purportedly to avoid difficulties and negative effects on 
business efficacy for large corporations. 
 
When CAMAC conducted its review of Australian insider trading laws in 2001 to 2003, it 
considered whether it might be appropriate to limit the application of insider trading laws to 
natural persons.  CAMAC noted that, if the application of insider trading laws was limited to 
natural persons, the legislative provisions could be simplified because there would be no 
need for the Chinese Wall defence for corporations.45  However, CAMAC ultimately 
determined that there is no compelling reason why corporations should not be subject to the 
prohibition of insider trading, and that it was beneficial to retain the Chinese Wall defence for 
corporations.  In particular, CAMAC considered that limiting the application of the insider 
trading prohibition to natural persons would undermine incentives for large organisations to 
control the internal flow of confidential information.46  
 
While there are a number of different models of corporate criminal liability, each of which will 
be addressed in detail in the next chapter, those models are all clearly predicated on the 
basis that it is appropriate for corporations to have criminal liability, with the primary issue 
being the determination of the manner in which such liability is to be attributed.  However, 
the difficulties associated with prosecuting and sentencing corporations have lead to 
45 CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper, above n 36, [1.54]. 
46 CAMAC, Insider Trading Report (2003) [3.2].  Issues concerning the operation of ‘Chinese Walls are 
considered in detail in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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suggestions by some commentators that criminal liability should only be imposed on natural 
persons.  This view is generally referred to as ‘individualism’, as it is argued that 
‘corporations don’t commit offences, people do.’47  Arguments in favour of individualism are 
commonly justified on the basis that corporations cannot be imprisoned, that significant fines 
cause hardship to the shareholders of the corporation rather than to those within the 
corporation who carry out the relevant criminal acts and omissions, and that the imposition 
of punishments upon corporations does little to actually deter criminal activity.48  However, 
these views are generally countered by arguments in favour of ‘collectivism’ that, as 
corporate crimes are so often hard to detect, corporations are more likely to take internal 
action to prevent the relevant criminal conduct occurring, if the corporation itself is likely to 
have liability for any resulting crime.49  As a result, the existence of corporate criminal liability 
can act as a deterrent to those who would engage criminal conduct within an organisation, 
with Fisse and Braithwaite stating that: 
 
 Individualism persistently fails to capture the corporate significance of corporate 
operations over which the law seeks to exercise control… The logic and practical 
imperatives of deterrence do not preclude corporate criminal responsibility, but, on the 
contrary, impel it.50  
 
47 Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, ‘The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, 
Collectivism and Accountability’ (1988) 11 Sydney Law Review 469, 473. 
48 John C Coffee, ‘No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate 
Punishment’ (1981) 79 Michigan Law Review 386, 387-389; Simon Chesterman, ‘The Corporate Veil, Crime 
and Punishment’ (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 1064, 1072-1073.  
49 Jonathan Clough and Carmel Mulhern, The Prosecution of Corporations, (Oxford University Press, 2002) 7; 
John C Coffee, ‘Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal 
Sanctions’ (1980) American Criminal Law Review 419, 421; Fisse and Braithwaite, above n 47, 489.  Indeed, in 
1929, Winn argued for direct criminal liability for corporations on the basis that they are more powerful than 
individuals and therefore more likely to cause harm, as well as the fact that the existence of corporate criminal 
liability is more likely to deter agents within the corporation from engaging in criminal conduct: C R N Winn, 
‘The Criminal Responsibility of Corporations’ (1929) 3 Cambridge Law Journal 398, 412-413, 415. 
50 Fisse and Braithwaite, above n 47, 510. 
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Some commentators take a ‘middle ground’ between individualism and collectivism, arguing 
that corporate criminal liability is only appropriate where no one individual can be identified 
as having criminal responsibility.51  However, in Australia it is generally accepted that it is 
appropriate to impose criminal liability on corporations as well as natural persons.  By way of 
example, the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Criminal Code’) provides in s 12.1(b) that ‘A 
body corporate may be found guilty of any offence, including one punishable by 
imprisonment.’  
 
I propose that corporations should remain subject to both criminal and civil liability for insider 
trading in Australia for a number of reasons.  Firstly, the imposition of criminal liability for 
insider trading on corporations reinforces the notion that insider trading is regarded as a 
serious threat to market integrity and that all persons, natural and legal, should be subject to 
the prohibition of insider trading.  Criminal sanctions are appropriate for any conduct which 
‘involves, or has the potential to cause, considerable harm to society or individuals, the 
environment or Australia’s national interests, including securities interests.’52  In this context, 
it is important to refer to the rationale for the prohibition of insider trading.  It was shown in 
chapter 1 of this thesis that insider trading is prohibited in Australia on the basis of a ‘market 
integrity’ rationale – a rationale which aims to protect and ensure market integrity on two 
bases: that it is necessary for both market fairness and market efficiency.   Accordingly, the 
question must be asked: is market integrity more likely to be protected and maintained if 
corporations are subject to the prohibition of insider trading, or would market integrity be 
better served by removing the application of insider trading laws to corporations?   As insider 
trading has the potential to cause significant harm to Australia’s securities markets, I 
consider that it is appropriate that all persons who may be regarded as engaging in such 
conduct be caught by the relevant prohibition and subject to criminal liability.  The impact of 
51 See, for example, Lim Win Ts’ai, ‘Corporations and the Devil’s Dictionary: The Problem of Individual 
Responsibility for Corporate Crimes’ (1990) 12 Sydney Law Review 311, 313;  Matthew Goode, ‘Corporate 
Criminal Liability ’in Neil Gunningham, Jennifer Norberry and Sandra McKillop (eds), Environmental Crime 
(Australian Institute of Criminology, 1995) 6.  
52 Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, Criminal Justice Division, A Guide to Framing 
Commonwealth Offences, Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers (2011) 12. 
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insider trading is not reduced or minimised merely because the conduct is engaged in by a 
corporation rather than a natural person.   
 
Secondly, the fact that a corporation has never been convicted of insider trading in Australia, 
and that there have been no successful civil proceedings for insider trading brought against 
a corporation, is not a compelling reason to simply cease to apply insider trading laws to 
corporations.  Even if corporations were to have only civil instead of criminal liability for 
insider trading, the elements of the insider trading offence must still be applied and proven, 
even if subject to a different standard of proof.53  There are a number of reasons why 
corporations may not have been the subject of successful proceedings for insider trading in 
Australia, including the complexity of Australian insider trading laws, particularly in relation to 
their application to corporations.  If the difficulties in the application of insider trading laws to 
corporations can be identified and resolved, greater enforcement action for insider trading 
might be brought.  In particular, any concerns that may relate to the operation or efficacy of 
Chinese Walls within corporations are better addressed by regulation aimed at improving 
such operation and efficacy, rather than a determination that liability for insider trading 
should be removed or reduced.  While the regulator may have a discretion to elect to pursue 
either criminal or civil proceedings against an alleged insider trader – whether that defendant 
is a natural person or a legal person – it would not be appropriate to remove insider trading 
liability for corporations, or to limit it to civil consequences only, as the significant impact of 
insider trading warrants the availability of both criminal and civil liability as a deterrent factor 
for all potential insider traders.   
 
Finally, that fact that insider trading is extremely difficult to detect and identify reinforces the 
importance of continuing to apply criminal liability for insider trading to corporations.  The 
continuing existence of direct corporate criminal liability for insider trading makes it more 
likely that corporations will take steps to proscribe such conduct and prevent it from 
occurring within the organisation.  This will limit opportunities for individuals associated with 
53 In civil proceedings for insider trading, the civil standard of proof, ‘on the balance of probabilities’ is applied, 
instead of the criminal standard, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. 
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the corporation to engage in insider trading, either on their own account or on behalf of the 
corporation.      
 
Accordingly, for these reasons, I consider that the intended rationale to protect and maintain 
market integrity is best served by continuing to apply the prohibition of insider trading to 
corporations.  Thus, having demonstrated that insider trading laws do currently apply to 
corporations in Australia, and that it is appropriate that they should continue to do so even 
though amendments to the manner in which they apply might be necessary, the next chapter 
of this thesis will consider the nature of corporate criminal liability in this context, looking at 
the manner in which the law has developed rules to provide for corporate criminal liability 
under the general law and statute, in order to apply principles of criminal liability to 
corporations.   
  
89 
 
CHAPTER 4 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
As insider trading is both a criminal and civil offence, and having determined that it is 
appropriate for corporations to have criminal liability for insider trading, the manner in which 
a corporation can be liable for a criminal offence is the necessary focus of this chapter.  In 
order to be able to properly analyse the application of the elements of the insider trading 
offence to corporations – that is, to determine how a corporation can possess inside 
information; how a corporation can have the requisite knowledge that certain information is 
inside information; and how a corporation can engage in the relevant trading conduct - 
corporate criminal liability, and the nature of the physical and fault elements of criminal 
offences, need to be addressed and understood.   
 
Determining the manner in which criminal liability should be imposed on corporations has 
long proved to be a complex and vexed legal issue.  The common law has attempted to 
address the issue of corporate liability for crimes in two primary ways: through principles of 
vicarious liability and through direct liability, incorporating the identification doctrine.  
Additionally, specific statutory rules have been developed to provide for the application of 
the necessary elements of various criminal offences to corporations.  While the Corporations 
Act contains particular provisions relating to corporate criminal liability for insider trading, 
and sets out rules for attributing the possession of information, knowledge and conduct of 
certain individuals to corporations, those provisions of the Corporations Act are not 
necessarily exclusive and may still allow the general law rules to operate, as will be 
demonstrated in later chapters of this thesis.  Thus, this chapter will consider the manner in 
which the law has developed rules to provide for corporate criminal liability under the general 
law, and then review the statutory rules which have been developed in order to apply 
principles of criminal liability to corporations.  The specific provisions of the Corporations Act 
which relate to corporate criminal liability for insider trading will be addressed in order to 
provide a clear context for the later chapters of this thesis.  It is necessary to determine 
which is the most appropriate model for corporate liability for insider trading when 
considering potential reform to the current provisions.    
 
90 
 
Models of Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
The common law has traditionally applied concepts of ‘actus reus’ (in essence, a guilty act) 
and ‘mens rea’ (a guilty mind) to most criminal offences.  The ‘actus reus’ is the ‘forbidden 
act’ or unlawful conduct which gives rise to the offence,1 and includes the relevant ‘act or 
omission, the circumstances in which it takes place, and any consequences.’2  The ‘mens 
rea’ is often considered to be ‘an evil intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the 
act.’3  The term also refers to a ‘variety of states of mind, including intent, knowledge and 
recklessness.’4  However, the Criminal Code, which provides for principles of criminal 
responsibility for Commonwealth offences, does not use the terms ‘actus rea’ or ‘mens rea’, 
but instead separates offences into ‘physical elements’ and ‘fault elements’.5  
 
The general law concepts of actus reus and mens rea were originally developed with 
individual offenders in mind,6 and have often proved difficult to apply to corporations, due to 
the fact that a corporation can only act through its officers and agents and has no physical 
body or mind of its own.7  Fisse has stated that: 
 
The attribution of criminal liability to corporations is an intractable subject; indeed, it is one 
of the blackest holes in criminal law.8 
 
1 R v Barker (1983) 153 CLR 338, 370 (Dawson J). 
2 David Brown, David Farrier, Luke McNamara, Alex Steel, Michael Grewcock, Julia Quilter and Melanie 
Schwartz, Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process in New South Wales 
(Federation Press, 6th ed, 2015) 144. 
3 Sherras v De Rutzen (1895) 1 QB 918, 921, approved in R v He Kaw Teh (1985) 157 CLR 523, 528 (Gibbs 
CJ).  
4 Brown et al, above n 2, 145.  
5 Criminal Code, s 3.1(1). 
6 Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Sentencing: Corporate Offenders, Report No 10 (2003) [2.3]. 
7 Jonathan Clough and Carmel Mulhern, The Prosecution of Corporations (Oxford University Press, 2002) 71. 
8 Brent Fisse, ‘The Attribution of Criminal Liability to Corporations: A Statutory Model’ (1992) 13 Sydney Law 
Review 277, 277. 
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As a reflection of this difficulty, the first recorded cases of corporations being found liable for 
crimes involved offences of strict liability only.9  Such cases concerned regulatory offences, 
such as criminal nuisance, which required only that it be demonstrated that the relevant acts 
or omissions had occurred (the actus reus), without needing any proof of mens rea.10   
 
The common law has now developed to recognise two primary models of corporate criminal 
liability - vicarious liability - where the corporation is liable for the criminal conduct of its 
employees or agents; and direct liability through the identification doctrine – where the 
corporation is actually regarded as having engaged in the criminal conduct itself due to the 
actions and intentions of its organs.11  There are also two other significant theories of 
corporate criminal liability which have received statutory recognition, if not judicial 
endorsement, in Australia – the ‘aggregation’ doctrine – under which a corporation can be 
liable for the collective actions and intentions of more than one individual within the 
organisation;12 and the ‘organisational fault’ model – which seeks to impose liability where 
there is perceived to be blameworthy conduct by the corporation itself, without needing to 
identify particular individuals whose actions and intentions must be attributed to the 
corporation.13   
 
Vicarious Liability 
 
Vicarious liability, a form of indirect liability, arises when one person is held responsible for 
the misconduct of another, due to the nature of the relationship between them.  For 
example, employers are generally vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of their 
9 For example, R v Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Co (1842) 114 ER 492; R v The Great North of 
England Railway Co (1846) 115 ER 1294. 
10 Clough and Mulhern, above n 7, 72-73. 
11 Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, above n 6, [2.5]. 
12 Eric Colvin, ‘Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability’ (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum 1, 18. 
13 G R Sullivan, ‘The Attribution of Culpability to Limited Companies’ (1996) 55 Cambridge Law Journal 515, 
524. 
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employees occurring within the scope of their employment.14  Where the employer is a 
corporation, the corporation will bear the vicarious liability for the conduct of its employees, 
as would a natural person in the same position.  Although vicarious liability is most 
commonly used in tort to impose liability for negligence, corporations can also be found 
vicariously liable for crimes in respect of the conduct of their officers or employees acting 
within the scope of their employment or authority.15  Courts have generally not been willing 
to find corporations vicariously liable for crimes committed by their officers or employees 
where the crime is prohibited by statute, unless the statute indicates a clear legislative intent 
that there should be such liability.16  In Mousell Bros Ltd v London and North-Western 
Railway Co,17 Viscount Reading CJ stated that: 
 
Prima facie ... a master is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servant 
to which the master is not a party.  But it may be the intention of the legislature, in order to 
guard against the happening of the forbidden thing, to impose a liability upon a principal 
even though he does not know of, and is not a party to, the forbidden act done by his 
servant.  Many statutes are passed with this object.  In those cases the legislature 
absolutely forbids the act and makes the principal liable without a mens rea.18 
 
Where vicarious liability operates so that a corporation is considered to be guilty of a criminal 
offence, the corporation is not actually regarded as having engaged in the offence itself, but 
it has liability because of the relationship between the corporation and the person actually 
committing the offence.   
 
The imposition of vicarious liability for criminal offences has been criticised because a 
corporation can be liable for the criminal acts of junior employees in circumstances in which 
the corporation derives no benefit from the relevant acts and, in very large organisations, 
14 R P Balkin and J L R Davies, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2009) 719. 
15 Meaghan Wilkinson, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability – The Move Towards Recognising Genuine Corporate 
Fault’ (2003) 9 Canterbury Law Review 142. 
16 For example, Mousell Bros Ltd v London and North-Western Railway Co [1917] 2 KB 836, applied by the 
High Court in R v Australasian Films Ltd (1921) 29 CLR 195. 
17 [1917] 2 KB 836. 
18 Ibid 844. 
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there can be great difficulty in closely supervising every employee.19  As a result, there are 
often ‘due diligence’ defences available under statutes which impose vicarious liability for 
criminal offences, which provide that there is no liability where a corporation has taken 
reasonable precautions to prevent the relevant act or omission occurring.20  Criminal 
vicarious liability is usually only imposed for less serious offences, such as those which are 
regulatory in nature – for example, fair-trading, consumer protection and environmental 
offences - or where it would be impossible to enforce the offence without vicarious liability.21  
As a result, vicarious liability is not used, or proposed, as a model for corporate criminal 
liability for insider trading.  
 
Direct Liability 
 
The common law model of ‘doctrine of identification’ - also known as ‘organic theory’ or the 
‘alter ego’ doctrine22 - operates to impose direct criminal liability on corporations, so that the 
actus reus and mens rea of certain officers or agents, as the corporate organs, are taken to 
be those of the corporation.23  This means that the corporation itself is regarded as having 
committed the crime, rather than merely being held responsible for crimes committed by 
others.  
 
19 See, for example, James Gobert, ‘Corporate Criminality: Four Models of Fault’ (1994) 14 Legal Studies 393, 
398. 
20 Fisse, above n 8, 279.  An example of such a ‘due diligence’ defence can be found in s 12.3(3) of the 
Criminal Code which provides that: 
Paragraph (2)(b) [which sets out the means by which authorisation or permission for relevant 
conduct might be established] does not apply if the body corporate proves that it exercised due 
diligence to prevent the conduct, or the authorisation or permission. 
21 Clough and Mulhern, above n 7, 124. 
22 Ross Grantham, ‘Attributing Responsibility to Corporate Entities: A Doctrinal Approach’ (2001) 19 Company 
and Securities Law Journal 168, 168; Sullivan, above n 13, 515.  For ease of reference, the term ‘identification 
doctrine’ will be used throughout this thesis. 
23 Martin Wolff, ‘On the Nature of Legal Persons’ (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review 494. 
94 
 
                                                 
The identification doctrine relies on the concept of the ‘directing mind and will’ of a 
corporation, which originated from the judgment of Viscount Haldane LC24 in the civil case of 
Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd.25  Under this doctrine, where there is 
a person who can be regarded as an organic part of the corporation, their actions and state 
of mind can be considered to be those of the corporation itself.  Viscount Haldane LC stated 
that: 
 
 ...A corporation is an abstraction.  It has no mind of its own any more than a body of its 
own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the person of somebody 
who ... may be called an agent, but who is really the directing mind and will of the 
corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation... That person 
may be under the direction of the shareholders in general meeting; that person may be 
the board of directors itself, or it may be, and in some corporations it is so, that that 
person has an authority co-ordinate with the board of directors given to him under the 
articles of association, and is appointed by the general meeting of the corporation, and 
can only be removed by the general meeting of the corporation.26   
 
The concept of the directing mind and will of a corporation was further developed by Lord 
Denning in H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Ltd,27 another civil case, 
where His Honour noted that: 
 
 Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents who … cannot be said 
to represent the mind or will.  Others are directors and managers who represent the 
directing mind and will of the company and control what it does.  The state of mind of 
these managers is the state of mind of the company… Whether their intention is the 
company’s intention depends on the nature of the matter under consideration, the relative 
24 The Law Lords – Lord Dunedin, Lord Atkinson, Lord Parker of Waddington and Lord Parmoor – all concurred 
with Viscount Haldane LC’s judgment. 
25 [1915] AC 705. 
26 Ibid 713-714. 
27 [1957] 1 QB 159. 
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position of the officer or agent and the other relevant facts and circumstances of the 
case.28       
 
In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass,29 the principle of the ‘directing mind and will’ of a 
corporation was then applied to criminal liability. This case involved criminal proceedings 
brought against Tesco Supermarkets under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 (UK) due to the 
advertisement of certain products at a price lower than the marked price on the products 
displayed in the supermarket.  All the products marked at the lower advertised price had 
been sold and a shop assistant had replaced them on the shelf with products marked at the 
original higher price.  The store manager, who, in accordance with the corporation’s 
procedures, was responsible for supervising the shop assistant, was not aware that this had 
occurred.  The Trade Descriptions Act contained a defence which could be relied on in such 
proceedings if it could be proved that: 
 
(a) the commission of the offence was due to … the act or default of another person; and 
 
(b) he [the corporation] took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to 
avoid the commission of such an offence…30   
 
Having been found guilty of the offence by the Magistrates Court, and after unsuccessfully 
appealing to the Divisional Court, Tesco Supermarkets appealed to the House of Lords on 
that basis that the offence was due to the act of the store manager, who was ‘another 
person’ within the meaning of s 24(1)(a), and that Tesco Supermarkets had taken all 
reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence within the meaning of s 24(1)(b) of 
the Trade Descriptions Act, having set up proper systems for the running of the store.  It was 
ultimately determined that Tesco Supermarkets was entitled to rely on the defence in s 24(1) 
of the Trade Descriptions Act on this basis. 
    
28 Ibid 172. 
29 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass (1972) AC 153. 
30 Trade Descriptions Act 1968 (UK), s 24(1) (emphasis added). 
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Lord Reid approved the comments of Viscount Haldane LC31 in Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v 
Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd,32 and those of Lord Denning33 in H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd 
v T J Graham & Sons Ltd,34 noting that: 
 
 A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent and he 
has hands to carry out his intentions.  A corporation has none of these: it must act through 
living persons, though not always one or the same person.  Then the person who acts is 
not speaking or acting for the company.  He is acting as the company and his mind which 
directs his acts is the mind of the company.  There is no question of the company being 
vicariously liable.  He is not acting as a servant, representative, agent or delegate.  He is 
an embodiment of the company or, one could say, he hears and speaks through the 
persona of the company, within his appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of the 
company.  If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the company. It must be a 
question of law whether, once the facts have been ascertained, a person in doing 
particular things is to be regarded as the company or merely as the company's servant or 
agent.  In that case any liability of the company can only be a statutory or vicarious 
liability.35 
 
Lord Reid then stated that: 
 
Normally the board of directors, the managing director and perhaps other superior officers 
of a company carry out the functions of management and speak and act as the company.  
Their subordinates do not.  They carry out orders from above and it can make no 
difference that they are given some measure of discretion. But the board of directors may 
delegate some part of their functions of management giving to their delegate full discretion 
to act independently of instructions from them. I see no difficulty in holding that they have 
31 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass (1972) AC 153, 170. 
32 [1915] AC 705. 
33 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass (1972) AC 153, 170. 
34 [1957] 1 QB 159. 
35 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass (1972) AC 153, 170. 
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thereby put such a delegate in their place so that within the scope of the delegation he 
can act as the company.36 
 
The other Lords also approved the comments of Viscount Haldane LC in Lennard’s Carrying 
Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd,37 and Lord Denning in H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v 
T J Graham & Sons Ltd,38 and accepted the application of the principle of the ‘directing mind 
and will’ when considering the imposition of criminal liability on the relevant corporation, in 
this case Tesco Supermarkets.39   The Lords also each separately determined that the store 
manager was not the directing mind and will of Tesco Supermarkets, so could properly be 
regarded as ‘another person’ for the purposes of the defence found in s 24(1)(b) of the 
Trade Descriptions Act.  
 
The use of the identification doctrine to impose direct criminal liability on corporations - 
particularly in accordance with the statements of Lord Reid in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v 
Nattrass40 - has been accepted and applied in a number of Australian cases41 and approved 
by the High Court in the decision of Hamilton v Whitehead.42  However, it must be 
acknowledged that there can be great difficulty in determining who actually is or may be 
36 Ibid 171.  It was determined by Lord Reid that the store manager was not the directing mind and will of Tesco 
Supermarkets, so that he could be considered to be ‘another person’ for the purposes of the defence relied 
upon, and that Tesco Supermarkets had also engaged in an appropriate degree of due diligence – the board of 
Tesco Supermarkets had developed an operational system for the proper running of its stores, and had not 
delegated its managerial function to the store manager, so that the store manager’s acts were not the acts of 
the corporation: Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass (1972) AC 153, 175. 
37 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705. 
38 H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159. 
39 See Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest at 180-181; Viscount Dilhorne at 187-188; Lord Pearson at 190; Lord 
Diplock at 199-200: Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass (1972) AC 153.  
40 (1972) AC 153. 
41 See, for example, Hanley v Automotive Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union 
(2000) 100 FCR 530; Collins v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1986) 5 NSWLR 209; Walplan Pty Ltd v Wallace 
(1985) 8 FCR 27; Trade Practices Commission v Tubemakers of Australia Ltd (1983) 47 ALR 719; G J Coles & 
Co Ltd v Goldsworthy [1985] WAR 183; Universal Telecasters (Qld) Ltd v Guthrie (1978) 18 ALR 531.  
42 (1988) 166 CLR 121. 
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regarded as the directing mind and will of a corporation.  The directing mind and will of the 
corporation may be, as stated by Lord Reid, the board of directors; the managing director; or 
a superior officer who ‘carr[ies] out the functions of management and speak[s] and act[s] as 
the corporation’.43  The concept does not apply to ‘all servants of a company…who exercise 
some managerial discretion under the direction of superior officers’.44  A person who is the 
directing mind and will of a corporation can only be a person or persons given ‘full discretion 
to act independently of instruction’ from the board.45  Thus, this approach has been widely 
criticised because it restricts liability to the conduct or fault of directors and high level 
managers,46 favouring larger corporations which will escape liability for acts of most 
employees47 and because criminal liability may be easily avoided by retaining an ultimate 
discretion within the board.48 
 
In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission,49 a case from 
New Zealand which went on appeal to the Privy Council, the identification doctrine was 
stated to be only one form of attribution available to determine direct corporate criminal 
liability.  This case concerned an investment management corporation, Meridian, which had 
two senior employees who had used Meridian’s funds to purchase shares in a listed 
corporation on Meridian’s behalf.  Due to the quantity of shares purchased, Meridian 
became a substantial shareholder of the listed corporation.  The managing director and 
board of directors of Meridian were unaware of the share purchase, or that Meridian had 
become a substantial shareholder of the listed corporation, although the two senior 
employees had authority to make investments on behalf of Meridian.  The relevant 
provisions of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 (New Zealand) required a person who 
43 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass (1972) AC 153, 171. 
44 Ibid 171 (Lord Reid). 
45 Ibid 171 (Lord Reid), 193 (Lord Pearson). 
46 Fisse, above n 8; Eilis Ferran, ‘Corporate Attribution and the Directing Mind and Will’ (2011) 127 Law 
Quarterly Review 239, 242.   
47 Gobert, above n 19, 400; Colvin, above n 12, 15.  
48 Jennifer Hill and Ronald Harmer, ‘Criminal Liability of Corporations – Australia’ in H De Doelder and K 
Tiedemann (eds), Criminal Liability of Corporations (Kluwer Law International, 1994) 71, 81-2. 
49 [1995] AC 500. 
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became a substantial shareholder of a listed corporation to notify the Securities Commission 
as soon as they knew, or ought to have known, that they had become a substantial 
shareholder.50  One of the employees was the corporation’s chief investment officer and his 
knowledge of the share purchase was attributed to Meridian, which meant Meridian ought to 
have known that it was a substantial shareholder of the listed corporation, placing it in 
breach of the notification obligation.  This determination was made, not because the chief 
investment officer was considered to be Meridian’s ‘directing mind and will’ but because it 
was considered by the Privy Council to be the natural construction of the statute.51     
 
In reaching the decision in this case, the Privy Council emphasised that the decision of the 
House of Lords in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass ‘was based not on general principle 
but on interpretation of particular statutory provisions’,52 in that case being those within the 
Trade Descriptions Act 1968 (UK).  Lord Hoffman53 stated that, when determining whether a 
corporation is to be liable for a particular crime, the question to be answered is: 
 
whose act (or knowledge, or state of mind) was for this purpose intended to count as the 
act etc of the company?  One finds the answer to this question by applying the usual 
canons of interpretation, taking into account the language of the rule (if it is a statute) and 
its content and policy.54  
 
Lord Hoffman then classified the rules of attribution into three separate groups: (i)  primary 
rules of attribution - where the relevant acts were authorised by a resolution of the board of 
directors or unanimous agreement of shareholders; (ii) general rules of attribution - such as 
the rules of agency and vicarious liability, which operate in respect of natural persons as well 
as corporations; and (iii) special rules of attribution - to be determined by the courts for the 
purpose of applying particular rules.  In such circumstances, the court must determine 
50 Securities Amendment Act 1988 (NZ), ss 20(3) and (4). 
51 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission [1995] AC 500, 512. 
52 Brown et al, above n 2, 253. 
53 All other Lords agreed with Lord Hoffman in this decision. 
54 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission [1995] AC 500, 507 (emphasis 
added). 
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whose act or knowledge was intended by the legislature to be counted as the act or 
knowledge of the corporation, taking into account the policy of the relevant law.55 
 
According to these classifications, the identification doctrine is regarded as one of the 
special rules of attribution, but not as the only way of determining direct corporate criminal 
liability.  This means that it is not always necessary to determine who might be the directing 
mind and will of a corporation, as: 
 
it is a question of construction in each case as to whether the particular rule requires that 
the knowledge that an act has been done, or the state of mind with which it was done, 
should be attributed to the company.56     
 
Following this decision would mean that employees who would not necessarily be regarded 
as the ‘directing mind and will’ of a corporation could still have their acts and intentions 
attributed to the corporation, depending upon the language, policy and intention of the 
relevant statute.57  
  
While the decision in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities 
Commission58 was welcomed by many commentators for its flexibility and recognition of the 
‘realities of diffused organisational decision making’,59 others criticised its lack of certainty 
and predictability, due to difficulties in determining whether a corporation is likely to have 
liability in any particular case.60  As noted in ABC Developmental Learning Centres Pty Ltd v 
Wallace,61 a decision of Bell J of the Supreme Court of Victoria, the pronouncements of Lord 
Hoffman in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission have 
55 Ibid 507 (emphasis added). 
56 Ibid 511.  
57 Ross Grantham, ‘Corporate Knowledge: Identification or Attribution’ (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 732, 734.  
58 [1995] AC 500. 
59 See, for example, Grantham, above n 57.   
60 See, for example, Clough and Mulhern, above n 7, 101.  
61 [2006] VSC 171 (3 May 2006).  
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‘been frequently followed or cited with approval in various contexts’:62 for example, by the 
Supreme Court of Western Australia,63 the Federal Court,64 the Supreme Court of South 
Australia,65 the Supreme Court of New South Wales,66 and the Supreme Court of Victoria.67  
However, it was also noted in ABC Developmental Learning Centres Pty Ltd v Wallace, that 
each of these instances involved cases which were regulatory in nature.68  The statements 
made by Lord Hoffman in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities 
Commission have not yet been adopted by the High Court, whose approval of the reasoning 
in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass in Hamilton v Whitehead69 remains the definitive 
pronouncement on direct corporate criminal liability in Australia.  Additionally, despite the 
decision in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission, the 
identification doctrine seems to have remained the judicially preferred basis for corporate 
attribution in relation to serious crimes involving mens rea.70   
 
As will be discussed in detail in chapter 5 of this thesis, while the Corporations Act does 
provide specific statutory mechanisms for determining when a corporation is to be regarded 
as engaging in the relevant elements of the insider trading offence, the Corporations Act 
does not exclude the general law or provide that the statutory mechanisms are to be 
exclusive.  Thus, while these statutory mechanisms might be regarded as ‘special rules of 
62 Ibid [6].  
63 The City of Perth and Ors v DL (Representing the Members of People Living With Aids (WA) (Inc) and Ors 
BC960167 [1996] EOC 92-796 (27 March 1996) (Ipp J). 
64 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v J McPhee & Son (Australia) Pty Ltd [1997] 469 FCA 
(19 May 1997) (Heerey J); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Simsmetal Limited and Ors 
[2000] FCA 818 (20 June 2000) (Heerey J); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian 
Safeway Stores Pty Ltd and Another (2003) 129 FCR 339 (Heerey, Sackville and Emmett JJ). 
65 Duke Group Limited (in liquidation) v Pilmer and Ors (1999) 73 SASR 64 (Doyle CJ, Duggan and Bleby JJ); 
Minister for Environment and Heritage v Greentree and Others (2004) 138 FCR 198 (Sackville J). 
66 AAPT Ltd v Cable & Wireless Optus Ltd and Others (1999) 32 ACSR 63 (Austin J).  
67 Director of Public Prosecutions Reference No 1 of 1996 [1998] 3 VR 352 (Callaway JA); Emhill Pty Ltd v 
Bonsoc Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 379 (Callaway JA). 
68 ABC Developmental Learning Centres Pty Ltd v Wallace [2006] VSC 171 (3 May 2006) [12]. 
69 (1988) 166 CLR 121. 
70 Attorney-Generals’ Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796; Ferran, above n 46, 246. 
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attribution’ in accordance with the statements of Lord Hoffman in Meridian Global Funds 
Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission,71 attribution through the identification 
doctrine and as a result of the acts and intentions of the directing mind and will of a 
corporation, may also be available to attribute the elements of the insider trading offence to 
corporations.   
 
The reforms which I propose to corporate liability for insider trading, and which are set out in 
detail in chapter 7 of this thesis, adopt a model of direct liability that would operate as an 
exclusive set of ‘special rules of attribution’ for determining whose acts and knowledge are to 
be counted as the acts and knowledge of the relevant corporation.   
 
Aggregation Doctrine 
 
Ordinarily, to find a corporation criminally liable for an offence, it will be necessary to show 
that the person who engaged in the relevant actus reus also had the necessary mens rea.72  
However, the aggregation doctrine, also referred to as the doctrine of ‘collective knowledge’, 
enables the ‘aggregation’ of the conduct or knowledge of more than one individual within a 
corporation.73  Even though no individual associated with the corporation would have 
criminal liability, the conduct or knowledge of two or more individuals who represent the 
corporation, or for whom the corporation is vicariously liable, can be aggregated so that the 
corporation has criminal liability.74  Primarily developed in the USA,75 this concept has been 
adopted in Australia in connection with civil liability, including liability for fraudulent 
misrepresentation,76 but the High Court rejected the aggregation doctrine as a general 
principle for criminal liability in R v Australasian Films Ltd.77  Despite this, the aggregation 
71 [1995] AC 500, 507. 
72 Clough and Mulhern, above n 7, 106. 
73 Colvin, above n 12, 18-19. 
74 Sullivan, above n 13, 527. 
75 See, for example, United States v Bank of England, 821 F2d 844 (1987).   
76 See, for example, Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 563. 
77 (1921) 29 CLR 195. 
103 
 
                                                 
doctrine has been implemented in some Australian statutes - for example, s 12.4(2) of the 
Criminal Code.78  
 
As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5, despite the fact that the provisions of the 
Criminal Code relating to corporate criminal liability do not apply to Chapter 7 of the 
Corporations Act and therefore do not apply to the insider trading provisions,79 the current 
model of corporate liability for insider trading in Australia does enable the aggregation model 
to operate.  The knowledge and actions of different individuals within a corporation can 
potentially be aggregated to attribute overall liability for insider trading to the corporation, 
regardless of whether any of those individuals would themselves have personal liability for 
insider trading.  The new legislative provisions proposed in this thesis, and set out in detail in 
chapter 7, would remove the concept of aggregation from the current statutory provisions so 
that a corporation is only liable for insider trading where a person who possesses inside 
information, which the corporation is taken to possess, also knows or ought reasonably to 
know that the information is inside information, and either engages in or authorises the 
relevant conduct or gives advice about the relevant conduct.  This is consistent with the 
rationale for the prohibition of insider trading in Australia – the protection of market integrity – 
and corporate criminal liability will only arise where an informational advantage might 
actually be obtained. 
   
Organisational Fault  
 
The organisational fault model of liability operates on the basis that while there may be 
circumstances where there is no particular individual whose conduct is actually criminal, the 
78 Section 12.4 of the Criminal Code provides that: 
If: 
(a) negligence is a fault element in relation to a physical element of an offence; and 
(b) no individual employee, agent or officer of the body corporate has that fault element,  
that fault element may exist on the part of the body corporate if the body corporate is negligent 
when viewed as a whole (that is, by aggregating the conduct of any numbers of its employees, 
agents or officers.) (emphasis added). 
79 Section 769A of the Corporations Act. 
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‘organisational conduct’ of the corporation itself is blameworthy and the corporation should 
be held criminally liable.80  This model also responds to the criticism of the ‘directing mind 
and will’ form of direct liability, that merely because one managerial representative of a 
corporation may be at fault, it does not necessarily mean that the corporation as a whole 
should be regarded as being at fault.81  ‘Organisational fault’ can arise under statute where 
the actus reus of the offence is committed by a person for whom the corporation is 
vicariously liable and the overall conduct of the corporation fulfils the mens rea through a 
corporate policy of non-compliance or a failure to take reasonable precautions or exercise 
due diligence.82  It has been suggested that the organisational fault model is most suitable 
for serious offences where it is necessary to consider corporate blameworthiness.83  The 
Criminal Code provides an example of this model of liability in s 12.3(2).84  Organisational 
fault is not currently applied in relation to corporate liability for insider trading, and it is not 
proposed to be applied as part of the new reforms set out in this thesis as, once again, the 
new reforms are focused on ensuring that market integrity is protected and corporations will 
only have liability where an informational advantage might actually be obtained.   
 
Statutory Principles of Corporate Criminal Liability  
 
In addition to the mechanisms available under the general law, statutory regimes may also 
provide particular rules for determining corporate criminal liability.  By way of example, Part 
2.5 of the Criminal Code sets out general principles of criminal responsibility for 
80 Sullivan, above n 13, 524. 
81 Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, ‘The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, 
Collectivism and Accountability’ (1988) 11 Sydney Law Review 468, 504.  
82 Fisse, above n 8, 279; James Gobert, ‘Corporate Criminality: New Crimes for the Times’ [1994] Criminal Law 
Review 722, 723. 
83 Clough and Mulhern, above n 7, 124. 
84 Section 12.3(2) of the Criminal Code sets out means by which a fault element can be attributed to a 
corporation by: 
(c) proving that a corporate culture existed within the body corporate that directed, 
encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision; or 
(d) proving that the body corporate failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that 
required compliance with the relevant provision. 
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Commonwealth offences.  Instead of using the common law terminology of ‘actus reus’ and 
‘mens rea’, s 3.1(1) of the Criminal Code provides that offences consist generally of ‘physical 
elements’ and ‘fault elements’.   The Criminal Code describes a variety of matters which may 
amount to a fault element – intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence.85  A physical 
element may be conduct, a result of conduct, or a circumstance in which conduct, or a result 
of conduct, occurs.86   
 
Section 3.2 of the Criminal Code then states that: 
 
In order for a person to be found guilty of committing an offence the following must be 
proved: 
 
(a) the existence of such physical elements as are, under the law creating the 
offence, relevant to establishing guilt;  
 
(b) in respect of each such physical element for which a fault element is required, 
one of the fault elements for the physical element. 
 
It is clear that an offence may have more than one physical element.87  The majority of the 
High Court noted in The Queen v LK,88 that the Criminal Code applies fault elements to 
particular physical elements of an offence and makes no provision for the specification of a 
fault element that does not directly relate to a specified physical element.89 
 
Despite the use of different terminology, in The Queen v LK90 French J approved the 
statement that the drafting of the Criminal Code adopted ‘the usual analytical division of 
criminal offences into the actus reus and the mens rea or physical elements and fault 
85 Criminal Code, s 5.1. 
86 Criminal Code, s 4.1(1).  
87 Ansari v The Queen [2010] HCA 18, [50] (French CJ). 
88 [2010] HCA 17 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
89 Ibid [132]. 
90 Ibid 17. 
106 
 
                                                 
elements’.91  Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code also sets out general principles pursuant to which 
corporate criminal responsibility can be established and s 12.1(2) provides that a corporation 
can be found guilty of any offence.   This part of the Criminal Code also provides specific 
rules for determining when a physical element92 and a fault element93 are to be attributed to 
a corporation.  
 
However, the provisions in the Criminal Code are just one example of a set of statutory rules 
providing for corporate criminal liability and they apply only to Commonwealth offences.94  
Additionally, certain statutes restrict the application of the rules contained within the Criminal 
Code.  In particular, the Corporations Act provides that the operation of Part 2.5 of the 
Criminal Code does not apply to any offences created under Chapter 7 of the Corporations 
Act,95 and a separate regime for corporate criminal liability for those offences is created in s 
91 Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Model Criminal Code, 
Chapter 2: General Principles of Criminal Responsibility, Final Report, (1992) 9; as approved in The Queen v 
LK [2010] HCA 17, [42] (French J). 
92 Section 12.2 of the Criminal Code provides as follows: 
If a physical element of an offence is committed by an employee, agent or officer of a body 
corporate acting within the actual or apparent scope of his or her employment, or within his or her 
actual or apparent authority, the physical element must also be attributed to the body corporate. 
93 Section 12.3(1) of the Criminal Code provides that a fault element must be attributed to a corporation that 
expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorises or permits an offence.  Pursuant to s 12.3(2) such an authorisation or 
permission may be established by: 
(a)   proving that the body corporate's board of directors intentionally, knowingly or recklessly carried 
out the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the commission 
of the offence; or  
(b)   proving that a high managerial agent of the body corporate intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
engaged in the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the 
commission of the offence; or  
(c)   proving that a corporate culture existed within the body corporate that directed, encouraged, 
tolerated or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision; or  
(d)   proving that the body corporate failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that required 
compliance with the relevant provision. 
94 Criminal Code, s 2.1.  
95 Corporations Act, s 769A.  
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769B of the Corporations Act.  The insider trading prohibition, contained in Part 7.10 of 
Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act, is therefore an offence excluded from the operation of 
Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code, and the principles of corporate criminal liability contained in 
that part are not applied to the insider trading offence. 
 
In relation to the conduct of a corporation, which is usually relevant to the physical element 
of a criminal offence, s 769B(1) of the Corporations Act provides that conduct engaged in on 
behalf of a body corporate: 
 
(a) by a director, employee or agent of the body, within the scope of the person’s 
actual or apparent authority; or  
 
(b) by any other person at the direction or with the consent or agreement (whether 
express or implied) of a director, employee or agent of the body, where the giving 
of the direction, consent or agreement is within the scope of the actual or 
apparent authority of the director, employee or agent; 
 
is taken for the purposes of a provision of this Chapter, or a proceeding under this 
Chapter, to have been engaged in also by the body corporate.   
 
Almost identical provisions are contained in other Commonwealth statutes, such as s 84(2) 
of the former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)96 and s 12GH(2) of the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth).  Similar provisions are contained in s 78(2) of 
the Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) Act 1991 (Cth) and s 
8ZD of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth).  These provisions will be useful for 
further interpretation of the elements of insider trading in later chapters of this thesis, as it 
will be seen in chapter 5 that such provisions have been interpreted to be non-exhaustive 
and not intended to exclude the operation of the general law.   
96 The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) has been replaced by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), 
which (unlike the former act) applies Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code in relation to corporate criminal 
responsibility: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 6AA(1).  The provisions of Part 2.5 of the Criminal 
Code in relation to corporate criminal responsibility do not apply to a small number of specified offences under 
the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth):  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 6AA(2).   
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The conduct caught by s 769B(1) of the Corporations Act goes further than that which would 
be caught by s 12.2 of the Criminal Code, as s 769B(1) of the Corporations Act includes 
conduct engaged in by a person at the direction or with consent or agreement of a director, 
employee or agent, even if it is not within the scope of the first person’s authority.   
 
In relation to criminal offences where it is necessary to establish the state of mind of a body 
corporate, which will usually be relevant to fault elements, s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act 
provides that: 
 
If, in a proceeding under this Chapter in respect of conduct engaged in by a body 
corporate, it is necessary to establish the state of mind of the body, it is sufficient to show 
that a director, employee or agent of the body [corporate], being a director, employee or 
agent by whom the conduct was engaged in within the scope of the person’s actual or 
apparent authority, had that state of mind. 
 
Again, almost identical provisions are contained in s 84(1) of the former Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth) and s 12GH(1) of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 
2001 (Cth).  Similar provisions are contained in s 8ZD of the Taxation Administration Act 
1953 (Cth) and s 78(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employment) 
Act 1991 (Cth).    
 
In Division 3 of Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act, which contains the insider trading 
prohibition, there is an additional means of establishing a corporation’s possession of 
information and knowledge, which may be relevant for both the physical and fault elements 
of the insider trading offence.  For example, s 1042G(1) of the Corporations Act states that, 
for the purposes of Division 3 of Part 7.10: 
 
(a) a body corporate is taken to possess any information which an officer of the body 
corporate possesses and which came into his or her possession in the course of the 
performance of duties as such an officer; and 
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(b) if an officer of a body corporate knows any matter or thing because he or she is an officer 
of the body corporate, it is to be presumed that the body corporate knows the matter or 
thing. 
 
Section 1042G(2) also specifically states that ‘this section does not limit the application of 
section 769B in relation to this Division.’  These provisions will be examined in detail in 
chapter 5 of this thesis.   The reforms proposed in this thesis and set out in detail in chapter 
7 would amend the current provisions of the Corporations Act to provide for a new statutory 
regime to apply the insider trading laws to corporations, and would not adopt the currently 
excluded provisions of the Criminal Code relating to corporate criminal liability.  As the 
insider trading laws are intended to maintain and protect ‘market integrity’, it is most 
appropriate to ultilise a particular set of provisions focused on achieving that rationale, rather 
than relying on the general statutory provisions applicable to the majority of Commonwealth 
criminal offences, which do not necessarily have similar aims or appropriate application to 
the insider trading offence.   
 
The Appropriate Model for the Liability of Corporations for Insider Trading in Australia 
 
It can be seen that there are a variety of models that are available for determining corporate 
criminal liability under both the general law and statute, with complex and intricate variations.  
Currently, corporate criminal liability for insider trading in Australia operates through a 
combination of models because the statute does not exclude the operation of the general 
law, and also incorporates concepts of direct liability and aggregation under the 
Corporations Act.  The manner in which these different models currently operate will be 
explored in detail in the next chapter of this thesis.   
 
I propose that a new model of direct liability be adopted as the exclusive means for 
determining the liability of corporations for insider trading in Australia  – it would operate as a 
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set of ‘special rules of attribution’ for determining whose acts and knowledge are to be 
counted as the acts and knowledge of the relevant corporation.97   
 
It causes significant confusion and uncertainty as to the operation of the law for multiple 
models of liability to operate concurrently in relation to the liability of corporations for insider 
trading.  As discussed in detail in chapter 1 of this thesis, insider trading is prohibited in 
Australian in accordance with a market integrity rationale, intended to ensure market 
fairness and promote market efficiency.   Underlying this rationale is the desire to prevent 
certain participants from gaining an unfair advantage over others, and limiting their 
opportunities to trade on the basis of information which is not available to all participants.  
The model of liability to be imposed should reflect this rationale.  Accordingly, a model of 
direct liability, in which a corporation will have liability for insider trading where it is regarded 
as having engaged in the prohibited conduct itself, is the only model which is truly consistent 
with this aim.  A corporation will only be obtaining an unfair advantage over other 
participants in securities markets, where it can be regarded as engaging in insider trading 
itself.  Further, a corporation does not obtain an unfair advantage over other market 
participants, if officers, employees or agents who may possess inside information are not 
aware that other officers, employees or agents may be trading or procuring trading in 
financial products to which that information might relate.  As a result, the model of direct 
liability which I propose in this thesis, and describe in full in chapter 7, has the following 
characteristics – a corporation would only be taken to have engaged in insider trading if the 
person who engaged in or authorised the relevant trading conduct on the corporation’s 
behalf, within the actual or apparent scope of their authority, also possessed the relevant 
information and had the requisite knowledge that it was inside information.  Under the 
operation of the new provisions, there would be no vicarious liability and no liability by 
aggregation.  The new provisions, which would set out when a corporation is taken to 
possess inside information, to have the requisite knowledge that the information is inside 
information, and when it is taken to have engaged in the relevant trading conduct, would 
provide for the direct liability of the corporation.   
97 Using the language of Lord Hoffman in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities 
Commission [1995] AC 500, 507.   
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In the next part of this thesis, I will consider in detail the individual elements of the insider 
trading offence - the possession of information (the ‘possession element’), the knowledge 
that the relevant information is inside information (the ‘knowledge element’), and the trading 
or procuring of trading in relevant financial products, or tipping (the ‘trading element’) - and 
the manner in which those elements can be attributed to a corporation.  Though the 
application of the relevant models of liability, it will be determined how and when a 
corporation can be regarded as having engaged in insider trading and the difficulties of 
interpretation and resulting issues of lack of clarity and certainty will be discussed and 
analysed.    
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CHAPTER 5 
ATTRIBUTING THE ELEMENTS OF INSIDER TRADING TO CORPORATIONS  
 
Having considered the principles of corporate criminal liability in chapter 4, this chapter 
focuses on the manner in which the elements of the insider trading offence are attributed to 
a corporation.  There are several issues which must be addressed in this chapter: when an 
alleged insider trader is a corporation, how does that corporation possess information?  How 
does a corporation have knowledge that certain information is inside information?  How does 
a corporation engage in the relevant trading conduct?  How do the relevant provisions of the 
Corporations Act operate, and are general law principles of the identification doctrine and 
agency also to be considered?  Accordingly this chapter will be comprised of three major 
parts: attributing the possession element to corporations; attributing the knowledge element 
to corporations; and attributing the trading element to corporations.  The legal complexities 
associated with each of these issues will be examined in this chapter, to attempt to reach a 
definitive answer in relation to the liability of corporations for insider trading, and to highlight 
legislative difficulties and inconsistencies that could be overcome with reform.  An analysis 
of these issues reveals significant uncertainty in the attribution of the elements of insider 
trading to corporations, which can only be resolved by significant legislative amendment.   
 
The Relevant Elements of Insider Trading 
 
In order to determine the manner in which elements of the insider trading offence are to be 
attributed to corporations, the following elements must be examined – the possession of 
inside information; the knowledge that certain information is inside information; and the 
relevant trading conduct.  
 
As was noted in chapter 2 of this thesis, s 1043A of the Corporations Act sets out the 
offence of insider trading, which can be summarised as having the following elements: (i) a 
person possesses certain information; (ii) the information is not generally available; (iii) if the 
information were generally available, it would be material information; (iv) the person knows 
(or ought reasonably to know) that the information is not generally available, and, that if the 
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information were generally available, it would be material information; and (v) while in 
possession of the information, the person trades in relevant financial products or procures 
another person to do so, or engages in tipping. 
 
Elements (ii) and (iii) will not be applied any differently when the alleged insider trader is a 
corporation rather than a natural person, as it will be a question of determining, based on the 
relevant tests in ss 1042C and 1042D of the Corporations Act, whether the relevant 
information is generally available, and, if it were, whether that information would be material.  
However, it is not immediately clear how a corporation can be shown to satisfy elements (i), 
(iv) and (v)  – that is, it needs to be determined how a corporation can be considered to 
possess information (to be referred to from now on as the ‘possession element’); how a 
corporation can be considered to know (or be considered to ought reasonably to know) that 
information is not generally available and, if it were, that the information would be material 
(to be referred to from now on as the ‘knowledge element’); and how a corporation can be 
considered to trade, or procure trading, in financial products or engage in tipping (to be 
referred to from now on as the ‘trading element’).    
 
Section 1043A of the Corporations Act states that: 
 
(3) For the purposes of the application of the Criminal Code in relation to an offence based 
on subsection (1)…  
 
(a) (1)(a) is a physical element, the fault element for which is as specified in 
paragraph (1)(b).1  
 
1 As discussed in chapter 4, s 3.1(1) of the Criminal Code provides that offences generally consist of ‘physical 
elements’ and ‘fault elements’.  Although s 769A of the Corporations Act provides that Part 2.5 of the Criminal 
Code does not apply to offences created under Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act, Part 2.5 of the Criminal 
Code (which comprises ss 12.1 to 12.6) is concerned only with ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility’.  Thus, s 3.1 
of the Criminal Code is still generally applicable to the insider trading offence.  When the current insider trading 
regime was inserted into the Corporations Act, it was noted that the insider trading provisions ‘are Criminal 
Code compliant’: Explanatory Memorandum, Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 (Cth), [15.23].  
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As the element set out in paragraph (1) (a) of s 1043A is that ‘a person (the insider) 
possesses inside information’ and the element set out in paragraph (1)(b) is that ‘the insider 
knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the matters specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
the definition of inside information in section 1042A are satisfied in relation to the 
information’,2 this means that the physical element of the insider trading offence is the 
possession of inside information, and the fault element is the knowledge that the information 
is inside information.  The conduct described in s 1043A(1)(c) of the Corporations Act relates 
to trading in relevant financial products – whether by applying for them, acquiring or 
disposing of them, or entering into an agreement to do any of those things.3  Section 
1043A(1)(d) concerns the procuring of another person to do any of those things, and s 
1043A(2) concerns the communication of inside information to another person likely to do 
any of those things or procure another person to do so.  While this is the conduct which a 
person who possesses inside information, and who knows or ought reasonably to know that 
it is inside information, must not engage in, such conduct is not stated to be a ‘physical 
element’ of the insider trading offence.  In this chapter, it will be determined how these three 
elements of the insider trading offence can be applied to corporations.  As will be 
demonstrated below, there are a number of statutory mechanisms and general law 
principles which can be used to determine when a corporation has possession of 
information, when a corporation has certain knowledge, and when a corporation has 
engaged in particular conduct.   However, as will also be demonstrated, the manner of their 
application is not at all certain. 
 
2 As set out in chapter 2, s 1042A of the Corporations Act provides that ‘inside information’ means information 
in relation to which the following paragraphs are satisfied: 
(a) the information is not generally available; and 
(b) if the information were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a material 
effect on the price or value of particular Division 3 financial products.    
3 Section 1043(1) of the Corporations Act expressly states that an insider must not (whether as principal or 
agent): 
(c) apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products, or enter into an agreement to 
apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products. 
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ATTRIBUTING THE POSSESSION ELEMENT TO CORPORATIONS4 
 
The meaning of the terms ‘information’ and ‘possession’ were discussed in detail in chapter 
2, and it was noted there that the pronouncements of Spigelman CJ in R v Hannes5 make it 
clear that, in the context of the insider trading offence, the possession of information requires 
actual ‘awareness’ of the relevant information, not mere physical possession or access to 
the information.6  Therefore, when applying this element to corporations, the question to be 
answered is – how does a corporation come to have actual ‘awareness’ of information?    
 
Within Division 3 of Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act there is a provision under which a 
corporation is taken to possess information that is possessed by one of its officers in certain 
circumstances.  Section 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act provides that: 
 
a body corporate is taken to possess any information which an officer of the body corporate 
possesses and which came into his or her possession in the course of the performance of 
duties as such an officer. 
 
In ASIC v Citigroup,7 this provision was the only mechanism considered by the Court when 
determining whether Citigroup possessed certain information relating to the proposed 
takeover of Patrick by Toll.  In that case, Jacobson J determined that even if the proprietary 
trader, Mr Manchee, had possessed the relevant information, that information was not taken 
to have been possessed by Citigroup under s 1042G(1)(a) because he was not an ‘officer’ of 
4 An earlier draft of this section of the thesis was published as the following journal article: Juliette Overland, 
'There Was Movement at the Station for the Word had Passed Around: How Does a Company Possess Inside 
Information under Australian Insider Trading Laws?' (2006) 3 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 241. 
5 (2000) 158 FLR 359. 
6 Ibid 398. 
7 (2007) 160 FCR 35.  This case was discussed in detail in chapter 2 and will be the subject of further 
discussion in chapter 6 of this thesis.  
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the corporation within the meaning of s 9 of the Corporations Act.8  As there are other 
potential mechanisms which could also be used to determine whether a corporation 
possesses certain information, before the application of s 1042G(1)(a) is examined, it is 
important to consider whether it is actually intended to be the exclusive mechanism for this 
purpose. 
 
I consider that there are three reasons why s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act should not 
be regarded as the exclusive means for determining when a corporation possesses inside 
information: (i) the language of s 1042G(1)(a) itself indicates an absence of exclusivity; (ii) 
cases which have interpreted other statutes which use the same or very similar language to 
s 1042G(1)(a) have found that there is an absence of exclusivity; and (iii) in order to make 
sense of other provisions of the Corporations Act, it is necessary to infer a lack of exclusivity 
in s 1042G(1)(a). 
 
When reaching these conclusions in relation to the interpretation of s 1042G(1)(a) of the 
Corporations Act (and other sections of this statute), careful examination and interpretation 
of the language used is necessary in order to discern the true meaning and underlying 
intention.  In this context, principles of statutory interpretation are clearly relevant – it is 
necessary in a number of instances to consider the manner in which the language of the 
Corporations Act has been interpreted in cases concerning other statutes which use the 
same or similar language, as well as to interpret the relevant sections of the Corporations 
Act in a manner which ensures that other provisions of the Corporations Act can continue to 
make sense.      
 
8 This was despite the fact that the proprietary trader had a daily limit of $10,000,000: ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 
160 FCR 35, 99; Keith Kendall and Gordon Walker, ‘Insider Trading in Australia’ in Stephen M Bainbridge (ed), 
Research Handbook on Insider Trading (Edward Elgar, 2013) 365, 378–379.   
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While clearly all words must be given their ‘plain and ordinary meaning’,9 when interpreting 
words and phrases used in the Corporations Act which have not been judicially considered 
in that context, principles of statutory interpretation allow reference to be had to cases which 
interpret their meaning when used in other statutes.10  Additionally, an interpretation which 
allows all words used within the statute to have ‘some meaning and effect’ is to be preferred 
over an interpretation which would result in certain words being considered meaningless or 
redundant.11         
 
Section 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act is not expressed in language which indicates a 
legislative intention that it be regarded as an exclusive mechanism.  Looking again at the 
precise language of s 1042G(1) – it states that: 
 
For the purposes of this Division:  
 
(a) a body corporate is taken to possess any information which an officer of the body 
corporate possesses and which came into his or her possession in the course of the 
performance of duties as such an officer.12  
 
The opening phrase – ‘For the purposes of this Division, a body corporate is taken to 
possess…’ – does not require or imply exclusivity.  Indeed, it is expressly stated in s 
1042G(2) that ‘this section does not limit the application of section 769B in relation to this 
Division.’  Since s 769B of the Corporations Act contains the rules of corporate criminal 
responsibility which are applicable to Chapter 7 of the Act in place of Chapter 2.5 of the 
9 See, for example, Cody v J H Nelson Pty Ltd (1947) 74 CLR 629, 647 (Dixon J); Herbert Adams Pty Ltd v 
Federal Commission for Taxation (1932) 47 CLR 222, 228 (Dixon J); D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory 
Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th ed, 2014) 61. 
10 See, for example, Gett v Tabet (2009) 254 ALR 504, [289]; Marshall v Director-General, Department of 
Transport (2001) 205 CLR 603, [62] (McHugh J); Pearce and Geddes, above n 9, 10. 
11 Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405, 404 (Griffith CJ); Beckwith v R (1976) 135 CLR 569, 574 (Gibbs 
J); Pearce and Geddes, above n 9, 62. 
12 Emphasis added. 
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Criminal Code, this means that the relevant rules from s 769B will also be applicable, further 
indicating that s 1042G of the Corporations Act is not intended to be exclusive. 
In Rowe v Transport Workers Union of Australia,13 Cooper J of the Federal Court considered 
whether the general law identification doctrine was applicable to determining whether an 
industrial association had engaged in certain conduct, or if only the specific statutory rules 
set out in s 298B of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) were relevant.  Section 298B(2) 
of the Workplace Relations Act provided that certain ‘action done by one of the [prescribed 
bodies or persons] is taken to have been done by an industrial association’.14  To that 
extent, it is similar to s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act providing that a body corporate 
is taken to possess information possessed by an officer in certain circumstances.  Cooper J 
found that the phrase ‘is taken to’ implies an additional alternative statutory mechanism, 
rather than an exclusive one, which: 
as a matter of construction, [is] not intended to exclude the operation of the directing mind 
principle… Indeed, the operation of the principle and the two sections may overlap.15 
 
In order to make sense of later provisions of the Corporations Act, it is also necessary to 
assume that other mechanisms (such as other statutory provisions and the general law 
rules) can also operate to attribute the possession of information to a corporation.  
Importantly, s 1043F of the Corporations Act, which sets out the Chinese Wall defence for 
corporations, refers to ‘information in the possession of an officer or an employee’.  If s 
1042G(1) is to be the only means by which the possession of information can be attributed 
to a corporation, requiring that it be possessed by an officer of the corporation, the words ‘or 
an employee’ in s 1043F of the Corporations Act would be meaningless, as information 
possessed by a mere employee would not be relevant.  Further, in the Explanatory 
13 (1998) 160 ALR 66. 
14 Emphasis added. 
15 Rowe v Transport Workers Union of Australia (1998) 160 ALR 66, 81.  Approved in Hadgkiss v Sunland 
Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 346 (14 March 2007) (Keifel J) and in Hanley v Automotive, Food, Metals, 
Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union [2000] FCA 1188 (24 August 2000) (Ryan, Moore and 
Goldberg JJ). 
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Memorandum, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth), which repealed a redundant definition of ‘officer’ in s 82A of the 
Corporations Act, there is a statement that ‘in cases where particular provisions of the 
Corporations Act dealing with personnel are intended to extend to employees, this will be 
expressly stated.’16  If the Chinese Wall defence is intended to apply when employees 
possess information, s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act must not be an exclusive 
mechanism because it does not provide for a corporation to possess information known only 
to an employee who is not an officer.  While some might regard this as only a drafting error 
in need of minor correction,17 such an interpretation still creates significant uncertainty as to 
the intended operation of these provisions.   
   
The need to rely on general law principles of attribution in connection with the possession of 
information by corporations is recognised by Qu,18 but he does so based on a view that s 
1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act contains a rebuttable presumption that the information 
possessed by an officer is also possessed by the corporation, and that general law 
principles of attribution can be used to rebut that presumption.19  While, for the reasons 
discussed above, the language of s 1042G(1) of the Corporations Act, in stating that ‘a body 
corporate is taken to possess any information which an officer of the body corporate 
possesses’, is not intended to be exhaustive, I respectfully disagree that it creates a 
rebuttable presumption in this instance.  If this statutory rule could be rebutted by 
demonstrating that the general law rules would not attribute possession of the relevant 
information to the corporation, it means that the statutory rule would only apply to attribute 
the possession of information to a corporation when the general law rules also have that 
effect.  If the statutory rule had that effect but the general law rules did not, and the general 
law rules could then be used to rebut the statutory rule, it would have the overall effect that 
16 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth), [5.574]. 
17 See, for example, Kevin A Lewis, ‘A Decade On: Reforming the Financial Services Law Reforms’ (Paper 
presented at Sixth Annual Supreme Court Corporate Law Conference, Sydney, 23 August 2011). 
18 Charles Zhen Qu, ‘How Statutory Civil Liability is Attributed to a Company: An Australian Perspective 
Focusing on Civil Liability for Insider Trading by Companies’ (2006) 32 Monash Law Review 177. 
19 Ibid 191.  
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only the operation of the general law would be relevant, as the possession of information 
would only occur if the general law rules had that effect, thereby making the statutory 
provision redundant.  This cannot have been the legislative intention behind this provision.  I 
consider that the better view is that both the general law rules and the statutory rules can be 
relied on as alternative means of attributing the possession of information to a corporation. 
 
Thus, it can be seen that, without exclusivity in s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act, other 
mechanisms can apply to attribute the possession of information to a corporation, even 
though the provisions of the Criminal Code are excluded.20  This is despite the fact that in 
ASIC v Citigroup, Jacobson J considered only the operation of s 1042G(1)(a) of the 
Corporations Act in this context.  One can infer from the judgment that arguments relating to 
alternative means of attributing the possession of information to a corporation such as 
Citigroup were not presented to Jacobson J, particularly since it appears that ASIC assumed 
that the proprietary trader would be regarded as an officer of Citigroup and that s 
1042G(1)(a) would therefore apply.21 
 
In Rivkin Financial Services Ltd v Sofcom Ltd,22 Emmet J found that, while the alleged inside 
information was not actually material and therefore that no insider trading had taken place, 
the three corporations controlled by Mr Khan did possess the information about Mr Khan’s 
intentions to attempt to increase his shareholding and gain control of the board.  However, 
His Honour did not give reasons for that determination and did not analyse any provisions of 
the Corporations Act or consider the general law in this context.  As a result, this decision 
does not assist in determining how corporations might possess inside information and which 
mechanisms are to be used for that purpose.   
 
20 Corporations Act, s 769A. 
21 ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35, 99-101.  Black notes that ‘ASIC did not seek to establish attribution 
under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 769B, or the general law in that case’: Ashley Black, Insider Trading 
and Market Misconduct’ (2011) 29 Company and Securities Law Journal 313, 320. 
22 (2004) 51 ACSR 486.  The facts of this case were set out in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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Other mechanisms which could potentially be used to determine when a corporation 
possesses certain information are, firstly, other provisions in the Corporations Act, such as s 
1042G(1)(b) and s 769B(3), and secondly, general law agency rules and the identification 
doctrine.   
 
Section 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act provides that: 
 
  if an officer of a body corporate knows any matter or thing because he or she is an officer 
of the body corporate, it is to be presumed that the body corporate knows that matter or 
thing. 
 
Is ‘information’ a matter or thing?  Even if information is not a ‘thing’, it clearly includes 
matter, as the definition of ‘information’ in s 1042A of the Corporations Act states that 
information includes: 
 
(a) matters of supposition and other matters that are insufficiently definite to warrant 
being made known to the public; and 
 
(b) matters relating to the intentions, or likely intentions, of a person.23 
 
Additionally, s 1042C(1)(a) of the Corporations Act provides that information is generally 
available if, among other things, it consists of readily observable matter.24  Thus, it appears 
that information can include a ‘matter’ and therefore s 1042G(1)(b) may be used to 
determine when a corporation possesses certain information.  
 
Some commentators, such as Lyon and du Plessis25 and Black,26 apply s 1042G(1)(b) of the 
Corporations Act to the knowledge element of insider trading – whether there was 
knowledge that the relevant information was not generally available and likely to be material.  
23 Emphasis added. 
24 Emphasis added. 
25 Gregory Lyon and Jean J du Plessis, The Law of Insider Trading in Australia (Federation Press, 2005) 57. 
26 Ashley Black, ‘The Reform of Insider Trading Law in Australia’ (1992) 15 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 214, 225. 
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Others, such as Austin and Ramsay27 and Hambrook,28 consider that it is applicable to both 
the possession element and the knowledge element of insider trading.  The title of s 1042G 
gives little assistance – the section is titled ‘Information in Possession of Officer of Body 
Corporate’.  Reliance on this heading29 would support the proposition that s 1042G(1)(b) 
actually relates to an alleged insider’s possession of inside information, rather than the 
knowledge that he or she may have about the qualities of that information.  However, later 
paragraphs of s 1042G(1) of the Corporations Act provide that: 
 
(c) if an officer of a body corporate, in that capacity, is reckless as to a circumstance or 
results, it is to be presumed that the body corporate is reckless as to that 
circumstance or result; and   
 
(d) for the purposes of paragraph 1043M(2)(b), if an officer of a body corporate ought 
reasonably to know any matter or thing because he or she is an officer of the body 
corporate, it is to be presumed that the body corporate ought reasonably to know 
that matter or thing.  
 
Neither of these additional subsections appear to relate exclusively to the possession of 
information, or knowledge as to the qualities of that information, so it seems that the heading 
of s 1042G is not helpful in this respect and that s 1042G(1) of the Corporations Act contains 
27 Robert P Austin and Ian M Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 16th ed, 
2014) [9.630].   
28 J P Hambrook, ‘Market Misconduct and Offences’ in LexisNexis, Australian Corporations Law Principles and 
Practice [7.13.0145].  
29 Section 13(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) provides that: 
  All material from and including the first section of an Act to the end of:  
(a) if there are no Schedules to the Act--the last section of the Act; or,  
(b) if there are one or more Schedules to the Act--the last Schedule to the Act;  
is part of the Act.  
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Acts Interpretation Amendment Bill 2011 (Cth), which inserted this 
provision into the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), it was noted that the ‘…new section 13 is intended to 
capture all headings… within the Act’.   However, it was also noted that, while headings are to be regarded as 
part of an Act, the weight to be given to headings ‘…will ordinarily be less than the words of the section itself’: 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Acts Interpretation Amendment Bill 2011 (Cth), [93]. 
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provisions which are capable of relating to both elements of the insider trading offence.  
Therefore, s 1042G(1)(b) appears to be applicable to both the possession and knowledge 
elements of the insider trading offence, and therefore to determining when a corporation 
may have possession of certain information.  However, the differing approaches on the 
availability of this subsection to attribute the possession of information to a corporation 
illustrate the difficulties of interpretation and uncertainty created by these provisions and 
highlight the need for legislative reform. 
 
Section 769B(3) of the Corporations Act provides that: 
 
If, in a proceeding under this Chapter in respect of conduct engaged in by a body 
corporate, it is necessary to establish the state of mind of the body, it is sufficient to show 
that a director, employee or agent of the body, being a director, employee or agent by 
whom the conduct was engaged in within the scope of the person’s actual or apparent 
authority, had that state of mind.30 
 
If the ‘state of mind’ of the body corporate can include the possession of information, this 
provision may also be a potential means of determining when a corporation has such 
possession.  Section 769B(10)(c) states that: 
 
A reference to the state of mind of a person includes a reference to the knowledge, 
intention, opinion, belief or purpose of the person and the person’s reason for the person’s 
intention, opinion, belief or purpose.31 
 
Since the possession of information does require ‘awareness’ and therefore knowledge of 
the contents of the information,32 it is arguable that this provision is relevant to the 
possession element of insider trading – the possession of inside information.  However, 
most commentators generally treat provisions similar to s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act as 
being relevant only to a fault element, rather than a physical element of an offence.  As was 
30 Emphasis added. 
31 Emphasis added. 
32 In accordance with the pronouncements of Spigelman CJ in R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359, 398. 
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noted in chapter 4, provisions very similar to s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act were found in 
s 84(1) of the former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and s 12GH(1) of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth).  Clough and Mulhern33 and Gillies34 
consider that such provisions are relevant to the fault elements of offences only.  However, 
these provisions can be contrasted with s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act which refers to 
the ‘state of mind’ of a body corporate, whereas s 84(1) of the former Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth) and s 12GH(1) of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 
2001 (Cth) refer only to the ‘intention’ of a body corporate.  The use of this much broader 
language differentiates s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act from those other statutory 
provisions and, accordingly, it need not be considered to be limited to a fault element only.  
The state of mind of a corporation can conceivably relate to both the awareness of the 
content of information (which would equate to the possession element of the insider trading 
offence), as well as to awareness of the qualities of that information – such as whether it is 
generally available or material (which would equate to the knowledge element).  Thus, it 
appears that s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act can relate to both the possession element 
and the knowledge element of insider trading and can be considered in both contexts to 
determine whether a corporation is to be regarded as having engaged in insider trading. 
 
Therefore, having established that s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act is not the exclusive 
mechanism for determining when a corporation may possess inside information, and having 
determined that there are a number of possible mechanisms which may be used to 
determine when a corporation possesses information – ss 1042G(1)(a), 1042G(1)(b) and 
769B(3) of the Corporations Act, as well as general law rules – each can now be analysed in 
order to determine how that possession occurs.     
33 Jonathan Clough and Carmel Mulhern, The Prosecution of Corporations (Oxford University Press, 2002) 
127. 
34 Peter Gillies, ‘Trade Practices Act Contraventions – Primary and Secondary Participation: Two Models of 
Participation’ (2000) 5 International Trade and Business Law Annual 73, 74.  
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Application of Statutory Provisions Concerning Possession 
 
Returning to s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act, the precise language of the section 
states that: 
 
For the purposes of this Division:  
 
(a) a body corporate is taken to possess any information which an officer of the body 
corporate possesses and which came into his or her possession in the course of 
the performance of duties as such an officer.  
 
Thus, in order for information to be possessed by a corporation in accordance with s 
1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act, there are two requirements which must be satisfied: (i) 
the information must be possessed by an officer of the corporation; and (ii) the information 
possessed by the officer must have come into his or her possession in the course of 
performing his or her duties. 
 
In ASIC v Citigroup, determining whether a proprietary trader who allegedly possessed 
inside information was an officer of Citigroup was treated as a ‘threshold question’ as to 
whether that information could be attributed to the corporation,35 as evidenced by the 
following statement of Jacobson J of the Federal Court: 
 
 Even if Mr Manchee was in possession of inside information, his knowledge is not 
attributable to Citigroup unless he was an officer of that body corporate.36  
 
The requirement under s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act that information will only be 
taken to be possessed by a corporation where it is acquired by an officer, will generally 
require that the person must be a director, company secretary or senior executive, as the 
term ‘officer’ is defined in s 9 of the Corporations Act to mean:   
35 ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35, 99. 
36 Ibid 99 (emphasis added). 
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(a) a director or secretary of the corporation; or 
(b) a person: 
(i) who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a 
substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or 
(ii) who has the capacity to significantly affect the corporation’s financial standing; or 
(iii) in accordance with whose instructions or wishes the directors of the corporation 
are accustomed to act (excluding advice given by the person in the proper 
performance of functions attaching to the person’s professional capacity or their 
business relationship with the directors or the corporation); or 
(c) a receiver, or receiver and manager, of the property of the corporation; or 
(d) an administrator of the corporation; or 
(e) an administrator of a deed of company arrangement executed by the corporation; or 
(f) a liquidator of the corporation; or 
(g) a trustee or other person administering a compromise or arrangement made between the 
corporation and someone else. 
 
It is for this reason that, in ASIC v Citigroup, the information allegedly possessed by the 
proprietary trader was not regarded as being possessed by Citigroup itself, as the 
proprietary trader did not fall within this definition of an ‘officer’.  He was clearly not a director 
or company secretary of Citigroup, or any form of trustee or insolvency controller within the 
meaning of paragraphs (c) to (g) of the definition in s 9, and he was also not a ‘shadow 
director’ of Citigroup, being ‘a person in accordance with those instructions or wishes the 
directors of the corporation are accustomed to act’ as required by paragraph (b)(iii).37   This 
meant that the decision as to whether he was an officer of Citigroup was an issue which 
turned on: 
 
whether he was a person: 
- who made, or participated in making, decisions that affected the whole, or a 
substantial part, of the business of Citigroup; or 
37 Ibid 99.  
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- who had the capacity to affect significantly the financial standing of Citigroup.38 
 
These parts of the definitions of ‘officer’, found in paragraphs (b)(i) and (b)(ii), are concerned 
with ‘identifying persons who are involved in the management of the corporation.’39  Mr 
Manchee, the proprietary trader, did not have ‘any involvement in policy making or decisions 
that affected the whole or a substantial part of the business of Citigroup.’40  He was one of 
five proprietary traders employed by Citigroup and he did not have any employees reporting 
to him or have any other responsibilities aside from proprietary trading.  The fact that he had 
a daily trading limit of $10 million did not ‘make him a person who had the capacity to affect 
Citigroup’s financial standing’, as this was not a significant sum ‘in the context of Citigroup’s 
very substantial business.’41 
 
Thus, only a person who fulfills at least one of the elements of the s 9 definition of ‘officer’ 
will be a person whose possession of information will be attributed to a corporation pursuant 
to s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act.  By contrast, s 1042H(1)(a) of the Corporations Act 
provides that each member of a partnership is regarded as possessing any information 
which another member of the partnership came to possess in their capacity as a member, 
and any information which an employee of the partnership possesses and which came into 
his or her possession in the course of the performance of their duties.  So a partner in a 
partnership will be taken to possess information that is acquired by a member of the 
partnership or any employee but, under s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act, a corporation 
is only taken to possession information acquired by or known to an officer. 
 
As is noted above, s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act provides that, for a corporation to 
be considered to possess information, the relevant officer who possesses the information 
must have acquired it in the course of the performance of their duties. Although the phrase 
‘in the course of performance of duties’ is not defined in the Corporations Act, or in any other 
38 Ibid 99.  
39 Ibid 99.  
40 Ibid 99.  
41 Ibid 101. 
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available Australian legislation, it is a concept which is relevant to the duties of directors, 
particularly in cases concerning conflicts of interest where it is necessary to consider 
whether certain information or opportunities came to directors in their capacity as a director 
or in a personal capacity. 
 
In Peso Silver Mines v Cropper,42 a director who acquired an interest in a mining claim, 
which had been previously offered to and rejected by the corporation of which he was a 
director, was found not to be liable to account to the corporation for any of the profits he 
made because he had been approached ‘not in his capacity as a director’ but ‘as an 
individual member of the public.’43  In Regal Hastings v Gulliver,44 directors who took up 
shares in an investment so that the corporation of which they were directors could also 
participate, were found to be liable to account to the corporation for the relevant profits 
because the opportunity to take up the investment only came to them only because they 
were directors of the corporation.45  In Boardman v Phipps,46 a trustee of a trust and the 
solicitor for the trust were both found to be in breach of duty and liable to account to the trust 
for profits they made when they purchased certain shares in a corporation in which the trust 
had a substantial holding, because information about the shares came to them only because 
of their position as trustee and solicitor, and because they would never have acquired the 
information if they were not acting for the trust.47  The common feature in each of these 
cases is that information or an opportunity that would not have been acquired or available 
‘but for’ the person’s connection with the corporation is regarded as being information or an 
opportunity which has been acquired in the course of the performance of a person’s duties.     
 
Therefore, returning to the possession of inside information, the requirement in s 
1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act that information be acquired by an officer ‘in the course 
42 [1966] SCR 673. 
43 Ibid 682. 
44 [1967] 2 AC 134. 
45 Ibid 158. 
46 [1967] 2 AC 46.  
47 Ibid 118.  
 
129 
 
                                                 
of performance of duties’ clearly requires a nexus between the duties that the particular 
officer ordinarily performs, or is authorised to perform, for the corporation and the manner in 
which the information comes into that officer’s possession.   
 
This requirement gives rise to an important issue: what is the position if information may be 
considered to have been acquired in two or more different capacities, only one of which 
relates to the performance of the officer’s duties?  For example: What is the status of 
information which could have been acquired in either a private or a professional capacity?  
What is the status of information which could have arisen in one of two different professional 
capacities, one of which is unrelated to the performance of the officer’s duties? 
 
Information which is acquired in a private capacity is necessarily excluded from the 
operation of the s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act, because it falls outside the 
performance of the officer’s duties.  For example, if an officer of a corporation is informed of 
some inside information by a close personal friend at a social event, the director is unlikely 
to have received the information ‘in the course of performing his or her duties’, and therefore 
the corporation will not be regarded as possessing the information pursuant to s 1042G(1)(a) 
of the Corporations Act.  By contrast, if the officer was informed of the inside information by 
a client of the corporation at a formal business meeting, the officer would be more likely to 
be regarded as acquiring the information ‘in the course of performing his or her duties’ and 
so the information would also be considered to be possessed by the corporation pursuant to 
this provision. 
 
However, the distinction between information acquired in a private capacity and information 
acquired in a professional capacity may not always be easily drawn.  What would be the 
result if an officer acquired information in a context which had both private and professional 
aspects?   How are such issues to be determined?  The difficulties associated with this 
question can be demonstrated by the following example: An officer may, over time, become 
very friendly with a client of the corporation, so that they sometimes socialise together.  Both 
the officer and the client may regularly, as part of their professional activities, attend industry 
functions for networking and marketing purposes.   If the officer and client were to run into 
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each other at such a function and then, when the function ended, move onto a bar for a 
post-function drink where they discussed both professional and social topics, would 
information passed on to the officer by the client be information acquired in the course of the 
officer’s performance of his or her duties?  The attendance at the industry function suggests 
a professional capacity, but the post-function drinks are more likely to be described as a 
mere social occasion, giving the event a more private capacity.  Is this really a satisfactory 
test, particularly in light of the reason for the prohibition of insider trading in Australia?  Since 
insider trading is prohibited in order to attempt to protect and maintain market integrity, 
ensuring a fair and efficient market, the application of the prohibition to corporations should 
be focused on ensuring that the corporation does not obtain an unfair informational 
advantage, rather than on the manner in which the information comes into the possession of 
various officers or employees. 
 
What then of information acquired in another professional capacity?  It is not uncommon for 
officers of corporations to have other professional roles and responsibilities outside their 
‘primary’ corporate role.  For example, a director may be on the board of more than one 
corporation.  Where such a director acquires inside information, how is it to be determined in 
which capacity he or she was acting when they acquired it?  Austin and Ramsay48 consider 
that if one corporation controls enough shares in a second corporation to be able to appoint 
an officer of the first corporation as a director of the second, any information acquired by that 
officer while serving as a director of the second corporation will be possessed by the first 
corporation as well, because the information will be acquired by the officer in the course of 
performing his or her duties for the first corporation.  However, in circumstances where a 
person is a director of two unrelated corporations, with no relationship or link between the 
two roles, there is generally no possession of information by one corporation if the director 
acquires the information while performing duties for the second corporation.49  Austin and 
Ramsay50 suggest that the common law agency rules may be relevant here, so that if a 
person is a director of two corporations and acquired information in the course of performing 
48 Austin and Ramsay, above n 27, [16.220]. 
49 Re David Payne & Co Ltd [1904] 2 Ch 608.  
50 Austin and Ramsay, above n 27, [16.220]. 
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their duties for the second corporation, the first corporation would only be considered to 
possess the information if the director was under a duty to acquire it for, or disclose it to, the 
first corporation and could do so without breaching any duties to the second corporation 
from which it was acquired.51 Alternatively, if the director was regarded as being the 
‘directing mind and will’ of both corporations at general law, each corporation could be 
regarded as possessing the information under the identification doctrine,52 as will be 
discussed below.  Once again, insider trading laws should be directed to ensuring a 
corporation does not obtain an unfair informational advantage, rather than focusing on the 
capacity in which an officer was acting when he or she came to possess inside information. 
 
Section 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act may also be used as a mechanism for 
determining that certain information is possessed by a corporation.  As set out above, 
section 1042G(1)(b) states that: 
 
if an officer of a body corporate knows any matter or thing because he or she is an officer 
of the body corporate, it is to be presumed that the body corporate knows that matter or 
thing. 
 
Thus, in order for information to be possessed by a corporation in accordance with s 
1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act there are two requirements which must be satisfied: (i) 
the information must be known by an officer of the corporation; and (ii) the officer must know 
the information because he or she is an officer of the corporation. 
 
The requirement that the person who knows the information must be an officer of the 
corporation is the same as for s 1042G(1)(a) and the definition of the term ‘officer’ in s 9 of 
the Corporations Act will be equally applicable.   
 
51 Harkness v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 543; El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc 
[1994] 2 All ER 685, 698. 
52 Endresz v Whitehouse (1997) 24 ACSR 208, 228.  
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A requirement that a person knows information because he or she is an officer of a 
corporation is similar but not identical to the requirement in s 1042G(1)(a) of the 
Corporations Act that the officer acquired information in the course of performance of their 
duties.  The phrase ‘because he or she is an officer’ is not defined in the Corporations Act or 
in any other Australian legislation.  However, it clearly requires a link between the position 
the person occupies within the corporation and the circumstances which lead to the person 
‘knowing’ the information.  Consequently, it will necessarily lead to the same or a similar 
result as under s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act, where information acquired in a 
private capacity will not be attributed to the corporation.  Thus, despite the variation in 
language used, there is likely to be little discernible difference between the operation of 
these two potential mechanisms of determining when a corporation will possess inside 
information.       
 
Turning now to s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act, another potential means of determining 
when a corporation possesses inside information, it has been noted above that this statutory 
provision states that: 
 
If, in a proceeding under this Chapter in respect of conduct engaged in by a body 
corporate, it is necessary to establish the state of mind of the body, it is sufficient to show 
that a director, employee or agent of the body, being a director, employee or agent by 
whom the conduct was engaged in within the scope of the person’s actual or apparent 
authority, had that state of mind. 
 
There are two requirements which must be satisfied to show that a corporation had a certain 
state of mind – in these circumstances, an awareness of information in order to amount to 
possession - under s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act: (i) a director, employee or agent of 
the corporation must be aware of relevant information; and (ii) the same director, employee 
or agent of the corporation must have engaged in certain conduct, within the scope of the 
person’s actual or apparent authority. 
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Section 769B(3) of the Corporations Act is widely drafted so that any director,53 employee or 
agent can possess the relevant information.  Unlike ss 1042G(1)(a) and 1042G(1)(b) 
discussed above, it is not limited to an officer of the corporation, but also applies to 
employees who possess relevant information.  An employment relationship is typically one in 
which an employee enters into a contract of service with an employer, in contrast to a 
contract for services entered into between a principal and an independent contractor.  While 
the totality of the relationship needs to be examined, the key criteria which are usually 
addressed to determine if there is an employment relationship are: the degree of control 
exercised, the mode of remuneration, whether there is an obligation to provide and maintain 
equipment, the obligation to work, the hours of work and provision of holidays, the deduction 
of income tax and the delegation of work.54   
 
Section 769B(3) of the Corporations Act also extends further to agents of a corporation.  An 
agent of a corporation may also be a director, officer or employee of the corporation, but that 
is not necessarily the case.  Agency is a relationship under which an agent agrees to act or, 
in the case of apparent authority, appears to act, on behalf of a principal, and under their 
control and direction, in relation to a particular matter, usually with the agent having the 
ability to effect a legal relationship between the principal and third parties.55  General law 
53 The term ‘director’ is extensively defined in s 9 of the Corporations Act, which states that: 
 “director” of a company or other body means: 
 (a) a person who:  
    (i) is appointed to the position of a director; or  
(ii) is appointed to the position of an alternate director and is acting in that 
capacity;  
regardless of the name that is given to their position; and  
(b) unless the contrary intention appears, a person who is not validly appointed as a director 
if:  
   (i)   they act in the position of a director; or  
(ii)   the directors of the company or body are accustomed to act in accordance with the 
person’s instructions or wishes.  
54 Hollis v Vabu (2001) HCA 44; Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) HCA 1.     
55 International Harvester Co of Australia Pty Ltd v Carrigan’s Hazledene Pastoral Co (1958) 100 CLR 644, 
652; Peterson v Maloney (1951) 84 CLR 91, 94. 
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rules of agency will apply to determine whether a particular person is considered to be a 
corporation’s agent (whether by express actual authority, implied actual authority or 
apparent authority).  Independent contractors, who are not regarded as employees, will 
generally be considered to be agents of a corporation.   
 
While it might be possible for a variety of agents who are engaged by corporations to come 
into the possession of inside information, the most likely agent to be representing a 
corporation while coming into possession of inside information is a securities broker, or 
another type of securities intermediary.  Security broking services may be provided by 
specialist securities brokers, or investment banks which offer their clients a wide range of 
financial intermediary services.56  
 
Accordingly, it can be seen that s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act, in applying to directors, 
employees and agents of a corporation, extends significantly beyond the scope of ss 
1042G(1)(a) and 1042G(1)(b).  However, while under this provision any director, employee 
or agent may have the relevant state of mind, being the awareness of certain information 
amounting to possession, it is only considered to be the state of mind of the corporation if 
the same person engaged in certain conduct in the scope of their actual or apparent 
authority.  The relevant conduct for insider trading can be described as the trading, or 
procuring of trading, in relevant financial products.  As noted above, this is specifically set 
out in s 1043A of the Corporations Act, which has the title ‘Prohibited Conduct by Person in 
Possession of Inside Information’, where it is stated that an insider: 
 
(1) …must not (whether as principal or agent): 
 
56 Such services may include issuing, buying and selling of securities, and the giving of related financial advice, 
securities underwriting and financial advisory services in connection with takeovers, mergers and acquisitions, 
divestitures, restructurings, joint ventures and privatizations, as well as a range of trading, investment research, 
financing asset management and foreign exchange dealings: Andrew Tuch, ‘Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: 
Implications for Conflicts of Interest’ (2005) 2 Melbourne University Law Review 478, 486. 
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(c) apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products, or enter 
into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 
financial products; or  
 
(d) procure another person to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 
financial product, or enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, 
relevant Division 3 financial products. 
 
An additional form of prohibited conduct is set out in s 1043A(2) of the Corporations Act, 
where it is stated that an insider must not: 
 
directly or indirectly, communicate the information, or cause the information to be 
communicated, to another person if the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that 
the other person would or would be likely to:  
 
(c) apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products, or enter 
into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 
financial products; or  
 
(d) procure another person to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 
financial products, or enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, 
relevant Division 3 financial products.  
 
This means that, for s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act to apply, the person in possession of 
the relevant inside information must also be the same person who traded, or procured the 
trading, in the relevant financial products, or engaged in tipping. 
 
It must also have been within the person’s actual or apparent authority to do so.  When 
assessing whether an act is done within the scope of authority – actual or apparent – 
general law principles of agency will be relevant.  It will be necessary to establish that the 
person either had: (i) express actual authority; 57 (ii) implied actual authority;58 or (iii) 
57 As described in Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480, 502. 
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apparent authority,59 to engage in that conduct as part of their ordinary duties, or as part of 
the broader role for which they are retained by the corporation.  Such a person is likely to 
include, for example, an employee specifically authorised to buy and sell shares on a 
corporation’s behalf, such as the proprietary trader whose activities were the subject of ASIC 
v Citigroup,60 and employees who advise clients of the corporation on share trading and 
facilitate such trading, such as securities brokers.  As the relevant conduct includes the 
procuring of trading, it will also include a senior manager or executive who directs a more 
junior employee to engage in the actual trading.  
 
Thus the ability to trade in financial products, or procure such trading, must be conduct in 
which the relevant person engages, with some form of authority.  The fact that the actual 
trading in question was not expressly authorised or permitted will not prevent the conduct 
from being considered to be within the scope of that general authority.61  
 
Where the person who engaged in the relevant trading conduct also possesses the relevant 
inside information, s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act will therefore operate so that the 
corporation will also be considered to possess the information.  This section must be 
contrasted with ss 1042G(1)(a) and 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act, which do not 
contain any requirement that the relevant officer who possesses inside information also 
engage in the relevant trading conduct.       
 
The Application of General Law Agency Rules 
 
As the Corporations Act does not provide an exclusive mechanism for determining when 
information is possessed by a corporation, as has been demonstrated earlier in this chapter, 
58 As described in Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549, 583. 
59 As described in Crabtree-Vickers v Australian Direct Mail (1975) 33 CLR 72. 
60 (2007) 160 FCR 35.  This case was discussed in detail in chapter 2 of this thesis, and will be a major focus of 
chapter 6.  
61 See, for example, Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission [1995] AC 500. 
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general law mechanisms are still available as an additional means of determining when a 
corporation possesses inside information. 
 
At general law, a corporation may be regarded as possessing information that is known to 
an authorised agent (who need not be the directing mind and will of a corporation) if the 
following conditions are satisfied: (i) the information is acquired by the agent in his or her 
capacity as a representative of the corporation;62 (ii) the agent has authority to receive 
information on the corporation’s behalf and a duty to disclose the information to the 
corporation;63 and (iii) the agent is not under a duty to another person to refrain from 
communicating the information to the corporation.64  If an agent of a corporation satisfying 
these criteria possesses certain inside information, the corporation could also be considered 
to possess that information pursuant to the general law agency rules.    
 
As has been noted above in the discussion concerning s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act, an 
agent of a corporation may also be a director, officer or employee of the corporation, but that 
is not necessarily the case, and general law rules of agency will apply to determine whether 
a particular person is considered to be a corporation’s agent (again, whether by express 
actual authority, implied actual authority or ostensible authority).  However, merely because 
an agent of the corporation knows certain relevant information, the corporation will not be 
found to possess it, if the agent did not acquire the information in their capacity as a 
representative of the corporation.  This raises similar issues to those which arise in 
connection with ss 1042G(1)(a) and 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act, where a 
corporation will only be regarded as possessing inside information if an officer of the 
corporation came into possession of the information in the course of performance of their 
duties, or because he or she was an officer of the corporation.  Information acquired by an 
agent in another professional capacity, or privately, will not be information which the 
principal corporation is considered to possess.   
62 Societe Generale de Paris v Tramways Union Co Ltd (1884) 14 QBD 424. 
63 Beach Petroleum NL and Claremont Petroleum NL v Johnson (1993) 115 ALR 411, 568-569. 
64 Re Marseilles Extension Railway Company (1971) LR 7 Ch App 161. 
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Although the agent must have a duty to disclose the information to the corporation, in order 
for knowledge to be regarded as the information of the corporation, a failure to actually make 
such a disclosure will not prevent the corporation from being considered to possess the 
information.65  Thus, if the agent has acquired the information while representing the 
corporation, but does not pass the information onto the corporation as required, the 
corporation will still be regarded as possessing the information under general law agency 
rules.    
 
If the information acquired by an agent is information which is confidential to another person, 
and it would breach the agent’s duty to that other person to disclose the information to the 
corporation, the agent is bound not to disclose the information and the corporation will not be 
regarded as possessing the information known to the agent.66  This will be the case even if 
the agent would otherwise have been obliged to disclose the information to the corporation. 
 
Possession of Information by the Directing Mind and Will of the Corporation 
 
As noted above, various cases have found that the words ‘is taken to’ in legislation similar to 
s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act indicate a lack of exclusivity and allow ‘the operation 
of the directing mind principle’67 to operate in addition to statutory mechanisms. 
 
The general law identification doctrine provides that certain people act not just as agents of 
a corporation but as the corporation itself, so that their acts and intentions are taken to be 
those of the corporation, as discussed in chapter 4.  Such persons, referred to as the 
directing mind and will of a corporation, may possess information which is then regarded as 
65 Deborah A DeMott, ‘When Is a Principal Charged with an Agent’s Knowledge?’ (2003) Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 291, 313. 
66 Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205, 214. 
67 Rowe v Transport Workers Union of Australia (1998) 160 ALR 66, 81.  Approved in Hadgkiss v Sunland 
Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 346 (14 March 2007) (Keifel J) and in Hanley v Automotive, Food, Metals, 
Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union [2000] FCA 1188 (24 August 2000) (Ryan, Moore and 
Goldberg JJ). 
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being possessed by the corporation itself.  Such persons include: (i) a person under the 
direction of the shareholders in general meeting; (ii) the board of directors; and (iii) a person 
who has the authority of the board of directors, given under the corporation’s constitution, 
and appointed by the shareholders.68 
 
As the board of directors is responsible for the overall management of a corporation, 
information which is known collectively to the board will automatically be imputed to the 
corporation.69  Similarly, if the board of directors has delegated their day-to-day 
management powers to a managing director or chief executive officer, the corporation will be 
regarded as possessing information which is possessed by that managing director or chief 
executive officer.70  However, if the information is possessed by one director only, who is not 
a managing director, that will not be sufficient for the information to be considered to be 
possessed by the corporation, as such a director will not ordinarily be regarded as the 
directing mind and will of the corporation, unless the board has delegated particular authority 
to that director. 
 
The ultimate test of whether a person is the directing mind and will of a corporation is 
whether the person manages and controls the actions of the corporation in relation to the 
relevant activity.71  For example, while a corporation may have a managing director who 
ordinarily would be regarded as the directing mind and will of the corporation in relation to 
most of its activities, if a particular employee has been given authority to act for the 
corporation in relation to a certain transaction or certain types of transactions (for example, 
to undertake securities trading on the corporation’s behalf) and the person has been vested 
with ‘authority, control, discretion and a significant degree of responsibility’72 in relation to the 
relevant transactions, that employee can be regarded as the corporation’s directing mind 
and will in relation to the securities trading but not other activities.  This makes it possible for 
68 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705, 713-714. 
69 Houghton and Co v Nothard, Lowe and Wills Ltd [1928] AC 1, 18-19. 
70 Re Rossfield Group Operations Pty Ltd [1981] Qd R 372, 377. 
71 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Ltd Plc [1994] 2 All ER 685. 
72 The Bell Group Ltd (in Liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1, [539]. 
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more than one person to be regarded as a corporation’s directing mind and will in relation to 
a variety of different activities of the corporation.73  However, as there is no separation of the 
relevant actus reus and mens rea between different people within a corporation when the 
identification doctrine is relied upon, in order for a corporation to be regarded as engaging in 
the offence under this doctrine, the person who is the directing mind and will of the 
corporation will need to engage in, or satisfy, all the relevant elements, so that the person’s 
acts and intentions are regarded as those of the corporation.  Accordingly, when applying 
the principles of the identification doctrine to the liability of corporations for insider trading, it 
will therefore be necessary to demonstrate that the person who is regarded as being the 
directing mind and will of the relevant corporation possessed the relevant information, had 
the necessary knowledge that it was inside information, and engaged in the relevant trading 
conduct.  
  
Collective Knowledge 
 
At general law it is possible, in certain circumstances, to find that a corporation has collective 
knowledge, comprised of separate pieces of information known by more than one person 
within the corporation.74  Not every piece of information held by separate employees can be 
aggregated,75 and a distinction is made between the aggregation of mere knowledge of facts 
and the aggregation of a particular state of mind - while the first type of aggregation is often 
possible, the second is rare.76  
In Re Chisum Services,77 it was acknowledged by Wootten J of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales that the aggregation of knowledge of facts within a corporation was possible, 
but only if one of the people who possessed some of the information was under a duty to 
communicate it to the other person (for example, if the first person reported to the second 
73 Brambles Holdings v Carey (1976) 2 ACLR 126. 
74 The Bell Group Ltd (in Liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1, 539; Krakwoski v 
Eurolynx Properties (1995) 130 ALR 1, 16.  
75 The Bell Group Ltd (in Liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1, 539. 
76 Ibid 540. 
77 (1982) 7 ACLR 641. 
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person) or if both people in possession of separate pieces of information reported to the 
same superior and had a duty to report it to him or her.78 
As was stated by Owen J of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in The Bell Group Ltd 
(in Liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9):79 
 
Whether a Court is prepared to infer that a company had particular knowledge or had a 
particular state of mind, based on collective knowledge of its officers and agents, depends 
on the circumstances of the case.  It may depend on the type of information and the effect 
that such a piece of information may have (or should have had) on the particular 
employee.  It will also depend on the particular employees’ positions, their duties and 
responsibilities, and their proximity to the relevant transaction.80   
 
Thus, at general law it may be possible for separate pieces of information possessed by 
more than one person to be aggregated, so that the corporation is deemed to possess all 
the information.  However, there are no known cases concerning insider trading in which the 
concept of collective knowledge has been applied.  The concept of collective knowledge is 
not expressly addressed by the Corporations Act in relation to insider trading, as s 
1042G(1)(a) refers only to a body corporate being taken to possess information which ‘an 
officer’ possesses and s 1042G(1)(b) provides only that if ‘an officer’ of a body corporate 
knows any matter or thing, it is presumed that the body corporate knows it.  Section 769B(3) 
of the Corporations Act links the state of mind of ‘a director, employee or agent’ with conduct 
that person engages in within the scope of his or her authority.  However, it is possible, in 
the absence of express language to the contrary, to determine that if separate pieces of 
information were known to two different officers of a corporation, the corporation could be 
regarded as possessing all of that information which together amount to inside information.    
 
78 Ibid 650. 
79 (2008) 70 ACSR 1. 
80 Ibid 542. 
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Relationship with Continuous Disclosure Obligations  
 
It is useful to consider the continuous disclosure obligations which exist under the ASX 
Listing Rules and require listed public corporations to immediately notify the ASX: 
 
 once an entity is or becomes aware of any information concerning it that a reasonable 
person would expect to have a material impact on the price or value of the entity’s 
securities.81 
 
In chapter 19 of the ASX Listing Rules, the term ‘aware’ is given the following meaning: 
 
 An entity becomes aware of information if, and as soon as, an officer of the entity… has, 
or ought reasonably to have, come into possession of the information in the course of the 
performance of their duties as an officer of that entity.82 
 
The continuous disclosure obligations contained in the ASX Listing Rules are considered to 
be ‘critical to the integrity and efficiency of the ASX market’.83  The ASX states that the 
definition of ‘aware’ is based on s 1042G of the Corporations Act.84  There is, however, an 
important distinction as, under the Listing Rules a corporation is regarded as being aware of 
information not only where the relevant person has come into possession of the information 
in the course of performance of their duties but also where they ought reasonably to have 
come into possession of the information.  This distinction has resulted in the continuous 
81 ASX Listing Rule 3.1.  
82 Prior to May 2013, when this definition was amended, an entity was considered to be ‘aware’ of information 
when a director or executive officer of the entity had, or ought reasonably to have, come into possession of the 
information in the course of the performance of their duties as director or executive officer of that entity. 
83 ASX Listing Rules Guidance Note 8, Continuous Disclosure: Listing Rules 3.1 – 3.1B, July 2015, 4.  As noted 
by the ASX, the view has also received judicial endorsement, as evidenced by the statement of the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal (comprised of Spigelman CJ, Beazley JA and Giles JA) in James Hardie Industries NV 
v ASIC [2010] NSWCA 332, [355], where it was noted that the policy objective of the continuous disclosure 
obligations is to ‘enhance the integrity and efficiency of Australian capital markets by ensuring that the market 
is fully informed.’  
84 ASX Listing Rules Guidance Note 8, Continuous Disclosure: Listing Rules 3.1 – 3.1B, July 2015, 12. 
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disclosure obligations being interpreted to as having both subjective and objective elements, 
so that where a director or an executive officer of a corporation has access to information, 
even without actual knowledge of the contents, they are deemed to have it in their 
possession.85  Thus, despite the similarity underlying the rationale for continuous disclosure 
rules and insider trading laws – both existing to protect and maintain market integrity – the 
difference in significant aspects of the statutory requirements means that, in this context, the 
continuous disclosure obligations are of little assistance in interpreting the insider trading 
laws.   
 
The ASX offers an explanation for including information that an officer ‘ought reasonably to 
have come into possession of’ as information that a corporation is ‘aware’ of, by stating that 
it is intended to prevent corporations from seeking to avoid their obligations and liability ‘by 
not bringing market sensitive information to the attention of its officers in a timely manner’.86  
However, for insider trading laws, such a position clearly falls outside the judicial 
interpretation of the meaning of ‘possession’ of inside information.   It is certainly not 
desirable that two sets of rules dealing with similar issues and with the same underlying 
rationale should differ significantly in this respect.87   
 
Comparison between Different Mechanisms for Determining when a Corporation 
Possesses Information  
 
Having determined that there are a number of mechanisms which are available to determine 
when a corporation possesses information – the statutory provisions found in ss 
85 ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd [2011] FCAFC 19 (18 February 2011) [185].  Although the ultimate 
decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court was overturned on appeal by the High Court, the High Court did 
not address the issue of objective and subjection considerations in relation to the possession of information: 
Forrest v ASIC; Fortescue Metals Group Ltd v ASIC [2012] HCA 39 (2 October 2012). 
86 ASX Listing Rules Guidance Note 8, Continuous Disclosure: Listing Rules 3.1 – 3.1B, July 2015, 10. 
87 While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider potential amendments to the continuous disclosure 
obligations under the Listing Rules as well the insider trading laws under the Corporations Act, it is hoped that 
any future reforms made to both the Corporations Act and the ASX Listing Rules may lead to greater 
consistency between these two interrelated sets of rules.     
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1042G(1)(a), 1042G(1)(b) and 769B(3) of the Corporations Act, and the general law 
principles of the identification doctrine and agency rules - the differences between these 
methods can now be analysed.  
 
Sections 1042G(1)(a) and 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act require the person who 
possesses the information to be an officer of the corporation; s 769B(3) of the Corporations 
Act has potential application to directors, employees and agents; and the general law 
requires the person to be the directing mind and will of the corporation, or an agent of the 
corporation with authority to receive the information and a duty to disclose it.  While the 
person who is regarded as the directing mind and will of a corporation will generally be a 
‘superior officer’88 and is likely to fall within the definition of ‘officer’ contained in s 9 of the 
Corporations Act, this will not necessarily be the case.  Indeed, not all officers of a 
corporation would be regarded as the corporation’s directing mind and will. 
  
Whether a particular agent with authority to receive the information and a duty to disclose it 
would be an officer or the directing mind and will of the corporation will obviously depend on 
the circumstances, but as an agent may be a person external to the corporation (such as a 
securities broker) it is certainly possible that such an agent would be neither an officer of the 
corporation nor the corporation’s directing mind and will.  Such an agent may also be an 
employee who is neither an officer of the corporation or the directing mind and will.  Sections 
1042G(1)(a) and 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act require either that the information 
known by the relevant officer came into his or her possession ‘in the course of the 
performance of the duties’ as an officer or was known by them ‘because he or she is an 
officer of the corporation’.  Both require a clear nexus with the person’s role or duties as an 
officer of the corporation and therefore exclude information acquired in a private capacity.  
Section 769B(3) of the Corporations Act requires no such nexus with the person’s role or 
duties when coming into possession of the information, but does require that the person also 
engaged in the relevant conduct – in this case, the trading or procuring or trading in relevant 
financial products, or tipping.  Under the general law, information obtained by an agent of the 
corporation with authority to receive the information and a duty to disclose it must also be 
88 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass (1972) AC 153, 171. 
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obtained in the course of performing the agent’s duties for the corporation.  However, there 
is no such requirement for possession by a person who is the directing mind and will of a 
corporation, as the information will still be possessed by the corporation if it is possessed by 
the person who is its directing mind and will, regardless of how it is obtained.  It also seems 
that the doctrine of collective knowledge has potential operation, so that a corporation may 
be regarded as being in possession of several different pieces of information each 
possessed by a different person within the corporation.   
 
As noted in chapter 3, most of the examined jurisdictions do not have statutory provisions 
within the relevant legislation prohibiting insider trading which set out the particular manner 
in which the elements of the insider trading laws are to be applied to corporations – this 
includes the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA, New Zealand and 
Hong Kong.  As a result, the general principles of corporate criminal liability which are 
applicable in the relevant jurisdiction must be relied upon to determine the manner in which 
corporations may be found liable for insider trading.   The exceptions are South Africa, 
where s 82(8) of the Financial Markets Act 2012 (South Africa) provides that, in connection 
with liability for insider trading, ‘the common law principles of vicarious liability apply’, and 
Singapore, which has a set of specific statutory rules to apply the elements of the insider 
trading offence to corporations.  Section 226(1) of the Securities and Futures Act 2001 
(Singapore) specifically provides that:  
 
(a) a corporation is taken to possess any information which an officer of the corporation 
possesses and which came into his possession in the course of the performance of 
duties as such an officer; and  
(b) if an officer of a corporation knows or ought reasonably to know any matter or thing 
because he is an officer of the corporation, it is to be presumed, until the contrary is 
proved, that the corporation knows or ought reasonably to know that matter or thing. 
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Section 236B(1) of the Securities and Futures Act 2001 (Singapore) also provides that: 
 
Where an offence of contravening any provision in this Part is proved to have been 
committed by an employee or an officer of a corporation (referred to in this section as the 
contravening person) — 
(a) with the consent or connivance of the corporation; and 
(b)  for the benefit of the corporation, 
the corporation shall be guilty of that offence as if the corporation had committed the 
contravention, and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 
 
I do not recommend that Australian insider trading laws adopt the model utilised in 
jurisdictions such as the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA, New 
Zealand and Hong Kong, where there are no statutory provisions within the relevant 
legislation prohibiting insider trading providing for manner in which the elements of the 
insider trading offence are to be applied to corporations.  Such a position would create 
additional uncertainty and in Australia would require reliance only on the common law 
agency rules or identification doctrine, or necessitate the use of the existing principles of 
corporate criminal responsibility contained in the Criminal Code but currently excluded from 
operation in respect of the insider trading offence.  Instead, the drafting of improved statutory 
provisions to better provide for the attribution of the elements of the insider trading offence to 
corporations is the basis of my reform proposals.            
 
The South African position, relying on vicarious liability, differs significantly from that adopted 
under Australian law.  As was noted in chapter 4, vicarious liability is generally only imposed 
for regulatory offences and is not usually a model utilised for serious criminal offences.  
Accordingly, it is not recommended that the South African position be explored as an 
alternative on which to base proposed new amendments to Australian laws.   
 
The Singaporean provisions are similar to those in Australia, having developed particular 
statutory rules for determining when a corporation possesses information, has knowledge 
and engages in an offence.   Indeed, s 226(1)(a) of the Securities and Futures Act 2001 
(Singapore) is almost identical to s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act, but this is not 
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surprising since the Singaporean insider trading laws were modeled on the Australian 
provisions.89  As a result, the Singaporean position, as a set of insider laws derived from 
Australia’s own, does not provide an alternative base on which to model potential reforms to 
the Australian legislation.     
 
The concurrent operation of both the general law and statute in this area, with overlapping 
but differing sets of rules, leads to significant difficulty and uncertainty in determining when a 
corporation possesses inside information, has knowledge that certain information is inside 
information, and engages in the relevant trading conduct.  It is not desirable that such 
uncertainty exist, particularly as the general law rules have also been demonstrated to apply, 
but with their application untested judicially in this context.  Legislative reform is vital in order 
to provide clarity and certainty in relation to the liability of corporations for insider trading. 
 
It can be seen from the analysis above, that the different mechanisms which may be used to 
attribute the possession of information to corporations are capable of giving quite varied 
results.  As has been noted, in ASIC v Citigroup, Jacobson J considered the operation of just 
one of these mechanisms, s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act, and did not address any 
other statutory mechanisms or the operation of the general law.  By contrast, Qu90 regards 
the general law as relevant to rebut statutory presumptions which might otherwise apply 
elements of the offence to a corporation.  A careful review of the element of possession 
leads to the necessary conclusion that both the statutory provisions and general law rules 
operate concurrently to provide a variety of mechanisms which can be used to establish that 
a corporation possesses inside information.  The Corporations Act is silent on the application 
of the general law, but the operation of the general law is not excluded.  This is in contrast to 
other sections of the Corporations Act which expressly refer to the general law – for 
example, s 133 of the Corporations Act excludes the operation of the general law in relation 
89 Hse-Yu Chiu, ‘Australian Influence on the Insider Trading Laws in Singapore’ [2002] Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies) 574. 
90 Qu, above n 18, 191. 
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to pre-registration contracts91 and s 236(3) of the Corporations Act abolishes the general law 
derivative action,92 whereas s 185 of the Corporations Act expressly provides that the 
statutory directors’ duties and obligations contained in ss 180 to 184 operate in addition 
those which exist under the general law.93   
 
Cases interpreting other pieces of legislation which use the same or very similar language to 
these provisions make it clear that the general law is not intended to be excluded and, in 
order to make sense of other provisions of the Corporations Act, it is necessary to infer that 
the general law is also intended to apply.  Even when considering the statutory tests alone, 
there is confusion as to which of those tests relate to the possession of information and 
which relate to the requisite knowledge.  For example, as is noted earlier, there is a 
divergence of opinion as to whether s 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act applies only 
when attempting to determine whether a corporation had the requisite knowledge, or 
whether it is applicable to both the possession of information and the requisite knowledge.  
This uncertainty needs to be resolved. 
 
In addition to the uncertainty which exists in determining whether both statutory and general 
law mechanisms are available to determine when a corporation possesses information, each 
of various available mechanisms applies a different set of tests - some require that, for a 
corporation to be considered to possess information that a natural person possesses, the 
91 Sections 131 and 132 of Part 2B.3 of the Corporations Act set out the statutory rules relating to pre-
registration contracts and s 133 provides: 
This Part replaces any rights or liabilities anyone would otherwise have on the pre--registration contract. 
92 Section 236(1) and (2) of the Corporations Act provide for the statutory derivative action and s 236(3) 
provides: 
The right of a person at general law to bring, or intervene in, proceedings on behalf of a company is abolished. 
93 Section 185 of the Corporations Act  provides: 
Sections 180 to 184:  
(a) have effect in addition to, and not in derogation of, any rule of law relating to the duty or 
liability of a person because of their office or employment in relation to a corporation; and  
(b) do not prevent the commencement of civil proceedings for a breach of a duty or in 
respect of a liability referred to in paragraph (a).  
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natural person must be an officer of that corporation,94 whereas others will operate in 
respect of any employee or agent who is able to act on the corporation’s behalf.95  Some 
require that there be a link or nexus with the person's role within the corporation.96  Some 
require that possession of information must be linked to the relevant conduct,97 while others 
do not.98  When the general law mechanisms are also considered, the confusion 
compounds, as the principles of the identification doctrine will apply so that a corporation 
possesses information which is possessed by its ‘directing mind and will’, with no necessary 
connection with their role or other elements of the offence.  The proposed reforms discussed 
at the end of this chapter and set out in detail in chapter 7 are intended to remedy these 
many problems.  I propose to expand the class of persons who may possess information on 
behalf of a corporation to include all officers, employees and agents, and to remove any 
requirement that they must acquire the information in connection with the performance of 
their duties or role.  However, a corporation would only be regarded as engaging in insider 
trading if the same person who possesses the relevant information, also has the knowledge 
that it is inside information and engages in the relevant conduct.     
 
ATTRIBUTING THE KNOWLEDGE ELEMENT TO CORPORATIONS99 
 
As noted above, the ‘knowledge element’ of the insider trading offence is that a person 
knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the relevant information possessed is not generally 
available, and that if it were, a reasonable person would expect it to be material.  That is, the 
person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the relevant information is ‘inside 
94 Corporations Act; ss 1042G(1)(a) and 1042G(1)(b).  
95 Corporations Act, s 769B(3). 
96 Corporations Act, ss 1042G(1)(a), 1042G(1)(b), and 769B(3). 
97 Corporations Act, s 769B(3).  
98 Corporations Act, ss 1042G(1)(a) and 1042G(1)(b). 
99 An earlier draft of this section of the thesis was published as the following journal article: Juliette Overland, 
'Corporate Liability for Insider Trading: How Does a Company have the Necessary 'Mens Rea'?' (2010) 24 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 266. 
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information’.100   Therefore, the next issues to be addressed in this chapter are how a 
corporation comes to have the requisite knowledge of these matters, and when it is that a 
corporation ‘ought reasonably to know’ something.  
 
As there has never been a criminal prosecution brought against a corporation for insider 
trading in Australia, and no successful civil penalty proceedings, the application of the 
knowledge element of insider trading to a corporation has never been considered 
judicially.101  However, as will be shown, this important issue concerning the liability of 
corporations for insider trading is unnecessarily unwieldy and complex.  I will demonstrate 
that there are currently a number of statutory mechanisms which can be used to determine 
that a corporation has certain knowledge, in addition to the general law principles of the 
identification doctrine.     
 
Statutory Mechanisms for Establishing Knowledge  
 
There are two provisions in the Corporations Act which could potentially be used to 
determine when a corporation has certain knowledge, and which therefore may be 
applicable to the knowledge element of insider trading: (i) s 104G(1)(b) of the Corporations 
Act; and (ii) s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act. 
 
100 As set out above, the knowledge element of the insider trading offence, contained in s 1043A(1(b) of the 
Corporations Act, is that: 
the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the matters specified in paragraphs (a) and 
(b) of the definition of inside information in section 1042A are satisfied in relation to the information. 
The matters specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of ‘inside information’ in s 1042A of the 
Corporations Act are: 
(a) the information is not generally available; and 
(b) if the information were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a 
material effect on the price or value of particular Division 3 financial products. 
101 It was not necessary for this issue to be addressed in ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35 due to the 
determinations made by the Court in relation to the other elements of insider trading. 
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Section 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act has already been examined above in the 
context of the possession element.102  In order to establish that a corporation had certain 
knowledge under the operation of this section, it must be established that: (i) an officer of the 
corporation had the relevant knowledge; and (ii) the officer had the knowledge because he 
or she was an officer of the corporation.  The application of this section in relation to the 
knowledge element does differ from its application to the possession element, as it is more 
difficult to determine how a person is likely to have knowledge of the qualities of certain 
information because he or she is an officer of a corporation.  
  
Section 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act requires an officer of the corporation to have 
the relevant knowledge.  Thus, the definition of ‘officer’ set out in s 9 of the Corporations 
Act103 must be satisfied, so the person will generally need to be a director, secretary or 
senior executive of the corporation.  Then, the relevant officer must have the knowledge 
because he or she was an officer of the corporation.  As noted above, the phrase ‘because 
he or she is an officer’ is not defined in the Corporations Act or in any other Australian 
legislation, but in cases concerning directors’ duties and fiduciary obligations104 the courts 
make it clear that there must be a causal link between the position the person occupies 
within the corporation and the reason they have acquired that particular knowledge, thereby 
excluding knowledge acquired or resulting from a private role or as a member of the general 
public.   
 
102 Section 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act provides that ‘if an officer of a body corporate knows any 
matter or thing because he or she is an officer of the body corporate, it is to be presumed that the body 
corporate knows that matter or thing.’  It was noted above that some commentators view s 1042G(1)(b) of the 
Corporations Act as relevant only to the knowledge element of insider trading, whereas others consider that it 
is also applicable to both the possession element and the knowledge element.  On either interpretation, s 
1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act is relevant to the knowledge element. 
103 This definition was set out in full and discussed above. 
104 See, for example, Peso Silver Mines v Cropper [1966] SCR 673; Regal Hastings v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134; 
and Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, as discussed above.  
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While this may be a concept which is fairly easy to apply to the possession element of 
insider trading – to determine whether a person came into the possession of information 
because of their position within a corporation – it is much more difficult to apply to the 
knowledge element.  This element obviously requires a person to have knowledge of certain 
qualities of the information – whether it is generally available and likely to be material – so 
how can it be said that a person has that sort of knowledge because he or she is an officer 
of a particular corporation?  If the person acquires the relevant information in connection 
with their role as an officer – for example, while working on a particular transaction – and it is 
made clear to them by the person imparting the information that it is confidential and would 
be likely to affect the price of certain financial products, it could potentially be said that the 
officer had such knowledge because of their position.  However, if they came into 
possession of the information in connection with their role as an officer, but were not 
expressly told that it was confidential and would be likely to affect the price of certain 
financial products, it is difficult to conclude that the person would have that knowledge 
because he or she was an officer of the corporation. 
 
It may be the case that certain people are more likely to be aware of these qualities of 
information - when it is generally available and when it is likely to be material – because they 
have a certain occupation.  For example, a proprietary trader or securities broker is more 
likely to be knowledgeable about such matters than many other employees or executives 
within an organisation.  However, merely because a person has a certain occupation which 
enables him or her to better assess the qualities of certain information than others, and also 
happens to be an officer of a corporation, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he 
or she had that knowledge because they are an officer.  Thus, the application of this 
provision to the knowledge element of insider trading is unclear and contains significant 
ambiguity.      
 
As noted above, s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act provides that: 
 
If, in a proceeding under this Chapter in respect of conduct engaged in by a body 
corporate, it is necessary to establish the state of mind of the body, it is sufficient to show 
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that a director, employee or agent of the body, being a director, employee or agent by 
whom the conduct was engaged in within the scope of the person’s actual or apparent 
authority, had that state of mind.105 
 
Section 769B(3) of the Corporations Act is clearly also relevant to the knowledge element of 
insider trading, due to the inclusion of ‘knowledge’ as the definition of ‘state of mind’ in s 
769B(10)(c) and the fact that almost identical provisions which give rise to criminal offences 
under other pieces of legislation106 are considered to apply to the fault element of those 
other offences.107   
 
In order to establish that a corporation had certain knowledge under s 769B(3) of the 
Corporations Act, there are two requirements which must be satisfied: (i) a director, 
employee or agent of the corporation must have the relevant knowledge; and (ii) the same 
director, employee or agent of the corporation must have engaged in the relevant conduct, 
within the scope of the person’s actual or apparent authority.  
 
As noted above in relation to the ‘possession element’ to which this section can also be 
applied, while any director, employee or agent may have the relevant knowledge, it is only 
considered to be the knowledge of the corporation if the same person engaged in the 
relevant conduct which, for insider trading, is not the physical element - the possession of 
the inside information – but the trading, or procuring of trading, in financial products, or 
tipping – the ‘trading element’.  Accordingly, for s 769B(3)  of the Corporations Act to apply 
so that the corporation is regarded as having the relevant knowledge, the person with the 
knowledge that the information is inside information must also be a person who engaged in 
the relevant trading conduct. 
105 As previously set out, s 769B(10)(c) of the Corporations Act provides that: 
A reference to the state of mind of a person includes a reference to the knowledge, intention, 
opinion, belief or purpose of the person and the person’s reason for the person’s intention, opinion, 
belief or purpose (emphasis added). 
106 For example, s 84(1) of the former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and s 12GH(1) of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). 
107 For example, Clough and Mulhern, above n 33, 127 and Gillies, above n 34, 74.  
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 It must also have been within the person’s actual or apparent authority to trade or procure 
trading in the relevant financial products, or engage in tipping.  As discussed above, this 
means that the general law principles of agency must be relied upon to establish such 
authority as part of their ordinary duties, or as part of the broader role for which they are 
retained by the corporation.  However, the fact that the actual trading conduct in question 
was not specially authorised or permitted will not prevent the conduct from being considered 
to be within the scope of that general authority.108  
 
Where the person who engaged in the relevant conduct knows that the relevant information 
is not generally available and would be likely to be material, s 769B(3) of the Corporations 
Act will therefore operate so that the corporation is considered to have such knowledge.  
This section can be contrasted with s 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act, which does not 
require any link between the knowledge element and the trading element of insider trading. 
 
The Application of General Law Principles 
 
As well as utilising the statutory mechanisms in ss 1042G(1)(b) and 769B(3) of the 
Corporations Act, general law principles may also be relevant to determine when a 
corporation has the requisite knowledge. 
 
As noted above, s 1042G(2) of the Corporations Act states that ‘this section does not limit 
the application of section 769B in relation to this Division’, indicating that ss 1042G and 
769B of the Corporations Act can both be applied and that s 1042G(1)(a) is not the exclusive 
means of determining when a corporation possesses inside information.   For the same 
reasons, as it is part of the same section, s 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act is clearly 
not intended to be the exclusive means of determining when a corporation has the 
knowledge that certain information is inside information.   
 
108 See, for example, Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission [1995] AC 
500. 
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Likewise, s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act  does not appear to require exclusivity, or the 
exclusion of the general law rules, as it uses the phrase ‘it is sufficient to show’, which does 
indicate an intention that it be exclusive, or that the general law should be excluded.  Section 
84(1) of the former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) contained a provision almost identical to 
s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act, and in a number of cases the courts have determined that 
such a provision extends liability beyond the general law rules, but does not exclude 
them.109  For example, in the case of Universal Telecasters (Qld) Ltd v Guthrie,110 the 
liability of a television station for broadcasting an advertisement that allegedly contained 
‘false or misleading statements concerning the existence of or amounts of price reductions’ 
in breach of s 53(e) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  The corporation’s sales manager 
looked after all dealings and communications concerning the advertisement, including 
viewer complaints.  In order to be able to rely on a defence in s 85(3) of the Trade Practices 
Act, the television station needed to establish that it ‘did not know and had no reason to 
suspect that its publication would amount to a contravention.’  Section 84(1) of the Trade 
Practices Act provided that ‘where it is necessary to establish the intention of the 
corporation, it is sufficient to show that a servant or agent had the particular intention.’111  
The Full Court of the Federal Court found that the language in this section did not exclude 
the general law and the identification doctrine was still relevant to determine whether or not 
the knowledge of the sales manager should be attributed to the corporation.  Although the 
sales manager had received complaints about the advertisement and should have had 
reason to suspect the contravention, the Court determined by majority112 that this did not 
amount to intention within the scope of s 84(1), and that the sales manager was not the 
directing mind and will of the television station and therefore that his knowledge was not that 
of the corporation itself.    
 
109 Universal Telecasters (Qld) Ltd v Guthrie (1978) 32 FLR 360; Walplan Pty Ltd v Wallace (1985) 8 FCR 27; 
Sydbank Soenderjylland A/S v Bannerton Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-525; Ballard v Sperry Rand Aust 
Ltd (1975) 8 ALR 696; See also Clough and Mulhern, above n 33, 127; Gillies, above n 34, 76. 
110 (1978) 32 FLR 360.    
111 Emphasis added. 
112 Bowen CJ and Franki J (Nimmo J dissenting). 
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Thus, in addition to the statutory mechanisms, it appears that general law rules can also be 
used to determine when a corporation has the necessary knowledge to satisfy the 
knowledge element of insider trading.      
 
Knowledge of the Directing Mind and Will of the Corporation 
 
As discussed above and in chapter 4, there are certain persons who may be considered to 
be the ‘directing mind and will’ of a corporation under the identification doctrine, so that their 
acts and intentions are taken to be those of the corporation itself.  Depending on the 
circumstances, such persons may include the board of directors, a managing director or a 
superior officer of the corporation, so long as they have ‘full discretion to act independently 
of instruction’ from the board.113  If a person who is considered to be the directing mind and 
will of a corporation has the necessary knowledge that certain information is inside 
information, the corporation will therefore be regarded as having that knowledge.  There is 
no need to demonstrate that the person, or persons, regarded as the corporation’s directing 
mind and will acquired the relevant knowledge because they are the directing mind and will 
of the corporation, or in the course of performing their duties.  However, the need to 
demonstrate that the person who is the directing mind and will of the corporation has 
engaged in, or satisfies, all the relevant elements means that it will be necessary to show 
that the person who is the directing mind and will of the relevant corporation possessed the 
relevant information, had the necessary knowledge that it was inside information, and 
engaged in the relevant trading conduct.  
 
Such a person may be anyone who manages and controls the actions of the corporation in 
relation to the relevant activity114 which, when considering insider trading, may be a person 
who has been given authority to undertake securities trading on the corporation’s behalf, 
regardless of whether they are a director or officer of the corporation, so long as the person 
is entitled to undertake such activities without direction or instruction.  In the case of ASIC v 
113 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass (1972) AC 153, 171 (Lord Reid). 
114 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Ltd Plc [1994] 2 All ER 685. 
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Citigroup,115 it is unlikely that Mr Manchee, the proprietary trader who had engaged in the 
relevant trading in Patrick shares, could be regarded as the directing mind and will of 
Citigroup in relation to proprietary trading, because it was clear that he was one of five 
proprietary traders who reported to Mr Darwell, the Head of Equities and Derivatives at 
Citigroup, and he was clearly subject to Mr Darwell’s direction and instruction.116 
 
Knowledge of an Agent of the Corporation 
 
As discussed above, at general law a corporation can be considered to possess information 
which is possessed by an agent, who need not be the directing mind and will of the 
corporation, if certain conditions are satisfied.  However, such rules appear to more 
obviously relate to the actual possession of information rather than knowledge or a state of 
mind.  Cases on this topic concern the imputation of knowledge about certain facts or 
circumstances that a corporation was deemed (or not deemed) to know, due to the 
possession of that information by an agent, not knowledge amounting to an intention or 
‘mens rea’.117  Additionally, the relevant criteria are very difficult to apply to knowledge 
amounting to a corporation’s state of mind.  For example, a requirement that the agent have 
authority to receive information on behalf of the corporation and a duty to disclose it, is 
applicable to knowledge of certain matters or facts, but not a subjective state of mind.  How 
can a person be authorised to have a certain state of mind or knowledge?  It is not possible 
to say that an agent can be authorised to know that certain information is not generally 
available or is likely to be material.  However, it could be possible that an agent who is 
authorised to receive information on behalf of a corporation and who has a duty to disclose 
it, might then have the knowledge that the information is inside information.  While this issue 
does not appear to have been considered judicially, the potential application of agency rules 
to the knowledge element of insider trading is clearly problematic and uncertain. 
115 (2007) 160 FCR 35. 
116  Ibid 98, 101. 
117 See, for example, Societe Generale de Paris v Tramways Union Co Ltd (1884) 14 QBD 424; Beach 
Petroleum NL and Claremont Petroleum NL v Johnson (1993) 115 ALR 411; Re Marseilles Extension Railway 
Company (1971) LR 7 Ch App 161; International Harvester Co of Australia Pty Lt v Carrigan’s Hazledene 
Pastoral Co (1958) 100 CLR 644; Peterson v Maloney (1951) 84 CLR 91; Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205.  
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Comparison between Different Mechanisms for Establishing the Knowledge of 
Corporations 
 
Both the statutory mechanisms under ss 1042G(1)(b) and 769B(3) of the Corporations Act, 
which can be used to determine when a corporation has certain knowledge, expressly 
require that a nexus with the person’s role or authority be demonstrated, either because the 
relevant director, employee or agent with the knowledge engaged in the relevant conduct in 
the scope of their actual or apparent authority,118 or because the relevant officer had the 
knowledge because he or she was an officer of the corporation.119  This is not explicitly 
required under the general law principles of the identification doctrine, as it does not matter 
how the directing mind and will came to have the relevant knowledge, only that such 
knowledge should be regarded as the knowledge of the corporation.  The general law rules 
of agency are difficult to apply to knowledge of information, rather than possession, and 
would create significant uncertainty if relied upon in this context.  
 
Section 769B(3) of the Corporations Act enables the knowledge of a corporation to be 
established by showing that a director, employee or agent of the corporation had the 
relevant knowledge and engaged in the ‘relevant conduct’, within the scope of their actual or 
apparent authority.  However, s 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act does not require the 
person with the requisite knowledge to have also engaged in the relevant conduct.  General 
law principles of the identification doctrine do not expressly contain any such requirement in 
relation to conduct, although it will generally be necessary to show that the person who is 
the directing mind and will of a corporation had the requisite intention and engaged in certain 
conduct which should necessarily be regarded as those of the corporation.    
 
The general law ordinarily requires that the person who is considered to be the directing 
mind and will of the corporation carries out a ‘function of management’ with authority before 
their state of mind can be attributed to the corporation.  Section 1042G(1)(b) requires that 
118 Corporations Act, s 769B(3). 
119 Corporations Act, s 1042G(1)(b). 
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the person with the relevant knowledge be an officer of the corporation, but s 769B(3) of the 
Corporations Act has no such requirement – encompassing any director, employee or agent 
- and does not require the person to have any particular role or degree of authority, so long 
as the relevant conduct they engage in falls within their own area of authority, regardless of 
how limited that authority may be.  They need not have the ability to act independently or 
without instruction as is required under the general law to demonstrate that a person is the 
corporation’s directing mind and will.     
 
Thus, there is great divergence between the different statutory and general law mechanisms 
as to the status of the person who may have the relevant knowledge, whether there are any 
particular requirements as to how they came to have such knowledge, and whether there 
must also be any link to the relevant conduct for the offence. 
 
This divergence leads to significant uncertainty as to how the knowledge element of insider 
trading is actually to be applied to corporations, where there are three potential mechanisms 
– s 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act, s 769B(3) of the Corporations Act and the general 
law identification doctrine - available to attribute that knowledge element to a corporation, 
each with different requirements.  Commercial and legal certainty would obviously benefit 
from a more clearly articulated application of the law in this respect  The reforms proposed in 
this thesis are intended to  overcome this uncertainty by excluding the general law 
provisions and creating one statutory mechanism for attributing knowledge to a corporation.  
The new statutory provisions would provide that a body corporate is taken to know, or to 
ought reasonably to know, that information is inside information if an officer, employee or 
agent of the body corporate knows, or ought reasonably to know, this.  These provisions 
would not require that the officer, employee or agent have such knowledge as a result of 
their position or role within the corporation, but would require that the person who has such 
knowledge be the same person who engaged in or authorised the relevant trading conduct.   
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Demonstrating that a Corporation ‘Ought Reasonably’ to Have Had Certain 
Knowledge   
 
As well as determining when a corporation is regarded as ‘knowing’ that certain information 
is inside information, it also needs to be determined when a corporation will be in a position 
where it ‘ought reasonably to know’ that certain information is inside information, as the 
knowledge element set out in s 1043A(1)(b) of the Corporations Act requires that it be 
demonstrated that: 
 
the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the matters specified in paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of the definition of inside information in section 1042A are satisfied in relation 
to the information.120   
 
Thus, it needs to be determined when a corporation ‘ought reasonably’ to know that certain 
information is not generally available and is likely to be material. 
  
Section 1042G(1)(d) of the Corporations Act states that: 
 
for the purpose of paragraph 1043M(2)(b), if an officer of a body corporate ought 
reasonably to know any matter or thing because he or she is an officer of the body 
corporate, it is to be presumed that the body corporate ought reasonably to know that 
matter or thing. 
 
Section 1043M(2) provides a defence to insider trading if the other party to the trade also 
knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of the inside information before trading.121  Thus, 
120 Emphasis added. 
121 Section 1043M(2) of the Corporations Act provides that:  
In a prosecution brought against a person for an offence based on subsection 1043A(1) because 
the person entered into, or procured another person to enter into, a transaction or agreement at a 
time when certain information was in the first-mentioned person’s possession:  
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while s 1042G(1)(d) might appear to assist in determining when a corporation ‘ought 
reasonably to know’ something, the fact that it is expressly limited to s 1043M(2)(b) of the 
Corporations Act means that it does not apply to the knowledge element of insider trading. 
 
By contrast, s 1002E of the previous legislative regime, the repealed Corporations Law, 
provided that: 
 
(b) if an officer of a body corporate knows or ought reasonably to know any matter or 
thing because he or she is an officer of a body corporate, it is to be presumed 
that the body corporate knows or ought reasonably to know that matter or thing.     
 
Unlike the current s 1043A(1)(b) of the Corporations Act, s 1002E(b) of the Corporations 
Law was not limited in application to a provision such as the current s 1043M.  Thus, while 
the current regulatory regime provides in s 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act that if an 
officer knows a matter or thing because he or she is an officer of a body corporate, the body 
corporate is presumed to know that matter or thing, there is no equivalent provision in 
relation to matters or things that the officer, and therefore the body corporate, ought 
reasonably to know.  The Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Services Reform Bill 
2001, which inserted the current insider trading regulatory regime into the Corporations Act, 
does not reveal any reason why an equivalent provision was not incorporated into the 
Corporations Act. 
 
However, even if such a provision did exist, in the same way that it is difficult to apply s 
1042G(1)(b) to show that a person knew that certain information was inside information 
‘because’ they were an officer of a corporation, as discussed above, it would also be difficult 
to demonstrate that a person ought reasonably to know that information was inside 
information because he or she was an officer.  
(b) it is a defence if the other party to the transaction or agreement knew, or ought 
reasonably to have  known, of the information before entering into the transaction or 
agreement.  
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There are no other provisions in the Corporations Act which would apply to assist in 
determining when a corporation ‘ought reasonably to know’ something.  Thus, there appears 
to be a gap in the legislation in relation to the application of this aspect of the knowledge 
element to corporations.  As discussed in chapter 2, the courts have determined that, when 
considering whether a person ‘ought reasonably to know’ that certain information was not 
generally available and was likely to be material, the question is subjective to the particular 
defendant, having regard to all of the relevant circumstances.122 This means that one 
considers whether the particular defendant in question ought to have had such knowledge, 
so in the case of a corporation it would require an assessment as to whether that particular 
corporation ‘ought reasonably’ to have known that the information was inside information.  
Knowledge of directors, officers, agents or employees might be relevant to this assessment, 
but without any guidance from the statute or the courts as to when a corporation should be 
regarded as being in a position where it ‘ought reasonably’ to have that knowledge, 
significant uncertainty exists.  As this matter has never been considered judicially, the 
uncertainty is further exacerbated. 
 
International Comparisons 
 
Singapore is the only jurisdiction amongst those examined which has a specific provision 
providing for the attribution of knowledge to a corporation.  As noted above, s 226(1)(b) of 
the Securities and Futures Act 2001 (Singapore) specifically provides that:  
 
if an officer of a corporation knows or ought reasonably to know any matter or thing 
because he is an officer of the corporation, it is to be presumed, until the contrary is 
proved, that the corporation knows or ought reasonably to know that matter or thing. 
 
This provision combines the concepts contained in ss 1042G(1)(b) and 1042G(1)(d) of the 
Corporations Act.123  However, as has been noted, under the Corporations Act it is only 
122 R v Rivkin (2004) 184 FLR 365, 384. 
123 As noted above, s 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act provides that:    
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presumed that a corporation ‘ought reasonably to know’ a matter or thing that an officer of 
the body corporate ought reasonably to know because he or she is an officer of the body 
corporate for the purposes of s 1043M(2)(b), when a defence to insider trading is available if 
the other party to the trade also knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of the inside 
information before trading.  The Singaporean provision does not limit the circumstances in 
which a corporation ‘ought reasonably to know a matter or thing’, so the provision is of wider 
application in connection with knowledge that a corporation has, or ought reasonably to 
have, which could include knowledge that certain information is inside information.   In that 
respect, s 226(1)(b) of the Securities and Futures Act 2001 (Singapore) is very similar to s 
1002E of the repealed Corporations Law. 
 
In the reforms set out in this thesis, I propose that a new provision be included in the 
Corporations Act, so that a body corporate would be taken to know, or to ought reasonably 
to know, that information is inside information if an officer, employee or agent of the body 
corporate has, or ought reasonably to have, that knowledge.  However, the provision would 
not import a requirement that the officer, employee or agent have such knowledge (or that 
the officer, employee or agent ought reasonably to have such knowledge) because he or 
she is such an officer, employee or agent of the corporation.  As previously identified above, 
it is extremely difficult to show that a person knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that 
certain information was inside information ‘because’ of a position he or she held within a 
corporation.  
 
As has been noted, the application of the knowledge element of insider trading to a 
corporation has not been considered judicially.  However, an examination of the 
Corporations Act indicates that both statutory provisions and general law rules can be used 
if an officer of a body corporate knows any matter or thing because he or she is an officer of the 
body corporate, it is to be presumed that the body corporate knows that matter or thing. 
Section 1042G(1)(d) of the Corporations Act provides that:    
for the purposes of paragraph 1043M(2)(b), if an officer of a body corporate ought reasonably to 
know any matter or thing because he or she is an officer of the body corporate, it is to be presumed 
that the body corporate ought reasonably to know that matter or thing.  
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to determine when a corporation knows that certain information is inside information.  The 
differences and discrepancies between the various rules create significant uncertainty.  Each 
of the rules attribute to the corporation the state of mind of a person within or connected to 
the corporation in some way – whether an officer, director, employee, agent or other person.  
The status of such a person and the nature of the connection required vary from rule to rule.  
Some rules require a nexus between the person’s state of mind and their position within the 
corporation, and others do not.  Some rules require that the person who had the relevant 
state of mind also engaged in the relevant conduct, while others have no such requirements.  
This creates further uncertainty when it becomes clear that both the general law and 
statutory rules are applicable when determining when a corporation actually engages in the 
relevant conduct and these rules contain variations similar to those found when attempting 
to determine the corporation’s state of mind.  Additionally, it is particularly unclear how it can 
be determined when a corporation ‘ought reasonably to know’ that information is inside 
information.  All of these ambiguities lead to the clear conclusion that it is increasingly 
difficult to be certain when the knowledge element will be made out when applying the 
insider trading laws to corporations, and that reform is needed in this area.   
 
ATTRIBUTING THE TRADING ELEMENT TO CORPORATIONS 
 
As has been noted above, the final element of the insider trading offence, as set out in s 
1043A(1) of the Corporations Act, is that: 
 
  the insider must not (whether as principal or agent): 
(c) apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products, or enter 
into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 
financial products; or 
(d) procure another person to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 
financial products, or enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, 
relevant Division 3 financial products.  
 
Further prohibited conduct is set out in s 1043A(2), pursuant to which an insider must not:  
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directly or indirectly, communicate the information, or cause the information to be 
communicated, to another person if the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that 
the other person would or would be likely to:  
(c) apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products, or enter 
into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 
financial products; or  
(d) procure another person to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 
financial products, or enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, 
relevant Division 3 financial products.  
 
The conduct described in s 1043A(1)(c) relates in essence to trading in relevant financial 
products – whether by applying for them, acquiring or disposing of them, or entering into an 
agreement to do any of those things.  Section 1043A(1)(d) concerns the procuring of another 
person to do any of those things and s 1043A(2) relates to tipping.  While this is the conduct 
which a person who possesses inside information, and who knows or ought reasonably to 
know that the information is inside information, must not engage in, it is not the ‘physical 
element’ of the insider trading offence.124 
     
The issue to be determined in relation to the trading element in this chapter is how a 
corporation can be regarded as engaging in the relevant conduct of trading, or the procuring 
of trading, in relevant financial products, or tipping.  I will demonstrate that the existing 
statutory mechanisms, and general law principles of the identification doctrine, can both be 
used to determine when a corporation has engaged in this form of conduct. 
 
Statutory Mechanism for Determining when a Corporation has Engaged in Conduct 
 
Unlike the ‘possession element’ and the ‘knowledge element’ of insider trading, Division 3 of 
Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act (Market Misconduct and Other Prohibited Conduct 
124 As has been noted above, s 1043A(3)(a) of the Corporations Act states that ‘for the purposes of the 
application of the Criminal Code’ in relation to an insider trading offence under s 1043A(1), ‘paragraph (1)(a) is 
a physical element.’  Section 1043A(1)(a) relates not to the trading or procuring of trading in financial products, 
but to the possession of information.  
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Relating to Financial Products and Financial Services) does not contain a specific provision 
relating to corporations and the ‘trading element’ of the offence.  Accordingly, there is only 
one provision in the Corporations Act which could be used to determine when a corporation 
engages in certain conduct, and which may therefore be applicable to the trading element of 
insider trading – s 769B(1) of the Corporations Act. 
 
Section 769B(1) of the Corporations Act provides that: 
 
Subject to subsections (7) and (8),125 conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate: 
 
(a) by a director, employee or agent of the body, within the scope of the person’s 
actual or apparent authority; or 
 
(b) by any other person at the direction or with the consent or agreement (whether 
express or implied) of a director, employee or agent of the body, where the giving 
of the direction, consent or agreement is within the scope of the actual or 
apparent authority of the director, employee or agent; 
 
is taken for the purposes of this Chapter126 or a proceeding under this Chapter, to have 
been engaged in also by the body corporate. 
 
Accordingly, in order for conduct to be attributed to a corporation in accordance with s 
769B(1) of the Corporations Act, there are two possible mechanisms available, either of 
which may be satisfied. 
 
Under the first: (i) the conduct must be undertaken on behalf of the corporation; (ii) the 
conduct must be engaged in by a director, employee or agent of the corporation; and (iii) the 
conduct must be within the scope of the person’s actual or apparent authority. 
125 Sections 769B(7) and 769B(8) of the Corporations Act are not relevant in this context, as they exclude the 
operation of the section in connection with the provision of financial services and financial products in certain 
circumstances.   
126 Being Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act, in which the insider trading prohibition is contained. 
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Under the second: (i) the conduct must be undertaken on behalf of the corporation; (ii) the 
conduct may be engaged in by any person; (iii) the conduct must be done at the direction, or 
with the consent or agreement, of a director, employee or agent of the corporation; and (iv) it 
must be within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the director, employee or 
agent to give the relevant direction, consent or agreement.    
 
The phrase ‘conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate’ has not yet been considered 
in this thesis, as it is not used in any of the statutory provisions analysed in relation to the 
possession element and knowledge element of the insider trading offence.  When 
considering the meaning of this phrase, it is useful to consider the operation of other 
legislation which uses the same terminology.  Section 84(2) of the former Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) was expressed in very similar language to s 769B(1) of the Corporations Act, 
and it stated that: 
 
  Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate by a director, agent or servant 
of the body corporate or by any other person at the direction or with the consent or 
agreement (whether express or implied) of a director, agent or servant of the body 
corporate shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to have been engaged in 
also by the body corporate.127 
 
In cases that interpreted the meaning of s 84(2) of the former Trade Practices Act 1974 
127 Section 84(2) of the Competition and Consumer Law 2010 (Cth), which has replaced the former Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth), now provides in language that is even more similar to s 769B(1) of the Corporations 
Act, that: 
Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate:  
(a) by a director, employee or agent of the body corporate within the scope of the person’s 
actual or apparent authority; or  
(b) by any other person at the direction or with the consent or agreement (whether express 
or implied) of a director, employee or agent of the body corporate, where the giving of the 
direction, consent or agreement is within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of 
the director, employee or agent;  
shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to have been engaged in also by the body corporate.  
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(Cth), the courts determined that a person is taken to engage in conduct ‘on behalf of’ a 
corporation if the person intends to do an act ‘as a representative of’ or ‘for’ the corporation, 
or in the course of the corporation’s business, affairs or activities.128  The phrase ‘on behalf 
of’ does not have a strict legal meaning but it requires ‘some involvement’ with the ‘activities 
of the corporation’ and will clearly encompass acts done by an employee in the course of his 
or her employment, as well as activities of a broader nature.129  It has a similar meaning to 
the phrase ‘in the course of [a] body corporate's affairs or activities’.130 
 
This means that, in relation to insider trading, the relevant conduct must be engaged in on 
the corporation’s behalf, and not by a person intending to trade on their own account.  By 
way of example, the proprietary trader in ASIC v Citigroup,131 was clearly acting ‘on behalf’ 
of Citigroup when engaged in proprietary trading – buying and selling securities in the 
corporation’s name, as part of the activities permitted by the terms of his employment, from 
which the corporation was intended to benefit.132   However, an employee of a corporation, 
buying shares in his or her own name, intending to keep any personal profits resulting from 
the trading, will not be acting on behalf of that corporation.  
 
Section 769B(1) of the Corporations Act is widely drafted so that any director, employee or 
agent can engage in the relevant conduct.  The term ‘director’ and the meanings of the 
terms ‘employee’ and ‘agent’ have already been discussed in detail above.  With such a 
broad category of persons specified, and subject to satisfying the other necessary limbs of 
the mechanisms in s 769B(1), any trading, procuring of trading or tipping engaged in by any 
director, employee or agent of the corporation will be regarded as having been engaged in 
128 Lisciandro v Official Trustee In Bankruptcy (1996) 69 FCR 180; NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank (No 10) 
(2000) 186 ALR 442; Downey v Carlson Hotels Asia Pacific Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 199. 
129 Walplan Pty Ltd v Wallace (1985) 8 FCR 27, 37 (Lockhart J). 
130 Ibid. 
131 (2007) 160 FCR 35. 
132 As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, the insider trading claims made against Citigroup were not successful 
for a number of reasons, including the fact that the trader was not considered to have actually possessed any 
inside information and, because he was not an officer of Citigroup, Jacobson J determined that any information 
he might have possessed was not to be taken to be possessed by Citigroup anyway.  
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by the corporation.       
 
When considering whether certain conduct is within the scope of a person’s actual or 
apparent authority, it is worth noting that s 349 of the former Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(Cth) used language very similar to s 769B(1) of the Corporations Act, providing that: 
 
Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate by:  
(a) an officer, a director, employee or agent of the body corporate within the scope 
of his or her actual or apparent authority; or  
(b)  any other person at the direction or with the consent or agreement (whether 
express or implied) of an officer, director, employee or agent of the body 
corporate, where the giving of the direction, consent or agreement is within the 
scope of the actual or apparent authority of the officer, director, employee or 
agent;  
shall be taken, for the purposes of this Act, to have been engaged in also by the body 
corporate.  
 
The meaning of the phrase ‘within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority’ was 
considered in this context by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Hanley v Automotive, 
Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing & Kindred Industries Union.133  In that case, the Court 
stated, in a joint judgment, that: 
 
there must at least be circumstances which would justify a belief on the part of a person 
dealing with the "officer, director, employee or agent" that that "officer, director, employee 
or agent" is acting with authority.134 
 
The fact that certain conduct may have been unlawful will not place that conduct outside the 
scope of a person’s authority – otherwise a corporation would be able to avoid liability for all 
unlawful conduct engaged in by its officers, employees or agents.135  
133 (2000) 100 FCR 530. 
134Ibid, 544 (Ryan, Moore and Goldberg JJ). 
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Concepts of actual and apparent authority are well defined in the general law in relation to 
agency, and have been discussed above in relation into the possession element and 
knowledge element.136  Here, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the person either had 
sufficient authority to trade or procure trading in the relevant financial products or engage in 
tipping as part of their ordinary duties, or as part of the broader role for which they are 
retained by the corporation.  Such a person is likely to include, for example, an employee 
specifically authorised to buy and sell shares on a corporation’s behalf, such as the 
proprietary trader whose activities were the subject of ASIC v Citigroup,137 and employees 
who advise clients of the corporation on share trading and facilitate such trading, such as 
securities brokers.   
 
Thus the ability to trade in financial products, or procure such trading, or give advice in 
relation to those activities, must be conduct in which the relevant person engages, with 
some form of authority.  The fact that the actual trading in question was not specially 
authorised or permitted will not prevent the conduct from being considered to be within the 
scope of that general authority.138  
 
If the relevant trading conduct is not undertaken by a director, employee or agent of the 
corporation (which is already a wide category of roles), it may still be regarded as having 
been undertaken by the corporation if it is done on the corporation’s behalf at the direction, 
135 Trade Practices Commission v Tubemakers of Australia Ltd (1983) 47 ALR 719, 742 (Toohey J); Hanley v 
Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing & Kindred Industries Union, [83] (Ryan, Moore and Goldberg 
JJ);  Australasian Brokerage Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Corporation Ltd  (1934) 52 CLR 430, 
451. 
136 The concept of actual and apparent authority import the notions of express actual authority (as described in 
Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480, 502), implied actual authority 
(as described in Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549, 583) and apparent authority (as described 
in Crabtree-Vickers v Australian Direct Mail (1975) 33 CLR 72).   
137 (2007) 160 FCR 35.  This case was discussed in detail in chapter 2 of this thesis.  
138 See, for example, Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Limited v Securities Commission [1995] AC 
500. 
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or with the consent or agreement, of a director, employee or agent of the corporation.  This 
very broad language enables the conduct to be undertaken by any person on the 
corporation’s behalf, if the necessary direction, consent or agreement can be demonstrated.  
It also means that it does not need to be demonstrated that it was within the scope of the 
usual role or responsibilities of the person who engaged in the conduct to carry out such 
activities, if they received a direction, consent or agreement to do so on the relevant 
occasion from a director, employee or agent of the corporation. 
  
It must also be within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the director, employee 
or agent to give such a direction, consent or agreement to another person to engage in the 
conduct on behalf of the corporation.  Once again, the general law principles of agency will 
be used to determine whether such actual or apparent authority existed.  This would 
encompass a situation where a senior executive of a corporation directs a more junior 
employee to undertake trading on behalf of the corporation, even if the more junior 
employee was not ordinarily authorised to carry out such an activity, so long as the senior 
executive has the necessary authority to do so.      
 
Is s 769B(1) of the Corporations Act intended to be an exclusive mechanism for determining 
when a corporation engages in relevant conduct?  As noted above, the language of s 
769B(1) of the Corporations Act is very similar to s 84(2) of the former Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth).  There are a number of statutory provisions which also use the same or very 
similar language – such as s 349 of the former Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and s 
12GH(2) of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth).  In a 
number of cases, these provisions have been found to extend the operation of the general 
law, rather than exclude it.  For example, in Trade Practices Commission v Queensland 
Aggregates Pty Ltd,139 Morling J of the Federal Court stated, in relation to the operation of s 
84(2) of the former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), that: 
 
139 (1982) 44 ALR 391, 404 
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The sub-section is not expressed to take effect to the exclusion of the common law… 
[T]he language of s 84(2) appears to disclose a legislative intention to extend, rather than 
limit, the liability of corporations for the actions of others.140 
 
The same conclusion was reached by Toohey J of the Federal Court in Trade Practices 
Commission v Tubemakers of Australia Ltd,141 when His Honour found that s 84(2) of the 
former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) did not exclude the operation of the general law:  
 
In my view s 84(2) is not intended to be an exhaustive statement of corporate 
responsibility under the Trade Practices Act.142 
 
Similarly, in Hanley v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing & Kindred Industries 
Union,143 when considering the operation of s 349 of the former Workplace Relations Act 
1996 (Cth) which, as noted above, used very similar language to s 769B(1) of the 
Corporations Act, Ryan, Moore and Goldberg JJ of the Federal Court, stated that the 
section: 
 
 does not exclude the operation of common law vicarious liability or direct liability under the 
principles in Tesco Ltd v Nattrass...  Rather, it provides an alternative statutory 
mechanism for imposing direct liability on a body corporate.144  
 
Accordingly, since s 769B(1) of the Corporations Act uses almost identical language to those 
considered in these cases, it can be argued that, in the absence of any express language to 
the contrary, the relevant general law principles are not excluded and s 769B(1) is not 
intended to be an exclusive statutory mechanism for determining when a corporation 
engages in particular conduct.  As a result, both s 769B(1) of the Corporations Act and the 
general law rules of the identification doctrine are potentially relevant to determining when a 
140 The full text of s 84(2) of the former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) is set out above.  
141 (1983) 47 ALR 719. 
142 Ibid 739. 
143 (2000) 100 FCR 530. 
144 Ibid 544. 
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corporation trades or procures trading in securities, or engages in tipping.  Thus, the 
operation of those general law rules will now be considered. 
 
The General Law Identification Doctrine  
 
As has been discussed, at general law a corporation may be found to have engaged in 
certain criminal conduct if it is undertaken by a person who is considered to be the 
corporation’s directing mind and will.  The nature of the directing mind and will of a 
corporation may, as noted above, include the following people: (i) a person under the 
direction of the shareholders in general meeting; (ii) the board of directors; or (iii) a person 
who has the authority of the board of directors, given under the corporation’s constitution 
and appointed by the shareholders.145 
 
If such persons trade, or procure trading, in relevant financial products, or engages in 
tipping, the corporation may be regarded as having engaged in that conduct.  This will 
clearly include the situation where the board of directors, or a managing director or chief 
executive, authorises particular trading activity.   As discussed above, the ultimate test of 
whether a person is the directing mind and will of a corporation is whether the person 
manages and controls the actions of the corporation in relation to the relevant activity.146  
So, even though a corporation may have  a managing director who ordinarily would be 
regarded as the directing mind and will of the corporation in relation to most of its activities, if 
a particular employee has been given authority to act for the corporation in securities trading 
on the corporation’s behalf, so long as that employee has been vested with ‘authority, 
control, discretion and a significant degree of responsibility’147 in relation to the relevant 
transactions, that employee can be regarded as the corporation’s directing mind and will in 
relation to the securities trading but not other activities.   
 
145 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705, 713-714, as discussed in chapter 4 of 
this thesis. 
146 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Ltd Plc [1994] 2 All ER 685. 
147 The Bell Group Ltd (in Liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2008) 70 ACSR 1, [539]. 
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Comparisons between Different Mechanisms for Establishing the Conduct of 
Corporations  
  
When determining whether a corporation has engaged in certain conduct, the statutory 
mechanisms in s 769B(1) of the Corporations Act offer a variety of alternatives – it includes 
conduct undertaken by a director, employee or agent on the corporation’s behalf, so long as 
the conduct is within the scope of the person’s actual or apparent authority, as well as 
conduct undertaken by any person on the corporation’s behalf if undertaken at the direction 
of, or with the agreement or consent of, a director, employee or agent given within the scope 
of their actual or apparent authority.  The general law will permit conduct engaged in by the 
directing mind and will of the corporation to be attributed to the corporation if the person 
engages in the relevant conduct.  There is no requirement at general law that the particular 
conduct be within the scope of the authority of the person who is regarded as the 
corporation’s directing mind and will.  However, for an employee to be regarded as the 
directing mind and will of a corporation, as noted above, that employee must have been 
vested with ‘authority, control, discretion and a significant degree of responsibility’148 in 
relation to the relevant transactions.  For an employee to be regarded as being in such a 
position, it would be highly likely that the general agency principles relating to actual and 
apparent authority would be satisfied anyway.   
 
Thus, as with the various tests for determining the possession of information for the physical 
element and the knowledge of the corporation for the fault element of insider trading, there is 
a wide variance between the role of the relevant person and any link between their role, and 
their authority, before the corporation is considered to have engaged in the relevant conduct.  
The wide variation in the role of the relevant person whose conduct is relevant, the presence 
or absence of a requirement for a nexus with that role, creates significant uncertainty in 
determining when a corporation will be regarded as having engaged in certain conduct.  This 
uncertainty - which exists for regulators who seek to enforce the law as well as corporations 
who are required to comply with it - should be remedied by legislative reform in order that 
148 Ibid. 
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there can be an appropriate level of clarity and certainty in connection with the attribution of 
this element of the insider trading offence to corporations. 
 
Like the knowledge element of the insider trading offence, the application of the trading 
element to a corporation has not been considered judicially.  However, this chapter has 
revealed that both statutory provisions and general law rules can be used to determine when 
a corporation has engaged in the prohibited conduct, creating significant uncertainty due to 
the differing elements of those mechanisms – s 769B(1) of the Corporations Act and the 
general law rules of the identification doctrine do not contain the same elements or tests.  
While a similar position exists under other legislation, allowing statutory rules and general 
law rules to operate simultaneously  – such as under the former Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth), and now under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) – such legislation can 
be distinguished from the offence of insider trading under the Corporations Act.  In particular, 
the regimes which exist under those statutes contain ‘due diligence’ defences and a defence 
that the relevant act was engaged in by ‘another person.’149  Such defences do not exist 
under the Corporations Act in relation to insider trading.  The availability of the Chinese Wall 
defence, which will be examined in detail in chapter 6 of this thesis, differs from a defence of 
due diligence because, while it requires that a corporation have in place arrangements that 
‘could reasonably be expected to ensure that information was not communicated’ and no 
advice was given,150 there is an additional requirement that there must be no actual 
communication of the information or giving of advice.151  While it is not proposed that a due 
diligence defence be created for insider trading, it is clear that for offences where such an 
defence is available to avoid corporate criminal liability, the uncertainty created by the 
149 For example, as noted above, most criminal offences under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) 
apply the rules of corporate criminal responsibility set out in Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code: Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 6AA(1).  As noted earlier in this thesis, s 12.3(3) of the Criminal Code provides 
that a fault element is not attributed to a body corporate on the basis that it expressly, tacitly or impliedly 
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence if the body corporate proves that it exercised due 
diligence to prevent the conduct, or the authorisation or permission. 
150 Paragraph (b) of s 1043F of the Corporations Act. 
151 Paragraph (c) of s 1043F of the Corporations Act. 
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various available mechanisms which may be used to attribute liability for criminal conduct, 
can be avoided by ensuring an appropriate degree of due diligence is exercised.  
 
Preliminary Conclusions and Recommended Reforms 
 
The reforms that I recommend to Australian insider trading laws would remedy the many 
difficulties and problems with the attribution of the elements of the insider trading offence to 
corporations as identified in this chapter.  I propose that the operation of the general law be 
expressly excluded from the statutory regime applying insider trading laws to corporations, 
and that a new set of provisions be adopted to provide for a model of direct liability as the 
exclusive means for determining when a corporation possesses inside information, has 
knowledge that the information is inside information, and trades or procures trading in 
relevant financial products, or engages in tipping.     
 
The proposed amendments to the Corporations Act are set out in full in chapter 7 of this 
thesis.   The reforms specifically provide that the only means by which a body corporate 
would be liable for the insider trading prohibitions in s 1043A are those set out in what would 
be a new s 1042G of the Corporations Act, to be entitled ‘Liability of Bodies Corporate’.  This 
would exclude the operation of the general law, so that the identification doctrine and the 
rules of agency would not operate in relation to the application of the elements of insider 
trading to a corporation in this context.  The operation of s 769B of the Corporations Act 
would also be specifically excluded, and Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code would continue to be 
excluded, so that there are not multiple statutory mechanisms which may apply, using 
different tests, to determine when a corporation satisfies the various elements of the insider 
trading offence. 
 
The new s 1042G would specifically state that a body corporate will be taken to possess 
information if an officer, employee or agent of the body corporate possesses the information, 
and would not limit the application of the law to information possessed only by officers of a 
corporation.  The new section would not require that the officer, employee or agent came to 
possess the information in the course of their duties or because they are an officer, 
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employee or agent of the corporation.  However, other provisions would apply so that a 
corporation would only be regarded as having engaged in insider trading if the person who 
possessed the information also had the requisite knowledge that it was inside information 
and engaged in, or authorised, the prohibited conduct of trading or procuring of trading in 
relevant financial products or tipping, within the actual or apparent scope of their authority.  
Thus, aggregation would not be possible and a link with the prohibited conduct would be 
required before a corporation would be considered to have engaged in insider trading.   
 
The new s 1042G of the Corporations Act would also specifically state that a body corporate 
would be taken to know, or to ought reasonably to know, that information is inside 
information if it was known, or ought reasonably to have been known, by an officer, 
employee or agent of the body corporate.  Similarly with the new position in relation to the 
possession of information, the new section would not require that the officer, employee or 
agent have such knowledge as a result of their position or role within the corporation.  The 
new s 1042G would provide that a body corporate would be taken to engage in the relevant 
trading conduct if an officer, employee or agent of the body corporate engages in the 
conduct on behalf of the body corporate within the scope of their actual or apparent 
authority, or any person engages in the conduct on behalf of the body corporate with the 
authorisation of an officer, employee or agent of the body corporate.  The section would 
further provide that conduct is taken to be authorised by a person if the conduct is 
undertaken at that person’s direction, or with the person’s consent or agreement (whether 
express or implied) where the giving of the direction, consent or agreement is within the 
scope of the actual or apparent authority of that person. 
 
The model proposed is one of direct liability, so that a corporation would itself be regarded 
as having engaged in insider trading, rather than having vicarious liability for conduct 
engaged in by others.  Such a model is appropriate, as it is only where a corporation actually 
engages in insider trading that market integrity is threatened.  Accordingly, even though the 
new provisions would provide that a corporation would be taken to possess information that 
is possessed by an officer, employee or agent, the new requirement that a corporation would 
only be liable for insider trading if the same person also had the requisite knowledge that the 
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information is inside information, and engaged in or authorised the relevant conduct within 
the scope of their authority, provides an appropriate nexus for the corporation to be 
considered to have engaged in insider trading.   
 
I do not consider that the new provisions should require an officer, employee or agent to 
have come into possession of the inside information in the course of performing their duties, 
or otherwise as a result of their position.  Market integrity requires that those who have an 
informational advantage should not be able to trade in relevant financial products – the 
manner in which a natural person came to possess the information has no bearing on their 
personal liability.  Similarly, for a corporation to be taken to have engaged in insider trading, 
it should not be relevant how its officers, employees and agents came to possess the 
relevant information, if allowing them to trade (or authorise trading) on the corporation’s 
behalf would give it an unfair advantage.  Accordingly, the new provisions would apply so 
that information possessed by an officer, employee or agent of a corporation is taken to be 
possessed by the corporation, regardless of how the officer, employee or agent came to 
possess that information.   
 
The proposed amendments to the Corporations Act are set out in full in chapter 7 of this 
thesis, where I will return to the issues raised in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CORPORATIONS AND THE CHINESE WALL DEFENCE TO INSIDER TRADING 
 
There are various statutory exceptions and defences available in relation to the insider 
trading offence.  When the alleged insider trader is a corporation, the manner in which those 
exceptions and defences may apply is not always straightforward.  This chapter will examine 
the most important and relevant defence for corporations - that of the Chinese Wall.  This 
defence purportedly exists to allow a corporation to avoid, in some circumstances, liability for 
insider trading that it might otherwise have as a result of the operation of various statutory 
mechanisms relating to the liability of corporations for insider trading.  In this chapter, the 
nature of a Chinese Wall will be considered, as well as the arrangements that must be put in 
place to establish a Chinese Wall that will satisfy the statutory requirements.  The problems 
associated with this defence will be identified and analysed in order to demonstrate that 
there are significant flaws in the current regulatory regime which could be improved by 
legislative reform.  In particular, it will be shown that the Chinese Wall defence as currently 
drafted does not serve the stated rationale for the prohibition of insider trading – the 
maintenance of market integrity – because of the significant uncertainty that exists: there is a 
gap in the operation of the defence because it extends only to trading and not the procuring 
of trading; and it does not apply where inside information is possessed by an agent of the 
corporation who is not an officer or employee.  Additionally, the uncertainty which exists in 
relation to the various mechanisms for determining when a corporation possesses inside 
information, has knowledge that the information is inside information, and engages in the 
trading or procuring of trading in financial products, leads to further uncertainty in the 
application of the Chinese Wall defence when a corporation would otherwise have fulfilled 
the various elements of the insider trading offence.  Accordingly, the reforms proposed to the 
application of the insider trading laws to corporations necessitate amendment to the Chinese 
Wall defence in order to best protect and maintain market integrity and ensure the 
international competitiveness of Australia’s securities markets. 1  
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as the following journal article: Juliette Overland, ‘All in All, 
Just Another Brick in the Wall: The Use of Chinese Walls as a Defence to Insider Trading’ (2011) 6 Journal of 
Applied Research in Accounting and Finance 2.  
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The Nature of the Chinese Wall Defence     
 
The Corporations Act provides a variety of exceptions and defences to the offence of insider 
trading.2  The defence most applicable to corporations is that of the Chinese Wall, which 
allows a corporation to avoid liability for insider trading which might otherwise arise if the 
corporation can demonstrate, amongst other things, that it has a sufficient Chinese Wall in 
place.   
 
It is not clear whether it is more appropriate to refer to a ‘Chinese Wall defence’ or a 
‘Chinese Wall exception’.  As noted by Lyon and du Plessis, the Corporations Act does not 
use either term in connection with s 1043F and appears to alternate between the two terms 
‘defence’ and exception’ when providing for other circumstances in which a person will not 
be liable for insider trading.3  Sections 1043B to 1043E, and ss 1043H to 1043J, are referred 
to in their titles as ‘exceptions’, whereas ss 1043F, 1043G4 and 1043K do not use the term 
‘defence’ or ‘exception’.  Sections 1043B to 1043E provide that each of ss 1043A(1) or 
1043A(2) ‘does not apply’ in respect of the stated circumstances, whereas ss 1043F to 
1043K instead state that a person who satisfies the requirements of the relevant section 
‘does not contravene’ ss 1043A(1) or 1043A(2).  In s 1043M(1) of the Corporations Act it is 
stated that ‘it is a defence’ if the ‘facts or circumstances’ existed which would, ‘preclude the 
2 There is an exception for withdrawal by a member from a registered scheme: s 1043B; an exception for 
underwriters entering into or acting under an underwriting agreement: s 1043C; an exception for an acquisition 
pursuant to a requirement imposed by the Corporations Act: s 1043D;  an exception for bodies corporate 
entering into a transaction or agreement in relation of financial products issued by another person if the inside 
information is merely the body corporate’s knowledge of its own intentions or activities: s 1043I; and an 
exception for financial service licensees entering transactions of behalf of a principal: s 1043K.  Section 1043M 
also contains additional defences to a prosecution - defences where a person came into possession of the 
inside information solely as a result of it having been made known in a manner likely to bring it to the attention 
of people who commonly invest in financial products of a kind whose price might be affected by the information: 
ss 1043M(2)(a) and 1043M(3)(a); and defences where the other party knew, or ought reasonably to have 
known, of the information: ss 1043M(2)(b) and 1043M(3)(b).  
3 Gregory Lyon and Jean J du Plessis, The Law of Insider Trading in Australia (Federation Press, 2005) 71. 
4 Which relates to Chinese Wall arrangements by partnerships. 
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act or omission from constituting a contravention’ under ss 1043B to 1043K.  There does not 
appear to be any discernible reason for the different use of the terms ‘defence’ and 
‘exception’, or ‘does not apply’ and ‘does not contravene’, in these provisions.  In general, an 
exception limits the scope of conduct which is prohibited by an offence and a defence is an 
excuse for conduct that would otherwise be prohibited.  However, in the context of 
considering the liability of corporations for insider trading, there is no practical consequence 
to the use of the alternative terms.  Section 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code clearly provides 
that: 
 
A defendant who wishes to rely on any exception, exemption, excuse, qualification or 
justification provided by the law creating an offence bears an evidential burden in relation 
to that matter.  
 
‘Evidential burden’ is then described in s 13.3(6) of the Criminal Code to mean ‘the burden of 
adducing or pointing to evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that the matter exists 
or does not exist.’  Thus, the defendant relying on an exception or a defence to insider 
trading will bear the evidential burden of proof in relation to the relevant matters.  If the legal 
burden of proof is imposed on a defendant, the defendant must establish the existence of 
the exception or defence on the balance of probabilities,5 and the prosecution must then 
refute the exception or defence beyond reasonable doubt.  However, the legal burden of 
proof in relation to exceptions or defences to insider trading is not imposed on the defendant 
under the Corporations Act.  Thus, the position of a person accused of insider trading is not 
altered by use of the term ‘defence’ instead of ‘exception’ in relation to the certain matters 
which may enable them to avoid liability. 
 
In the case of ASIC v Citigroup,6 Jacobson J used the term ‘Chinese Wall defence’ rather 
than ‘Chinese Wall exception’ and that term appears to be favoured by the majority of 
5 Criminal Code, s 13.5 
6 (2007) 160 FCR 35, 110.   
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academic commentators.7  Accordingly, for consistency and simplicity, I refer to a ‘Chinese 
Wall defence’ and not a ‘Chinese Wall exception’ in this thesis.    
 
Section 1043F of the Corporations Act provides as follows: 
 
A body corporate does not contravene subsection 1043A(1) by entering into a transaction 
or agreement at any time merely because of information in the possession of an officer or 
employee of the body corporate if: 
 
(a) the decision to enter into the transaction or agreement was taken on its behalf by a 
person or persons other than that officer or employee; and 
  
(b) it had in operation at that time arrangements that could reasonably be expected to 
ensure that the information was not communicated to the person or persons who 
made the decision and that no advice with respect to the transaction or agreement 
was given to that person or any of those persons by a person in possession of the 
information; and 
 
(c) the information was not so communicated and no such advice was so given. 
 
Thus, the defence operates so that a corporation is not liable for insider trading, even if an 
officer or employee in the corporation possesses inside information at the time when the 
corporation trades in certain financial products, so long as the person who decided to trade 
did not possess the inside information, the corporation had a sufficient Chinese Wall in 
place, and the inside information was not communicated to the person deciding to trade. 
 
7 See for example, Robert P Austin and Ian M Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 16th ed, 2014) [9.630]-[9.710]; Roman Tomasic, Stephen Bottomley and Rob McQueen, 
Corporations Law in Australia (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 636-638; Ashley Black, ‘Insider Trading and 
Market Misconduct’ (2011) 29 Company and Securities Law Journal 313; Vivien Goldwasser, ‘Recent 
Developments in the Regulation of Chinese Walls and Business Ethics – In Search of a Remedy for a Problem 
that Persists’ (1993) 11 Company and Securities Law Journal 227; Roman Tomasic, ‘Chinese Walls, Legal 
Principle and Commercial Reality in Multi-Service Professional Firms’ (1991) 14 University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 46; CAMAC, Insider Trading Report (2003) 6-7.  
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The ‘arrangements’ referred to in s 1043F(b) of the Corporations Act have become known as 
‘Chinese Walls’, although in recent times such arrangements are increasingly referred to as 
‘information barriers’.8  As will be seen below, the arrangements comprise physical, 
documentary and electronic barriers.  Section 1043F is titled ‘Chinese Wall arrangements by 
bodies corporate’ but the term ‘Chinese Wall’ is not used elsewhere in the legislation.9  
There is divergence over the origin of the term Chinese Wall in this context - some consider 
that it is a reference to the ‘Great Wall of China’,10 while others consider that it is a reference 
to the fact that the ‘Chinese used to make walls out of paper through which you could 
whisper and therefore the name is a flagrant indication of what frequently goes on’.11  
Regardless of the origins of the term, in Mallesons Stephen Jaques v KPMG Peat Marwick,12 
Ipp J stated that: 
 
 The derivation of the nomenclature is obscure.  It appears to be an attempt to clad with 
respectable antiquity and impenetrability something that is relatively novel and potentially 
porous.13  
 
The Origins of Chinese Walls 
 
The first documented use of a Chinese Wall in relation to insider trading occurred in the 
USA, as a settlement device in the case of Re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 
Inc.14  Merrill Lynch, a large multi-national financial institution, became the subject of an 
insider trading claim in connection with its dual role as underwriter and retail broker to a 
client, Douglas Aircraft.  As a result of the underwriting activities, a number of Merrill Lynch 
8 Asia Pacific Telecommunications Limited v Optus Networks Pty Limited [2007] NSWSC 350 [4]; ASIC v 
Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35, 43.   
9 Other than in the title of s 1043G of the Corporations Act, which contains a similar exception for partnerships. 
10 See, for example, Charles Hollander and Simon Salzedo, Conflicts of Interest and Chinese Walls (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2000) 96.  
11 John Quarrell, ‘Modern Trusts in Legal Education’ (1991) 5 Trust Law International 99, 103.   
12 [1990] WAR 357.  
13 Ibid 371-372.  
14 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968); Tomasic, above n 7, 53; Goldwasser, above n 7, 232. 
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employees obtained information about a severe reduction in projected future earnings for 
Douglas Aircraft and, before the market was properly informed, trading on the basis of this 
inside information occurred through Merrill Lynch’s retail brokerage division.  The SEC 
alleged that Merrill Lynch had engaged in insider trading but the case was ultimately settled, 
with a term of the settlement being an undertaking given by Merrill Lynch to impose stricter 
policies and procedures on its business operations in an effort to limit the sharing of inside 
information within the corporation in the future – effectively amounting to a Chinese Wall.15  
 
This type of structure was then adopted by other investment banks and multi-service 
organisations to try to limit any potential liability for insider trading and avoid conflicts of 
interest.16  Chinese Wall arrangements have since become common and accepted practice 
in investment banking.17  Australian law first provided for these types of structures as a 
statutory defence to insider trading under s 128(7) of the former Securities Industry Code.18  
Using language that is similar, but not identical, to that in the current s 1043F of the 
Corporations Act, s 128(7) of the Securities Industry Code then provided that: 
 
A body corporate is not precluded … from entering into a transaction at any time by 
reason only of information in the possession of an officer of that body corporate if: 
 
(a) the decision to enter into the transaction was taken on its behalf by a person 
other than the officer; 
 
(b) it had in operation at that time arrangements to ensure that the information was 
not communicated to that person and that no advice with respect to the 
transaction was given to him by a person in possession of the information; and 
15 Stanislav Dolgopolov, ‘Insider Trading, Chinese Walls, and Brokerage Commissions: The Origins of Modern 
Regulation of Information Flows in Securities Markets’ (2008) 4 Journal of Law, Economics and Policy 311, 
347; Norman S Poser, ‘Chinese Wall or Emperor’s New Clothes? Regulating Conflicts of Interest of Securities 
Firms in the U.S. and the U.K’ (1988) 9 Michigan Yearbook International Legal Studies 91, 106.  
16 Martin Lipton and Robert B Mazur, ‘The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflicts Problems of Securities Firms’ 
(1975) 50 New York University Law Review 459, 461.  
17 Norman S Poser, International Securities Regulation (Little Brown & Co, 1991) 207. 
18 And then under s 1002(7) of the Corporations Law, as noted by Goldwasser, above n 7, 230. 
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(c)  the information was not so communicated and such advice was not so given. 
 
The two primary differences between s 128(7) of the Securities Industry Code and s 1043F 
of the Corporations Act are that s 128(7) referred only to information in possession of an 
officer of the corporation, whereas s 1043F also refers to information in the possession of an 
employee.  Section 128(7) also required arrangements ‘to ensure’ information was not 
communicated to the person deciding to enter the relevant transaction, whereas s 1043F 
more leniently requires arrangements ‘that could reasonably be expected to ensure’ that the 
information was not communicated.  These concepts will be discussed in detail below. 
 
Chinese Wall arrangements have been described as a form of ‘procedural architecture’19 
whose primary purpose is to separate areas of conflict of interest and prevent the transfer of 
information.20  In general, Chinese Walls aim to prevent officers and employees of a 
corporation from sharing confidential information by separating those parts of a corporation 
that are most likely to receive inside information, such as corporate advisory, research and 
analysis departments (the ‘private’ side of a corporation) from those which are most likely to 
engage in securities trading (the ‘public’ side of a corporation).21   
 
The most common types of corporations which utilise Chinese Walls are investment banks – 
large organisations providing a wide range of financial intermediary services.  Such services 
include issuing, buying and selling of securities and giving of related financial advice, 
securities underwriting and financial advisory services in connection with mergers and 
acquisitions, divestitures, restructurings, joint ventures and privatisations.  A wide range of 
additional services are also commonly provided, such as securities trading, investment 
research, financing asset management and foreign exchange dealings.22  
19 Roman Tomasic, Casino Capitalism? Insider Trading in Australia (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1991) 
89. 
20 Goldwasser, above n 7, 228.  
21 CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper (2001) [2.190].  
22 Andrew Tuch, ‘Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest’ (2005) 29 Melbourne 
University Law Review 15. 
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Apart from being utlised as a defence to insider trading, Chinese Walls are also frequently 
created to avoid more general conflicts of interest.  There are a wide variety of cases 
involving Chinese Walls in other contexts, particularly those concerning conflicts of interests 
in accounting and law firms.  In these situations, Chinese Walls may be established in an 
effort to ensure there is no breach of fiduciary and contractual duties to act in the best 
interests of clients and avoid a conflict of interest, and to avoid the sharing of information 
between lawyers and accountants acting for different parties, or each side of a dispute or set 
of proceedings.  Chinese Walls are also utilised by organisations which carry on a business 
of providing financial services, due to a requirement under s 912A(1)(aa) of the Corporations 
Act that a person licensed to carry on such a business must maintain Chinese Wall 
arrangements in order to manage conflicts.23 
   
Why Are Chinese Walls Necessary? 
 
For the purposes of insider trading, the Chinese Wall defence is considered to be necessary 
due to the operation of the mechanisms which set out when a corporation will possess 
information, have the requisite knowledge that information is inside information, and engage 
in the trading or procuring of trading in financial products.  Theoretically, it may be possible 
for one person in a corporation to possess inside information (which is information that the 
corporation may be regarded as possessing) and for another person elsewhere in the 
corporation to engage in trading or procuring trading in relevant financial products (which is 
conduct that the corporation may be considered to have engaged in).  Therefore, the 
corporation could potentially be regarded as having engaged in trading in relevant financial 
products while in possession of inside information and therefore be potentially liable for 
23 Section 912A(1) of the Corporations Act provides that: 
A financial services licensee must: 
(aa) have in place adequate arrangements for the management of conflicts of interest that 
may arise wholly, or partially, in relation to activities undertaken by the licensee or a 
representative of the licensee in the provision of financial services as part of the financial 
services business of the licensee or the representative.  
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insider trading,24 even if neither of the relevant individuals would have any such liability 
themselves.  The varying operation of different statutory and general law mechanisms for 
determining when a corporation is considered to possess inside information, have the 
requisite knowledge that the information is inside information, and to have engaged in the 
relevant trading conduct, has been discussed in detail in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
In certain circumstances, in order to avoid the cumulative effect of these various 
mechanisms, the Chinese Wall defence provides, in essence, that there will be no liability for 
insider trading just because an officer or employee of a corporation possesses inside 
information, so long as any trading in affected financial products is undertaken by or at the 
direction of another officer or employee to whom the inside information or related advice has 
not been communicated, and so long as the corporation has arrangements in place that 
could ‘reasonably be expected to ensure’ that the inside information would not be 
communicated.   
 
In addition to operating as a means of avoiding liability for insider trading, Chinese Walls 
may also prevent insider trading from occurring, by restricting access to inside information to 
employees on the ‘public side’ of organisations.  As stated by Poser: 
 
 …a Chinese wall can have two very different regulatory purposes.  Its purpose may be merely 
prophylactic: to prevent inside information in the possession of persons in one part of a firm 
from being misused by persons in another part of the firm.  Its purpose may also, however, be 
legal: to provide a defence to the firm against liability for insider trading or breach of duty to a 
customer that would normally arise as a result of the imputation of knowledge of an employee 
to the employer.25 
 
24 Christopher M Gorman, ‘Are Chinese Walls the Best Solution to the Problems of Insider Trading and 
Conflicts of Interests in Broker-Dealers?’ (2004) 9 Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 475, 476; 
Lyon and du Plessis, above n 3, 80. 
25 Poser, above n 15, 189-190. 
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Requirements for Reliance on the Chinese Wall Defence  
 
Section 1043F of the Corporations Act has three distinct elements which must be satisfied 
before a corporation can rely on the Chinese Wall defence to insider trading, which can be 
summarised as follows: (i) the person deciding to trade in the relevant financial products did 
not possess the inside information; (ii) the corporation had a sufficient Chinese Wall in place; 
and (iii) the person deciding to trade did not receive the inside information or advice from a 
person in possession of the inside information.  These elements will now be examined in 
turn to determine the circumstances in which the Chinese Wall defence will operate. 
 
The Person Deciding to Trade in Relevant Financial Products Did Not Possess Inside 
Information  
 
Section 1042F(a) of the Corporations Act requires that the decision to enter a transaction or 
agreement – effectively, the decision to trade in certain financial products – must have been 
made by a person who did not possess inside information.  To repeat the precise language 
of the section, the first element requires that: 
 
 the decision to enter into the transaction or agreement was taken on its [the body 
corporate’s] behalf by a person or person other than that officer or employee [in 
possession of inside information]. 
 
This gives rise to three issues to consider: (a) Is making ‘the decision to enter’ a transaction 
or agreement different from the prohibited conduct for the insider trading offence?  (b) What 
occurs if inside information is possessed by an agent of the corporation who is not also an 
officer or employee?  (c) As the defence refers to a decision to enter into a transaction or 
agreement ‘on its behalf’, does it extend to liability for procuring trading, or only to actual 
trading in financial products by a corporation? 
 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, insider trading occurs where a person trades, or procures 
trading, in relevant financial products, or engages in tipping while in possession of inside 
information, and with knowledge that the information is inside information (or where the 
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person ought reasonably to have known that the information was inside information).  The 
act or trading, or procuring of trading, or tipping, is the conduct which prohibited and is 
referred to in this thesis as the ‘trading element’.  The manner in which a corporation 
engages in the trading element has been discussed in detail above.   
   
The person who actually made ‘the decision to enter’ the transaction or agreement might not 
be the same person who actually engaged in the trading element on the corporation’s 
behalf.  The specific conduct prohibited by s 1043A(1) is to: 
 
(c) apply for, acquire, or dispose of relevant Division 3 financial products, or enter 
into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 
financial products; or 
 
(d) procure another person to apply for, acquire, or dispose of relevant Division 3 
financial products, or enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, 
relevant Division 3 financial products. 
 
It is also prohibited conduct under s 1043A(2) for an insider to: 
 
directly or indirectly, communicate the information, or cause the information to be 
communicated, to another person if the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that 
the other person would or would be likely to:  
 
(c) apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products, or enter 
into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 
financial products; or  
                  
(d) procure another person to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 
financial products, or enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, 
relevant Division 3 financial products.  
 
Clearly, a ‘decision to enter’ into a ‘transaction or agreement’ is not necessarily the same as 
the prohibited conduct set out in s 1043A(1) (c) and (d).  It is certainly possible that a person 
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may ‘apply for, acquire, or dispose of relevant Division 3 financial products, or enter into an 
agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products’ without 
being a person who made ‘the decision to enter’ the relevant transaction or agreement.  For 
example, a trader in a merchant bank may possess inside information and may be directed 
by a more senior employee to purchase certain shares in a corporation to which the inside 
information relates.  If the trader buys the shares on behalf of the corporation, he or she has 
caused the corporation to acquire the financial products while he or she is in possession of 
inside information.  As a result of the application of s 769B(1) of the Corporations Act, the 
trader has acquired financial products on behalf of the merchant bank, satisfying s 
1043A(1)(c) of the Corporations Act.  However, since the decision to buy the shares was 
actually made by a more senior employee who did not possess the inside information, the 
more senior employee has actually made ‘the decision to enter’ the transaction.  As that 
more senior employee did not possess the inside information, s 1043F(a) of the 
Corporations Act is able to be applied, so long as the other requirements of s 1043F are 
met.    
 
As a dominant theme of this thesis is that insider trading laws must be framed to reflect the 
underlying legislative rationale, which is the protection and maintenance of market integrity, I 
do consider that it is appropriate not to prohibit conduct, or to provide a defence or 
exception, where the party who has engaged in the trading conduct has not obtained an 
advantage for themselves at the expense of other market participants.  However, the other 
difficulties and uncertainties which arise in relation to Chinese Walls, which will be explored 
throughout this chapter, result in a need to reform this defence.     
 
The availability of the defence is restricted due to the use of the terms ‘employee or officer’ 
in s 1043F of the Corporations Act.  As demonstrated above, s 769B(3) of the Corporations 
Act or the general law may apply so that a corporation will be considered to possess 
information which is the possession of an agent, who is not necessarily an officer or 
employee of the corporation.  However, the Chinese Wall defence will not be available if the 
information was possessed by an agent who was not also an officer or employee, as s 
1043G quite clearly states that: 
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A body corporate does not contravene subsection 1043A(1) by entering into a transaction 
or agreement at any time merely because of information in the possession of any officer 
or employee of the body corporate…26  
 
This creates a gap in the operation of the Chinese Wall defence, limiting its application to the 
possession of information by some persons associated with a corporation and not others.  If 
the inside information was possessed by an agent of the corporation, such that s 769B(3) of 
the Corporations Act or the general law could apply and the corporation would be taken to 
possess the information, the Chinese Wall defence in s 1043F of the Corporations Act would 
not be applicable, even though it could apply if the inside information were possessed by an 
officer or employee.  There is an absence of any available explanation, in either legislative 
history or commentary, for the different treatment of agents as opposed to officers and 
employees in this respect.  This issue will be addressed in the proposals for reform 
described in this chapter and set out in full in chapter 7 of this thesis.  
 
Some commentators have noted that the Chinese Wall defence only operates in relation to 
the trading limb of the insider trading offence, and not the procuring limb.27  This is because 
the defence only applies where ‘the decision to enter’ a transaction or agreement (being the 
decision to trade in relevant financial products) was taken ‘on its behalf’ by a person other 
than the person in possession of the inside information.  The words ‘on its behalf’ make it 
clear that the decision must be made for the person or entity that is actually trading.  A 
person who procures trading by another will not ordinarily be the person who makes the 
ultimate ‘decision to enter a transaction or agreement’ unless they are also a decision-maker 
for that other person (for example, if the other person is a corporation controlled by that 
person).  A person who merely ‘encourages’ another person to trade in securities will be 
26 Emphasis added. 
27 Austin and Ramsay, above n 7, [9.660]; Michael Ziegelaar, ‘Insider Trading Law in Australia’ in Gordon 
Walker, Brent Fisse and Ian Ramsay (eds), Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand (Lawbook, 2nd 
ed,1998) 554, 585; Vivien Goldwasser, above n 7, 242; Lyon and du Plessis, above n 3, 82; Robert Baxt, 
Ashley Black and Pamela Hanrahan, Securities and Financial Services Law (Lexis Nexis, 8th ed, 2012) 710. 
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regarded as procuring that other person to trade,28 but the ultimate decision is still made by 
that other person.  Thus, the requirement that the relevant person makes a ‘decision to 
enter’ a transaction or agreement on a corporation’s ‘behalf’ prevents the defence from 
applying where the corporation procures another person to trade.   
 
This is obviously a significant anomaly in the law as it applies to corporations, many of which 
operate in circumstances where trading recommendations may be made to clients by 
employees in one part of the organisation (which may amount to procuring) at times when 
others in the organisation possess inside information.  Technically, such conduct is not 
protected by the existence of a sufficient Chinese Wall and may amount to insider trading.  
Why should a corporation be liable for insider trading for recommending that a client buy or 
sell certain securities when there would not be any such liability it if bought or sold the same 
securities itself?  
 
A corporation with a sufficient Chinese Wall will be protected from claims of insider trading 
where, for example, it engages in proprietary trading on its own behalf even though inside 
information is possessed elsewhere in the organisation, but not where it procures others to 
trade.  Section 1043K of the Corporations Act provides a version of the Chinese Wall 
defence for the holders of financial services licences,29 but it only operates where the holder 
28 Section 1042F of the Corporations Act defines ’procure’ as follows: For the purposes of this Division, but 
without limiting the meaning that the expression procure has apart from this section, if a person incites, 
induces, or encourages an act or omission by another person, the first-mentioned person is taken to procure 
the act or omission by the other person. 
29 Section 1043K of the Corporations Act provides that:  
A person (the agent) does not contravene subsection 1043A(1) by applying for, acquiring, or 
disposing of, or entering into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, financial products 
that are able to be traded on a licensed market if:  
(a) the agent is a financial services licensee or a representative of a financial services 
licensee; and  
(b) the agent entered into the transaction or agreement concerned on behalf of another 
person (the principal) under a specific instruction by the principal to enter into that 
transaction or agreement; and  
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of the licence or their representative acts as the agent of another party and where the other 
party gives specific instructions to the agent to trade on their behalf, rather than where the 
agent procures the other party to trade.  So the defence in s 1043K does not fill this gap 
within the Chinese Wall defence in s 1043F of the Corporations Act. 
 
When CAMAC undertook its review of Australian insider trading laws, this gap in the 
legislation was noted30 and in 2003 CAMAC recommended that the Chinese Wall defence 
be extended to include procuring as well as trading, as this omission was considered to be 
‘the result of a legislative oversight’.31  While this recommendation was accepted by the 
Commonwealth Treasury in 2007 as an appropriate amendment to be made to Australian 
insider trading laws,32 despite the passing of a number of years, no action has yet been 
taken to give formal effect to this proposed reform.  As there appears to be no sound basis 
for the exclusion of procuring of trading from the operation of the Chinese Wall defence, the 
reforms proposed in this thesis would operate so that no such gap would continue to exist, 
even though it is proposed that the Chinese Wall defence to insider trading be amended. 
 
(c) the licensee had in operation, at the time when that transaction or agreement was 
entered into, arrangements that could reasonably be expected to ensure that any 
information in the possession of the licensee, or of any representative of the licensee, as 
a result of which the person in possession of the information would be prohibited by 
subsection 1043A(1) from entering into that transaction or agreement was not 
communicated to the agent and that no advice with respect to the transaction or 
agreement was given to the principal or to the agent by a person in possession of the 
information; and  
(d) the information was not so communicated and no such advice was so given; and  
 (e) the principal is not an associate of the licensee or of any representative of the licensee;  
but nothing in this section affects the application of subsection 1043A(1) in relation to the principal.  
30 CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper, above n 21, [2.190]-[2.195]; CAMAC, Insider Trading Proposals 
Paper (2002) [3.58]-[3.62]. 
31 CAMAC, Insider Trading Report, above n 7, 2 and 7. 
32 Commonwealth Treasury, Insider Trading Position and Consultation Paper (2007) 5. 
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A Sufficient Chinese Wall was in Place 
 
Section 1043F(b) of the Corporations Act requires that a sufficient Chinese Wall be in place, 
as for a corporation to rely on the defence it must be shown that: 
 
 it had in operation at that time arrangements that could reasonably be expected to ensure 
that the information was not communicated to the person or persons who made the 
decision [to enter the transaction or agreement] and that no advice with respect to the 
transaction or agreement was given to that person or any of those persons by a person in 
possession of the information.    
 
Despite describing the nature of the arrangements that must be in place as arrangements 
‘that could reasonably be expected to ensure’ that information is not communicated or 
advice given by those who possess the inside information, the Corporations Act does not 
specify what is required to establish a sufficient Chinese Wall. 
 
The phrase ‘could reasonably be expected to ensure’ was first used in connection with the 
Chinese Wall defence in s 1002M of the former Corporations Law, due to amendments 
resulting from the  Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 1991 (Cth).  This language was 
used instead of the previously proposed phrase, which would require arrangements 
‘reasonably designed to ensure’33 that information was not communicated,34 which would 
have appeared to have created a higher standard.35  In Attorney-General’s Department and 
Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Cockcroft,36 it was determined that:  
 
the correct approach to the interpretation of the phrase ‘could reasonably be expected 
to’... is that the words should be given their ordinary and natural meaning.  They require a 
33 Emphasis added. 
34 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth), [355]. 
35 Austin and Ramsay, above n 7, [9.670]. 
36 (1986) 10 FCR 180. 
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judgment to be made as to whether something is reasonable, as distinct from something 
that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous.37 
 
Finding an objective and appropriate yardstick for measuring the sufficiency of Chinese 
Walls, and whether they can be reasonably expected to ensure that information is not 
communicated and advice is not given, is challenging because the detection of insider 
trading is notoriously difficult.38  Without accurate empirical evidence, it is difficult to 
determine objectively whether Chinese Walls actually work, particularly as Chinese Walls 
are only likely to come under scrutiny if and when claims of insider trading, or other forms of 
misconduct, are brought. 
 
However, in order to avoid liability for insider trading where appropriate, corporations must 
have confidence that their internal arrangements would withstand scrutiny to be considered 
sufficient.  It is therefore necessary to look at other sources to determine what is needed to 
establish and maintain a sufficient Chinese Wall to protect a corporation from liability for 
insider trading, including: (i) cases interpreting s 1043F of the Corporations Act; (ii) market 
rules and accepted industry practices in relation to Chinese Walls; and (iii) cases 
considering Chinese Walls in other contexts. 
 
Cases Concerning section 1043F of the Corporations Act  
 
Although the Chinese Wall defence to insider trading is set out in the Corporations Act, and 
has existed in legislative form in the former Companies Code and the Corporations Law, the 
requirements for a sufficient Chinese Wall as a defence to insider trading were untested 
judicially until the case of ASIC v Citigroup.39  In this case, ASIC made two separate claims 
37 Ibid 190. 
38 Simon Rubenstein, ‘The Regulation and Prosecution of Insider Trading in Australia: Towards Civil Penalty 
Sanctions for Insider Trading’ (2002) 20 Company and Securities Law Journal 89; Roman Tomasic and 
Brendan Pentony, ‘The Prosecution of Insider Trading: Obstacles to Enforcement’ (1989) 22 Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Criminology 65; Explanatory Memorandum, Financial Services Bill 2001 (Cth) [2.78]-
[2.79]; Lyon and du Plessis, above n 3, 163-168.   
39 (2007) 160 FCR 35.  
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of insider trading against Citigroup: (i) ASIC alleged that the sale of Patrick shares by the 
proprietary trader, Mr Manchee, which occurred after he was told by his manager, Mr 
Darvall, to stop buying Patrick shares, amounted to insider trading attributable to Citigroup; 
and (ii) ASIC alleged that there was not a sufficient Chinese Wall in place, so that all buying 
and selling of Patrick shares by the proprietary trader amounted to insider trading, as at all 
relevant times executives in the Investment Banking Division of Citigroup possessed inside 
information about the proposed takeover of Patrick by Toll. 
 
The case also gave rise to claims that Citigroup had failed to properly manage conflicts of 
interest and that it breached fiduciary duties it owed to its client, Toll.40 
 
As discussed in chapter 5, the first insider trading claim brought against Citigroup ultimately 
failed because the proprietary trader, Mr Manchee, was not found to be an ‘officer’ of 
Citigroup and Jacobson J determined that this meant that any information he possessed was 
not to be taken to be information possessed by Citigroup.  Additionally, as a matter of fact, it 
was found that Mr Manchee had not made the necessary supposition alleged by ASIC - that 
Citigroup was acting for Toll on an imminent takeover of Patrick41 - and that such a 
supposition had not been conveyed to him by his manager.42 
 
Most relevant in the context of a review of the Chinese Wall defence, the second insider 
trading claim brought against Citigroup also failed, because Citigroup’s Chinese Wall was 
found to satisfy the necessary requirements.  Although officers in the Investment Banking 
Division of Citigroup, who were advising Toll, were aware of relevant inside information 
concerning Patrick shares at a time when trading in those shares was occurring in another 
part of the organisation (that is, at the time the proprietary trader was trading in those shares 
on Citigroup’s behalf), the Chinese Wall in place between the Investment Banking Division 
40 Jacobson J ultimately determined that there was no duty to avoid a conflict of interest because of the 
absence of a fiduciary relationship between Citigroup and Toll, but a discussion of those issues is unrelated to 
the topic of insider trading and therefore beyond the scope of this thesis. 
41 ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35, 101-102. 
42 Ibid 103-104.  
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(which was on the ‘private’ side of the Chinese Wall) and the proprietary trading group 
(which was on the ‘public’ side of the Chinese Wall), was found to be sufficient.43   
 
The existence of a sufficient Chinese Wall meant that there was no contravention of the 
prohibition of insider trading.  In this context, the most pertinent statements made by the 
Court are those which describe the requirements for a sufficient Chinese Wall.  Jacobson J 
described the type of organisational arrangements which would ordinarily be sufficient as: 
 
(a) the physical separation of departments to isolate them from each other; 
(b) an educational program, normally recurring to emphasise the importance of not 
improperly or inadvertently divulging confidential information; 
(c) strict and carefully designed procedures for dealing with situations where it is 
thought the Chinese Wall should be crossed, and the maintaining of proper 
records where this occurs; 
(d) monitoring of the effectiveness of the Chinese Wall by compliance officers; and 
(e) disciplinary sanctions where there has been a breach of the Chinese Wall.44 
 
It is clear from his judgment that Jacobson J considered that these characteristics would 
usually be considered to give rise to a sufficient Chinese Wall, but also that each situation is 
to be determined on its own merits, and he did not attempt to exhaustively describe how a 
Chinese Wall should be established. 
 
It was noted by Jacobson J that a Chinese Wall arrangement ‘[does] not require a standard 
of absolute perfection.  The test stated…is an objective one.’45  Indeed, the ‘practical 
impossibility of ensuring that every conceivable risk is covered by written procedures and 
followed by employees’46 was also noted.    
 
43 Ibid 110-112. 
44  Ibid 82, citing with approval statements of Lord Millett in Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222, 238. 
45 Ibid 112. 
46 Ibid 112. 
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Thus, ASIC v Citigroup usefully describes the very general characteristics a sufficient 
Chinese Wall might be expected to have, with a recognition that each case will need to be 
determined objectively on its facts.  However, it is clearly not a detailed or exhaustive list of 
the ways in which a sufficient Chinese Wall can be established and maintained.   
 
Market Rules and Accepted Industry Practices 
 
As noted by Lyon and du Plessis,47 the financial sector has had significant input into the 
requirements for Chinese Walls, and there are a variety of industry practices and rules which 
relate to these sorts of arrangements.  Independent of the prohibition of insider trading, s  
912A(1)(aa) of the Corporations Act provides, as noted above, that a financial services 
licensee must have in place ‘adequate arrangements for the management of conflicts of 
interest’.  ASIC has produced Regulatory Guide 181 Licensing: Managing Conflicts of 
Interest (RG 181) to assist financial services licensees meet their obligations under this 
section, which is supplemented by Regulatory Guide 79 Managing Conflicts of Interest: A 
Guide for Research Report Providers (RG 79).  RG 181 set outs ASIC’s ‘general approach 
to compliance with the statutory obligation.’48  While the regulatory guide is not prescriptive, 
ASIC takes the view that ‘licensees whose conflict of interest management arrangements 
are not consistent with the guidelines and expectations ... are less likely to be complying with 
their obligations ... and will be exposed to greater risk of regulatory action.’49  RG 181 does 
not explicitly set out requirements for Chinese Walls (or information barriers, as they are 
described in the regulatory guide) but it does emphasise the role of monitoring procedures,50 
internal structures – including ‘organisational structure, physical layout and reporting 
processes’51 – and documentation and record-keeping.52 It also states that: 
 
47 Lyon and du Plessis, above n 3, 86-87. 
48 ASIC, Regulatory Guide 181, Licensing: Managing Conflicts of Interest (2004) 1. 
49 Ibid 4. 
50 Ibid 10. 
51 Ibid 11. 
52 Ibid 14-15. 
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robust information barriers may help a licensee manage their conflicts of interest.  They 
may allow a licensee to insulate one group of staff from the information...  To be effective, 
such barriers must actually prevent information being passed to the relevant group of 
staff.53  
 
RG 79 contains a more definitive statement about Chinese Walls:54 
  
 We expect research report providers55 to ensure that research staff are structurally and 
physically separated from (and not supervised by) any staff who are performing an 
investment banking, corporate advisory or dealing function.56 
 
The ASX previously had in place a set of Market Rules that set out requirements for Chinese 
Walls for market participants in connection with the provision of advice to clients.  Market 
Rule 7.18.3 provided that:  
 
A Market Participant will not be regarded as having possession of inside information that 
is not generally available in relation to a Financial Product where that Market Participant 
has Chinese Walls in place and the person advising the client is not in possession of that 
information.  
 
Market Rule 7.18.1 of the ASX Market Rules then defined a ‘Chinese Wall’ as an 
arrangement: 
 
whereby information known to persons included in one part of the business of the Market 
Participant is not available (directly or indirectly) to those involved in another part of the 
business of the Market Participant and it is accepted that in each of the parts of the 
business of the Market Participant so divided decisions will be taken without reference to 
53 Ibid 11.   
54 ASIC, Regulatory Guide 79, Managing Conflicts of Interest: A Guide for Research Report Providers (2012) 
34. 
55 That is, ‘public’ side employees. 
56  That is, ‘private’ side employees. 
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any interest which any other such part or person in any other such part of the business of 
the Market Participant may have in the matter.  
 
Additionally, the ASX Market Rules required further measures such as advising the ASX of 
the creation, alteration or removal of Chinese Walls before any action could be taken by the 
market participant.57  However, ASIC has now taken over the supervision of financial 
markets, and adopted the ASIC Market Integrity Rules (ASX Market) 2010.  Rule 3.6.3 of the 
new ASIC Market Integrity Rules has similar content to the ASX Market Rules in relation to 
Chinese Walls, but market participants are no longer required to advise ASIC of the creation 
of a Chinese Wall.58  
 
Under the old ASX Market Rules, Guidance Note 13 was released by the ASX, which set out 
certain procedures to be adopted by market participants in connection with Chinese Wall 
arrangements.  Guidance Note 13 specifically stated that it did ‘not deal with the 
provisions… of the Corporations Act which provides the statutory basis of the regulation of 
insider trading.’59  Guidance Note 13 required market participants to have: (i) a written policy 
statement and restricted communication flows; (ii) a personal acknowledgement completed 
by staff on commencement of employment; (iii) physical access restrictions; (iv) separate 
supervision of each department or work unit; (v) physical separation; (vi) limits on transfer of 
staff between departments or work units; (vii) continuing education; and (viii) monitoring and 
detection of breaches.60  
 
Although these concepts have some similarity and overlap with those outlined by the Court 
in ASIC v Citigroup, they are not identical and the Guidance Note 13 requirements were 
more expansive than those already identified.  While the adoption of such further 
arrangements would not necessarily ensure that a Chinese Wall would pass judicial scrutiny 
when considering whether the elements of s 1043F are satisfied, Guidance Note 13 
57 ASX Market Rules (2004) r 7.18.1-17.18.2.  
58 ASIC, Regulatory Guide 214, Guidance on ASIC Market Integrity Rule for ASX and ASX 24 Markets (August 
2010) RG 214.78. 
59 ASX Market Rules, Guidance Note 13 (2004) 1. 
60 Ibid 2-4. 
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provided helpful guidance on how a regulator considers that Chinese Walls are to be 
managed and interpreted.  However, these requirements were not considered by the Court 
in ASIC v Citigroup when determining what is necessary for a sufficient Chinese Wall. 
 
As noted above, while Chinese Walls are maintained in order to avoid liability for offences 
such as insider trading, by restricting the flow of information, such arrangements also serve 
to minimise opportunities for insider trading which might otherwise exist within organisations 
– whether such trading might be undertaken on behalf of a corporation or by an officer, 
employee or agent of the corporation on their own account. Accordingly, while amendments 
are proposed to the Chinese Wall defence to remedy the various problems with the 
application of insider trading laws to corporations, as identified throughout this thesis, it is 
recognised that Chinese Wall arrangements serve more than one purpose, and that it would 
not be appropriate to remove the Chinese Wall defence in its entirety. 
 
Cases Concerning Chinese Walls in Other Contexts  
 
Chinese Wall arrangements may be used by professional service firms, such as law firms 
and accounting firms, in circumstances where there is a conflict of interest – for example, if a 
law firm wishes to act for more than one party to a dispute, or to act against a current or 
former client of the firm.   This has resulted in much judicial consideration of the 
effectiveness and operation of Chinese Walls in this context. 
 
Such arrangements commonly involve the use of a Chinese Wall to separate the relevant 
sections of the firm in order to avoid a breach of fiduciary duty and the inappropriate 
disclosure of confidential client information.  Where a firm acting for one client seeks to act 
for another client in circumstances where a conflict of interest would arise,61 the firm may 
deal with the conflict by implementing a Chinese Wall.  This means that the relevant 
employees who act for each client are separated from each other so that an employee who 
acts for one of those clients cannot act for the other, or have access to information 
61 For example, if the firm were to take instructions from one client to act against another client of the firm. 
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concerning the other client.62  Where a conflict of interest arises because a firm seeks to act 
against a former client of the firm, the firm may also implement a Chinese Wall.  This 
generally means that an employee who has previously acted for the former client will not be 
permitted to act against them, and that employees acting against the former client will not be 
permitted to have access to the files or confidential information concerning the former 
client.63  It is also common for these arrangements to be supported by appropriate 
undertakings - for example undertakings given to the court by individual employees that they 
will not seek or obtain access to documents, act for a particular party, or discuss any 
relevant issues with other identified employees within the firm.64  
 
An analysis of the cases which have considered what is necessary for a sufficient Chinese 
Wall in those circumstances reveals that courts are willing to accept such arrangements as a 
means of quarantining information within a firm,65 but it will be a question of fact in each 
case as to whether a particular Chinese Wall is sufficient.66  The primary issue on which a 
court needs to be satisfied is that the arrangements have no real risk of disclosure.67  Mere 
physical segregation of particular employees is not enough68 - there also need to be 
‘sensible and safe systems in place’.69  Due to the fiduciary duties owed by lawyers to their 
62 See, for example, Blackwell v Barroile Pty Limited (1994) 51 FCR 347, 359; Wan v McDonald (1992) 33 FCR 
491, 511; Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 287. 
63 See, for example, British American Tobacco Australian Services Ltd v Blanch [2004] NSWSC 7; Spincode 
Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 287; Asia Pacific Communications Limited v Optus Networks Pty 
Limited [2007] NSWSC 350. 
64 For example, undertakings of this type were given to the court in Photocure ASA v Queen’s University At 
Kingston [2002] FCA 905. 
65 See Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222, 237-238 (Lord Millett), as approved by Jacobson J in 
ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35, 81. 
66 Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222, 239, as noted by Jacobson J in ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 
FCR 35, 82. 
67 McDonald Estate v Martin (1991) 77 DLR (4th) 249, 269. 
68 Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222, 239; Lee Aitkin, ‘Chinese Walls, Fiduciary Duties and Intra-
Firm Conflicts – A Pan-Australian Conspectus’ (2000) 19 Australian Bar Review 116, 122. 
69 Asia Pacific Communications Limited v Optus Networks Pty Limited [2007] NSWSC 350, [5] (Bergin J).   
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clients,70 the relevant clients must also expressly consent to the Chinese Wall 
arrangements.71  
 
A Chinese Wall which is ‘an established part of the organisational’ structure, rather than one 
created ‘ad hoc’ to deal with a particular conflict, is likely to be preferred by the courts.72  
Additionally, a consideration of the adequacy of Chinese Walls in law firms requires an 
appreciation that ‘it is not part of everyday legal practice for a lawyer to have his or her 
knowledge from a case quarantined from another lawyer within the same section of the 
firm.’73  It is considered unrealistic ‘to place reliance on such arrangements in relation to 
people with opportunities for daily contact over long periods, as wordless communication 
can take place inadvertently and without explicit expressions, by attitudes, facial expression 
or even by avoiding people one is accustomed to see, even by people who sincerely intend 
to conform to control.’74  Accordingly, there needs to be awareness that ‘there will always be 
an element of some risk of disclosure where its prevention depends upon human contact 
because people make mistakes.  The lack of a real risk of disclosure or misuse will depend 
on the design of the information barrier.’75 
 
Thus, the key principles relevant to the sufficiency of Chinese Walls within law firms can be 
summarised as follows: (i) each case must be assessed on an independent basis to 
determine if there is a real risk of disclosure of confidential information; (ii) the physical 
separation of relevant employees must also be supported by appropriate systems and 
practices as well as undertakings; and (iii) established structures will be preferred to ‘ad hoc’ 
arrangements because they are more likely to be effective. 
70 Which are not ordinarily owed by investment banks to their clients, and are customarily excluded by contract, 
as noted in ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35, 75. 
71 Hollander and Salzedo, above n 10, 98. 
72 As noted by Jacobson J in ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35, 82, citing Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG 
[1999] 2 AC 222, 239. 
73 Asia Pacific Communications Limited v Optus Networks Pty Limited [2007] NSWSC 350, [35].  
74 As stated by Bryson J in D & J Constructions Pty Limited v Head & Ors Trading as Clayton Utz (1987) 9 
NSWLR 118, 123. 
75 Asia Pacific Communications Limited v Optus Networks Pty Limited [2007] NSWSC 350 [14].  
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Tomasic has suggested that the problems identified in relation to the use of Chinese Walls 
within law firms could apply equally to the securities industry and that therefore ‘…the 
Chinese Wall defence to insider trading should logically also be abandoned.’76  However, 
when comparing investment banks and financial services organisations to law firms and 
accounting firms, it is worth noting that Chinese Walls in corporations such as investment 
banks are more likely to be well-established structures.  As noted above, lawyers are not 
used to being quarantined from sharing knowledge with other lawyers within the same firm, 
but corporate organisations such as investment banks with established Chinese Walls have 
employees who are used to working within a section of the organisation where information 
sharing with others in other parts of the organisation is prohibited.  Employees within those 
organisations will always be on either the ‘public’ or ‘private’ side of the Chinese Wall and 
become used to that position.  In law firms, employees may be on one side of a Chinese 
Wall in respect of certain cases and not others, on a true ‘case by case’ basis.  As the 
arrangements have differing functions, purposes and degrees of permanence in the various 
forms of organisations, those in corporations such as investment banks or financial services 
organisations are more likely to have the degree of permanence necessary to be regarded 
as sufficient structures for the purposes of s 1043F of the Corporations Act.  Thus, it can be 
argued that Chinese Wall structures within corporations in the securities industry are less 
likely to suffer from the same problems as those within law firms. 
 
Although there are certain basic characteristics which would generally need to be present in 
order for a Chinese Wall to be regarded as sufficient to provide a defence against a claim of 
insider trading, there is an absence of a clear objective measure against which such 
sufficiency can be measured. This does create an inherent lack of certainty in connection 
with the Chinese Wall defence.   
 
Since insider trading is prohibited in Australia in order to protect market integrity, the 
available exceptions and defences to the prohibition should also be grounded in the same 
76 Roman Tomasic, ‘Insider Trading Law Reform in Australia’ (1991) 9 Company and Securities Law Journal 
121, 134. 
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rationale. The principles of market fairness, market efficiency and maintenance of investor 
confidence are fundamental pillars of the legislation, pursuant to which the securities 
markets is intended to operate ‘freely and fairly, with all participants having equal access to 
relevant information’.77  While Chinese Walls themselves may not always prevent insider 
trading, the presence of such a mechanism should nevertheless provide a degree of 
security, as their existence can serve to reassure market participants that all parties are 
‘playing by the same rules’.78  However, in order for market participants, investors, 
regulators and the corporations that maintain Chinese Walls to have confidence that those 
walls are both likely to prevent confidential information from being communicated and that 
they can be relied upon as a potential defence to a claim of insider trading, there must be a 
clear understanding by all parties as to the basic requirements that will generally be 
necessary for these arrangements to be considered sufficient.  
 
The Inside Information Was Not Communicated and No Advice Was Given  
 
Section 1042F(c) of the Corporations Act requires that the relevant inside information must 
not have been communicated to the person or persons who made the decision to enter a 
transaction or agreement – that is, to the person who made the decision to trade in certain 
financial products – and that no advice relating to the transaction or agreement was given to 
them by a person in possession of inside information. 
 
In ASIC v Citigroup, when determining whether any inside information was communicated or 
‘advice given with regard to the transaction’, the Court recognised that the communications 
which took place between the Investment Banking Division executives and the proprietary 
trader’s manager did ‘reveal the potential fragility of Chinese Walls.’79  However, those 
particular discussions, because of their equivocal nature, did not amount to the 
77 Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, House of Representatives, Fair Shares for All: 
Insider Trading in Australia (1989), [3.34]-[3.36]. 
78 Raymond Gozzi, ‘The Chinese Wall Metaphor’ (2003) 60 ETC: A Review of General Semantics 171; 
Goldwasser, above n 7, 249.  
79 ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35, 104. 
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communication of any inside information or advice, primarily because the proprietary trader’s 
manager was ‘astute to ensure that confidential information should remain quarantined,’80 
but the Court did note that, due to the pressured nature of the investment banking 
environment, such a result might not always prevail.81 
 
It is widely recognised that there is a risk that Chinese Walls are not effective at preventing 
the transfer of information and that they can be porous or ‘leak’.82  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many who work within the securities industry may doubt the effectiveness of 
Chinese Walls.  Indeed, Tomasic quotes market participants who have such a view, with one 
stating that ‘I’ve never seen a Chinese Wall without a grapevine growing over it.’83  In ASIC v 
Citigroup, Jacobson J noted the ‘practical impossibility of ensuring that every conceivable 
risk is covered by written procedures and followed by employees’,84 and in the Asia Pacific 
Communications Limited v Optus Networks Pty Limited, Bergin J stated that ‘there will 
always be an element of some risk of disclosure where its prevention depends upon human 
contact because people make mistakes.’85  It is also recognised that Chinese Walls are 
more difficult to utilise within small corporations,86 so that there may then be an increased 
risk of disclosure.87 
 
This element of the Chinese Wall defence requires a consideration as to whether advice was 
given to a person who made a decision to trade in financial products (‘the decision-maker’) 
by a person who was in possession of inside information (‘the insider’) rather than merely 
whether the insider communicated the inside information to the decision-maker.  This is 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 See, for example, Philip Anisman, Insider Trading Legislation for Australia: An Outline of the Issues and 
Alternatives (National Companies and Securities Commission, 1986) 85-86. 
83 Tomasic, above n 19, 79.  
84 ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35, 112. 
85 Asia Pacific Communications Limited v Optus Networks Pty Limited [2007] NSW SC 350, [14].  
86 Goldwasser, above n 7, 237. 
87 B E Brown and C M Herringes, ‘Dovetailing the ‘Chinese Wall’ Defence within the Rules of Professional 
Conduct – Washington Should Finish What It Has Started’ (1990/91) 26 Gonzaga Law Review 569, 583.  
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necessary to ensure that the insider does not indicate, either expressly or impliedly, to the 
decision-maker matters that might influence their decision to trade, even if they do not 
actually pass on the inside information.  Such matters might include a suggestion or 
intimation that the trade is a ‘good idea’ (or a ‘bad idea’) or that it might be better to wait to 
conduct the trading at a future time.  In such circumstances, the Chinese Wall defence 
would be unlikely to apply.  This would be the case regardless of whether the decision-
maker was aware that the insider possessed inside information.  This is an appropriate 
restriction as, for market integrity to be protected and maintained, those who possess inside 
information must not be able to benefit from it at the expense of other investors and 
participants in the market.  If those who make decisions to trade in securities on behalf of 
corporations are able to do so with the advice of those who possess inside information, the 
corporation does receive an unfair advantage and should be unable to avoid any resulting 
liability for insider trading.  This principle is reflected in the proposals for reform described in 
this chapter and set out in full in chapter 7 of this thesis.  
 
International Comparisons 
 
Several jurisdictions specifically provide for a Chinese Wall defence under statute: the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore and the USA.  However, a number of 
jurisdictions have no specific provision for a Chinese Wall defence for insider trading: the 
European Union, Germany and South Africa. 
 
In Germany, the Securities Trading Act (WpHG) does not specifically provide for a Chinese 
Wall defence to insider trading.  However, it seems that it is still common practice for 
merchant banks in Germany to utilise Chinese Walls to quarantine information.88  Similarly, 
88 See, for example, Alfred Lehar and Otto Randl, ‘Chinese Walls in German Banks’  
Lehar, Alfred and Otto Randl, ‘Chinese Walls in German Banks’ (2006) 10 Review of Finance 301. Indeed, Part 
6 of the Securities Trading Act (WpHG) provides for the ‘Rules of Conduct for Investment Enterprises’ which 
include obligations on organisations providing ‘investment services’ to: endeavour to avoid conflicts of interest 
(s 31(1)2); be organised in such a way that, in the provision of investment services, conflicts of interest are kept 
to an unavoidable minimum (s 33(1)2); and have adequate internal control procedures capable of countering 
infringements (s 33(1)3).  While these provisions are not specifically related to the prohibition of insider trading, 
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in South Africa, the Financial Markets Act 2012 (South Africa) does not contain a Chinese 
Wall defence.  Notwithstanding this, Chinese Walls are still used by merchant banks in 
South Africa to manage conflicts of interest and control the transfer of information.89  There 
is no specific Chinese Wall defence90 provided for in the Market Abuse Directive91 or the 
Market Abuse Regulation92 of the European Union.93  In the absence of any guidance in the 
and there is no specific reference to Chinese Walls, these obligations indicate that merchant banks have the 
option to determine their own methods for managing conflicts of interest, which could include the use of 
information barriers such as Chinese Walls: European Commission, ‘Best Practices in an Integrated European 
Financial Market – Recommendations from the Forum Group to the European Commission Services’, 
Annexure 3, (September 2003) 21. 
89 Andrew Myburgh and Ben Davis, ‘The Impact of South Africa’s Insider Trading Regime: A Report for the 
Financial Services Board’ (March 2004) 24; Kenneth Kaoma Mwenda, ‘Banks and the Use of Chinese Walls in 
Managing Conflict of Duties’ (2000) 2 University of Newcastle Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 14. 
90 In the superseded Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on 
Insider Dealing and Market Abuse, OJ 2003 l 96/16, Chinese Walls were referred to in recital (24) as a 
measure to ‘contribute to market integrity’, and there was an obligation in article 6(6) to ensure that ‘market 
operators adopt structural provisions aimed at preventing and detecting market manipulation practices.’  
However, such provisions have not been incorporated into the current Market Abuse Directive or Market Abuse 
Regulation, and no reason has been proffered for the removal of these provisions.  
91 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Criminal Sanctions 
for Market Abuse, OJ 2014 L 173.179. 
92 Regulation (EU) 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Market Abuse. 
93 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Markets in Financial 
Instruments (the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) does set out, amongst other things, organisational 
requirements for ‘investments firms’.  It provides, in Article 13(3), that ‘an investment firm must maintain and 
operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements with a view to taking all reasonable steps 
designed to prevent conflicts of interest … from adversely affecting the interests of its clients.’  Whilst not 
explicitly referred to, information barriers such as Chinese Walls could certainly form part of such 
arrangements.  However, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive primarily requires such arrangements 
for the protection of clients, rather than to protect the market generally or to prevent market abuse such as 
insider trading, as evidenced by the recitals to this Directive.  It is also clear that the use of arrangements such 
as Chinese Walls is considered necessary under applicable codes of conduct.  For example, the Market 
Conduct Standards developed by the Forum of European Securities Commissions require participants in an 
offering to have Chinese Walls in place to restrict the flow of information between business areas to prevent the 
misuse of material information: The Forum of European Securities Commissions, ‘Market Conduct Standards’ 
99-FESCO-B (December 1999) 14-18. 
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Market Abuse Directive, or related legislative instruments, the availability of a Chinese Wall 
defence for insider trading will depend on the content of local laws of each Member State of 
the European Union, which does give rise to the potential for inconsistent positions in the 
different Member States.      
 
In those jurisdictions which do specifically provide for a statutory Chinese Wall defence to 
insider trading, there are certain similarities with the Australian position but, as will be shown 
below, there are two primary differences – not all  jurisdictions require that the relevant 
Chinese Wall arrangements must be ‘reasonably expected to ensure’ that inside information 
is not communicated, and not all jurisdictions expressly provide that, for the defence to 
apply, advice must not be given by a person in possession of inside information to a person 
making the relevant decision to trade.  Unlike Australia, some jurisdictions also apply the 
Chinese Wall defence to the procuring of trading, as well as trading, in relevant financial 
products.      
 
In the United Kingdom, which applies civil liability for insider trading to corporations under 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) c 8, there is no specific provision for a 
Chinese Wall defence in that Act.  However, s 147 gives the Financial Conduct Authority 
(formerly the Financial Services Authority) the power to make rules about the disclosure and 
use of information,94 and it does so in the Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, which 
provides in SYSC 10.2.2R that a Chinese Wall is: 
 
an arrangement that requires information held by a person, in the course of carrying on 
one part of the business, to be withheld from, or not to be used for, persons with or for 
whom it acts in the course of carrying on another part of its business.95   
 
SYSC 10.2.3R of the Financial Conduct Authority Handbook then provides that acting in 
conformity with SYSC 10.2.2R does not amount to market abuse, thereby providing a 
94 Known as ‘control of information rules’: Financial Services and Market Act 2000 (United Kingdom), s 147. 
95 SYSC 10.2.2R is specifically stated to be a ‘control of information rule’ made under s 147 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act (UK) c 8.   
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defence to a civil action against a corporation for insider trading.  Additionally, SYSC 
10.2.4R of the Financial Conduct Authority Handbook specifically provides that where an 
organisation has in place such arrangements, it ‘will not be taken to act with knowledge…if 
none of the relevant individuals involved on behalf of the firm acts with that knowledge’.  
SYSC 10.2.5R of the Financial Conduct Authority Handbook then provides that ‘Individuals 
on the other side of the wall will not be taken to possess information denied to them as a 
result of [a] Chinese Wall’.  
 
Unlike the Australian Chinese Wall defence, the Chinese Wall defence available in the 
United Kingdom does not require that the relevant arrangements be ‘reasonably expected to 
ensure’ that the relevant inside information was not communicated.  Additionally, there is no 
express requirement in the United Kingdom that no advice be given by a person in 
possession of the inside information to the person making the decision to trade.   
 
As noted above, the use of Chinese Walls as a defence to insider trading claims made 
against corporations first occurred in the USA.  This defence is now contained in statutory 
form in SEC Rule 10b5-1(c)(2) made pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
USC § 78a (1934) and it provides that: 
 
A person other than a natural person also may demonstrate that a purchase or sale of 
securities is not “on the basis of” material nonpublic information if the person 
demonstrates that: 
 
(i) The individual making the investment decision on behalf of the person to 
purchase or sell the securities was not aware of the information; and 
 
(ii) The person had implemented reasonable policies and procedures, taking into 
consideration the nature of the person's business, to ensure that individuals 
making investment decisions would not violate the laws prohibiting trading on the 
basis of material nonpublic information. These policies and procedures may 
include those that restrict any purchase, sale, and causing any purchase or sale 
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of any security as to which the person has material nonpublic information, or 
those that prevent such individuals from becoming aware of such information. 
 
While this defence is similar in substance to the Australian Chinese Wall defence found in s 
1043F of the Corporations Act, it does not require that the relevant arrangements be 
‘reasonably expected to ensure’ that inside information was not communicated, instead 
mandating that the corporation must have ‘implemented reasonable policies and procedures 
… to ensure that’ the prohibition of insider trading is not violated, and there is no express 
requirement that advice not be given by a person in possession of the inside information to 
the person making the decision to trade in relevant financial products.   
 
In New Zealand, a Chinese Wall defence is contained in s 261 of the Financial Markets 
Conduct Act 2013 (NZ), which is in very similar terms to the Australian Chinese Wall 
defence.  It provides that it is a defence to any proceedings for insider trading if: 
 
(a) A [the relevant corporation] had in place arrangements that could reasonably be 
expected to ensure that no individual who took part in the decision to trade the 
financial products or to advise or encourage (as the case may be) received or 
had access to, the inside information or was influenced, in relation to that 
decision, by an individual who had the information; and 
 
(b) no individual who took part in the decision received, or had access to, the inside 
information, or was influenced, in relation to that decision, by an individual who 
had the information; and 
 
(c) every individual who had the information and every individual who took part in 
that decision acted in accordance with the arrangements referred to in paragraph 
(a).    
 
The Chinese Wall defence in New Zealand expressly covers both trading and the procuring 
of trading – being ‘advising or encouraging’.  As in Australia, the arrangements must be 
‘reasonably expected to ensure’ that the relevant inside information is not communicated 
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and while there is no prohibition of the ‘giving of advice’ by a person in possession of inside 
information, such persons must not ‘influence’ any individual making a trading decision. 
 
In Hong Kong, s 271(2) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Hong Kong) cap 571 
provides for a Chinese Wall defence for corporations – it is also very similar to that 
contained in s 1043F of the Corporations Act.  It provides that a corporation shall not be 
regarded as having engaged in insider dealing if it establishes that: 
 
(a) although one or more of its directors or employees had the inside information in relation to 
the corporation the listed securities of which were, or the derivatives of the listed 
securities of which were, the listed securities or derivatives in question, each person who 
took the decision for it to deal in or counsel or procure the other person to deal in such 
listed securities or derivatives (as the case may be) did not have the inside information up 
to (and including) the time when it dealt in or counseled or procured the other person to 
deal in such listed securities or derivatives (as the case may be); 
 
(b) arrangements then existed to secure that –  
 
(i) the inside information was up to (and including) the time when it dealt in or 
counseled or procured the other person to deal in listed securities or derivatives 
(as the case may be), not communicated to any person who took the decision; 
and      
 
(ii) none of its directors or employees who had the inside information gave advice 
concerning the decision to any person who took the decision at any time before it 
dealt in counseled or procured the other person to deal in such listed securities 
or derivatives (as the case may be); and     
 
(c) the inside information was in fact not so communicated to any person who took the 
decision and none of its directors or employees who had the inside information in fact so 
gave advice to any person who took the decision. 
 
213 
 
Rather than being ‘reasonably expected to ensure’ that inside information was not 
communicated, the laws of Hong Kong require instead that ‘arrangements then existed to 
secure that’ inside information was not communicated.  There is an express prohibition of 
the giving of advice by a person in possession of inside information and this Chinese Wall 
defence does apply to both trading and the procuring of trading. 
 
In Singapore, s 226(2) of the Securities and Futures Act 2001 sets out a Chinese Wall 
defence, in almost identical terms to that contained in s1043F of the Corporations Act.  It 
provides that a corporation does not contravene the prohibition of insider trading in s 218(2) 
of the Act (which prohibits both trading and the procuring of trading) by entering into a 
transaction or agreement at any time merely because of information in the possession of an 
officer of the corporation if: 
 
(a) the decision to enter into the transaction or agreement was taken on its behalf by a 
person other than that officer;  
 
(b) it had in operation at that time arrangements that could reasonably be expected to ensure 
that the information was not communicated to the person who made the decision and that 
no advice with respect to the transaction or agreement was given to that person by a 
person in possession of the information; and  
 
(c) the information was not so communicated and no such advice was so given. 
 
This defence does require that the arrangements be ‘reasonably expected to ensure’ that 
inside information was not communicated and there is an express prohibition of the giving of 
advice by a person in possession of inside information to the person making the relevant 
trading decision.  However, unlike the position in Australia, the Chinese Wall defence in 
Singapore expressly applies to both trading and the procuring of trading in relevant financial 
products. 
 
Thus it can be seen that some jurisdictions have no statutory Chinese Wall defence for 
insider trading – such as Germany, South Africa and the European Union - and in those 
jurisdictions in which there is a statutory Chinese wall defence, it is generally similar to the 
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Australian Chinese Wall defence, but with a few significant points of departure.  The Chinese 
Wall defences available in the United Kingdom and the USA do not require that the relevant 
arrangements be ‘reasonably expected to ensure’ that inside information is not 
communicated, focusing instead upon whether the information is actually communicated to 
those who make trading decisions, whereas in Hong Kong the arrangements must exist to 
‘secure’ that inside information is not communicated.  In the United Kingdom and the USA 
the inside information must not be communicated to a person making a trading decision but 
there is no express requirement that no advice be given by a person in possession of inside 
information, whereas such a prohibition of the giving of advice or exerting ‘influence’ applies 
in New Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore.  The Chinese Wall defence also specifically 
applies to the procuring of trading as well as trading in New Zealand, Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
  
Looking at the differences between the positions adopted in these jurisdictions in relation to 
the Chinese Wall defence to insider trading, the only point of difference with Australian law 
which I recommend be adopted is to extend the operation of the Chinese Wall defence to 
the procuring of trading in relevant financial products as well as trading.  As noted above, s 
1043F of the Corporations Act only extends the Chinese Wall defence to the trading limb of 
the insider trading offence and not the procuring limb, since it only applies where ‘the 
decision to enter’ a transaction or agreement (being the decision to trade in relevant financial 
products) was taken ‘on [a corporation’s] behalf’ by a person other than a person in 
possession of the inside information.  As has previously been recommended by CAMAC96 
and accepted by the Commonwealth Treasury,97 without a sound basis for excluding the 
procuring of trading from the operation of the Chinese Wall defence, I propose, along with 
other amendments to the Chinese Wall defence, to also extend it to the procuring of trading.   
 
I do not recommend the adoption of the next point of difference – the absence of a 
requirement that the Chinese Wall arrangements be ‘reasonably expected to ensure’ that 
information is not communicated.  The existence of such a requirement is more likely to lead 
96 CAMAC, Insider Trading Report, above n 7, 2 and 7. 
97 Commonwealth Treasury, Insider Trading Position and Consultation Paper, above n 32, 5. 
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to corporations maintaining appropriate arrangements at all times, thereby limiting 
opportunities for insider trading to occur within the corporation, which might not exist if 
corporations merely had to prove that a particular person did not possess inside information 
at a certain point in time.  If opportunities for insider trading within corporations are limited, 
there is less likely to be any impact on market integrity, which is consistent with the rationale 
for the prohibition of insider trading in Australia.   
 
The absence of an express requirement in some jurisdictions for there to be no advice given 
to persons making trading decisions by those who possess inside information is also not a 
position that I would recommend be adopted in Australia.  If this were to occur, advice about 
a transaction could be given without the need to actually communicate the relevant inside 
information to those making trading decisions.  As noted above, it is appropriate to restrict 
the giving of advice by persons in possession of inside information as, if those who make 
decisions to trade in securities on behalf of corporations are able to do so with the advice of 
those who possess inside information, the corporation receives an unfair advantage and 
thus should be subject to possible liability for insider trading.  To allow otherwise would 
enable those within corporations to circumvent the operation of the prohibition of insider 
trading in a manner inconsistent with the need to maintain and protect market integrity.   
 
Preliminary Conclusions and Recommended Reforms 
 
As a potential defence to a claim of insider trading against a corporation, the greatest 
limitation of the Chinese Wall defence is the absence of certainty.  There is a lack of clarity 
as to the requirements for a sufficient Chinese Wall, as the only real guidance is contained in 
fairly general judicial comments supplemented by regulatory guidelines and market practice 
principles.  As a result, there is a lack of certainty as to whether insider trading is actually 
occurring and whether corporations are exposed to liability for insider trading.  This 
uncertainty is compounded by the application of the differing general law and statutory 
mechanisms which can be used to determine when a corporation engages in certain 
conduct, possesses information and has relevant knowledge.  In its current form, the 
Chinese Wall defence is not available where information is possessed by an agent who is 
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not also an officer or employee of the corporation.  Additionally, the defence applies only 
where the corporation itself engages in trading, and not where it procures trading, although 
there is no logical explanation for this gap in its application.  In order to respond to the 
limitations and uncertainty in the application of the Chinese Wall defence, legislative reform 
is clearly needed.  The interests of market integrity are not served by statutory exceptions 
and defences which are unclear, imprecise and uncertain, and which may operate in limited 
but vague circumstances.   
 
The reforms that I recommend be made to Australian insider trading laws would remedy the 
difficulties identified in this chapter.  As has been noted, I propose that the operation of the 
general law be expressly excluded from the statutory regime applying insider trading laws to 
corporations, and that a new set of provisions be adopted to provide for a model of direct 
liability as the exclusive means for determining when a corporation possesses inside 
information, has knowledge that the information is inside information, and engages in the 
necessary trading conduct in relation to relevant financial products, and an amended version 
of the Chinese Wall defence for corporations would be incorporated into the Corporations 
Act.     
 
The proposed reforms would specifically provide that the only means by which a body 
corporate would be liable for the insider trading prohibitions in s 1043A are those set out in 
what would be a new s 1042G of the Corporations Act, to be entitled ‘Liability of Bodies 
Corporate’.  As well as excluding the operation of the general law, and the operation of s 
769B of the Corporations Act and Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code, a new s 1042G would 
specifically provide that a corporation would only be regarded as having engaged in insider 
trading if the person who possessed the information also had the requisite knowledge that it 
was inside information and engaged in, or authorised the prohibited trading conduct within 
the actual or apparent scope of their authority, or received advice from a person in 
possession of inside information.  However, there should be no liability for insider trading 
where a person who possesses inside information engages in the trading conduct if another 
person who did not possess the inside information was the person who made the decision 
that the trading should occur, so long as a person possessing the inside information did not 
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pass on that information or give advice about the transaction.  The new provisions would 
apply where an officer, employee or agent of a corporation possesses information, has the 
requisite knowledge and engages in the trading conduct on behalf of a corporation.  
Accordingly, the amended Chinese Wall defence would extend to agents, as well as to 
officers and employees, and would be a defence to all the forms of the prohibited conduct, 
not just trading in relevant financial products.  
 
In the final chapter of this thesis which follows, I set out in full the proposed reforms to better 
apply Australian insider trading laws to corporations.   
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 CHAPTER 7  
THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS FOR INSIDER TRADING IN 
AUSTRALIA: 
REFORM PROPOSALS 
 
In this thesis I have undertaken a review of the current system of the regulation of insider 
trading in Australia, including the rationale for the prohibition of insider trading, with a 
thorough consideration of the relevant principles of corporate criminal liability, and the 
application of insider trading laws to corporations.  I have undertaken a detailed analysis of 
the manner in which the elements of the insider trading offence are attributed to 
corporations, and the availability of the Chinese Wall defence for corporations, and 
described the resulting difficulties and problems which arise.  This chapter sets out in full my 
recommendations and proposals for the reform of Australia’s insider trading laws.   
 
Throughout this thesis I have demonstrated that Australia’s current insider trading laws are 
significantly flawed due to uncertainty in their application to corporations which arises in a 
number of ways - there is uncertainty as to which mechanisms, statutory or general law, are 
to be applied to determine when corporations possess information, have knowledge, and 
engage in the relevant conduct; the potential availability of several different attribution 
mechanisms applying a variety of tests results in significant uncertainty as to when the 
elements of the offence will be satisfied in relation to corporations; and there is also 
uncertainty in the manner and extent of the application of the Chinese Wall defence for 
corporations.  Since insider trading laws are intended to maintain and protect market 
integrity, which clearly requires certainty in the application of the insider trading offence to 
corporations, the law should be reformed in order to give better effect to this aim.   
 
As a result of the identified flaws in the current system of regulation, I propose three key 
reforms to Australian insider trading laws: that the operation of the general law be expressly 
excluded from the statutory regime applying insider trading laws to corporations; that a 
revised set of provisions be adopted to provide for a new model of direct liability as the 
exclusive means for determining when the elements of insider trading apply to a corporation; 
219 
 
and that an amended version of the Chinese Wall defence for corporations be adopted.  The 
new statutory provisions would provide greater clarity, be more consistent with the market 
integrity rationale for the prohibition of insider trading, and offer increased certainty for all 
affected and interested parties as to the intended operation of the law.   
 
In this concluding chapter, I will summarise the flaws in the current legislative regime which 
have been analysed and discussed in detail throughout this thesis. I will then set out in full 
my suggested amendments to the Corporations Act which are aimed at overcoming the 
identified flaws in the current regulatory regime.   Finally, I will explain in detail the nature of 
the reforms which I propose, providing reasons for the suggested amendments to the law, 
and discuss the ways in which they will address the identified problems with the current 
regime.  I will conclude this thesis with my thoughts on the potential impact of the adoption of 
the suggested amendments and the outcomes from the research undertaken in connection 
with this thesis. 
  
Flaws in the Current Regime  
 
As noted above, throughout this thesis I have identified three significant flaws in the 
application of Australian insider trading laws to corporations: (i) there is confusion as to 
which mechanisms are to be used to determine how the elements of the insider trading 
offence are applied to corporations; (ii) the different mechanisms which are available to 
apply the elements of the insider trading offence to corporations have conflicting and varying 
tests; and (iii) there are uncertainties and difficulties associated with the application of the 
Chinese Wall defence for corporations to insider trading. 
 
In chapter 5 of this thesis, I discussed the manner in which the key elements of the insider 
trading offence – the possession of information, the requisite knowledge and the necessary 
conduct – are applied to corporations.  One of the main flaws identified was the confusion as 
to the manner in which these elements are actually to be applied to corporations.  A careful 
review of these elements leads to the necessary conclusion that both the statutory 
provisions and general law rules operate concurrently to provide a variety of mechanisms 
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which can be used to establish that a corporation possesses inside information, has 
knowledge that the information is not generally available and is likely to be material, and has 
traded or procured trading in relevant financial products, or tipped.  The Corporations Act is 
silent on the application of the general law to the statutory offence of insider trading, but the 
operation of the general law is not excluded when determining how the insider trading laws 
apply to corporations.  Cases interpreting other pieces of legislation which use the same or 
very similar provisions make it clear that the general law is not intended to be excluded and, 
in order to make sense of other provisions of the Corporations Act, it is necessary to infer 
that the general law is also intended to apply.  However, there is widespread confusion as to 
whether and how this is to occur.  In ASIC v Citigroup, Jacobson J considered only one of 
the potentially applicable statutory provisions of the Corporations Act when determining 
whether the information allegedly possessed by a proprietary trader acting on behalf of 
Citigroup was possessed by the corporation, and did not consider the potential application of 
the general law at all.1  Meanwhile, some commentators do regard the general law as 
relevant, but suggest that it is to be used to rebut statutory presumptions which might 
otherwise apply elements of the offence to a corporation.2   
 
Even when considering the statutory tests alone, there is confusion as to which of those 
tests relate to the possession of information and which relate to the requisite knowledge.  
Some commentators3 consider s 1042G(1)(b) of the Corporations Act to apply when 
attempting to determine whether a corporation had the requisite knowledge rather than the 
1 ASIC v Citigroup (2007) 160 FCR 35, 99. 
2 See, for example, Charles Zhen Qu, ‘How Statutory Civil Liability is Attributed to a Company: An Australian 
Perspective Focusing on Civil Liability for Insider Trading by Corporations’ (2006) 32 Monash Law Review 177, 
191. 
3 See, for example, Gregory Lyon and Jean J du Plessis, The Law of Insider Trading in Australia (Federation 
Press, 2005) 57; Ashley Black, ‘The Reform of Insider Trading Law in Australia’ (1992) 15 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 214, 255. 
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possession of information, whereas others4 regard it as applicable to both the possession of 
information and the requisite knowledge.  This uncertainty needs to be resolved. 
 
I have demonstrated in this thesis that a wide variety of mechanisms, both statutory and 
general law, are potentially available to apply the elements of the insider trading offence to a 
corporation.  As discussed in chapter 5, each of the various available statutory mechanisms 
applies a different set of tests - some require that, for the possession of information, 
knowledge or conduct of a natural person to be applied to a corporation, the natural person 
must be an officer of that corporation,5 whereas others will operate in respect of any 
employee or agent who is able to act on the corporation’s behalf.6  Some require that there 
be a link or nexus with the person's role within the corporation.7  Some require that the 
possession of information or knowledge must be linked to the relevant conduct,8 while others 
do not.9  Significant uncertainty is created by having many overlapping statutory 
mechanisms with a variety of different requirements.  This uncertainty is further compounded 
when the general law mechanisms are also considered, as the principles of the identification 
doctrine require only that the relevant person who possesses the information, has the 
requisite knowledge or engages in the relevant conduct be the ‘directing mind and will’ of the 
corporation, with no necessary connection with their role or other elements of the offence.  
This gives rise to additional uncertainty as to the circumstances in which the elements of the 
insider trading offence are to be applied to a corporation, and that uncertainty needs to be 
resolved.   
 
4 See, for example, Robert P Austin and Ian M Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 16th ed, 2014) [9.630]; J P Hambrook, ‘Market Misconduct and Offences’ in LexisNexis, 
Australian Corporations Law Principles and Practice [7.13.0145]. 
5 See, for example, Corporations Act, ss 1042G(1)(b) and 1042G(1)(c).  
6 See, for example, Corporations Act, ss 769B(1) and 769B(3). 
7 See, for example, Corporations Act, ss 1042G(1)b) and 1042G(1)(c); Corporations Act, ss 769B(3) and 
769B(1). 
8 See, for example, Corporations Act, s 769B(3). 
9 See, for example, Corporations Act, ss 1042G(1)(b), 1042G(1)(c) and 769B(1). 
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The adoption of a new set of provisions which would provide the only mechanism for 
applying insider trading laws to corporations would resolve the existing uncertainties and 
would also implement the following changes to the application of those trading laws: (i) there 
would no longer be any requirement for a nexus between a natural person’s role or position 
for information they come to possess or knowledge they have to be attributed to a 
corporation; (ii) a corporation could have liability for insider trading as a result of information 
possessed, knowledge held and conduct engaged in by any officer, employee or agent of 
the corporation; (iii) the trading element would continue to require that the conduct occur 
within the scope of a person’s authority, or was undertaken with the authorisation of a 
person with authority, on behalf of the corporation; and (iv) there would be a new 
requirement for a link between the possession of information, knowledge and conduct, as it 
would be necessary that the same natural person possess the inside information, have the 
requisite knowledge and engage in the relevant conduct for it to be attributed to a 
corporation, removing the possibility of aggregation. 
 
The uncertainties concerning the manner in which the elements of the insider trading offence 
are applied to corporations are further exacerbated by the fact that the primary defence to 
insider trading for corporations - the Chinese Wall defence – is expressed in vague terms 
which appear to have inconsistencies with the statutory provisions.  As discussed in chapter 
6, s 1043F of the Corporations Act, which sets out the Chinese Wall defence for 
corporations, refers to ‘information in the possession of an officer or an employee’ even 
though s 1042G(1)(a) of the Corporations Act, which sets out the circumstances in which a 
corporation is taken to possess information, refers only to information in possession of an 
officer of a body corporate.  Although this inconsistency may be overcome by either inferring 
that s 1042G does not provide an exclusive mechanism for attributing the possession of 
information, and that other statutory provisions and the general law might apply where an 
employee and not an office of a corporation possesses information, or by assuming that the 
discrepancy results from a drafting error, the uncertainty created requires clarification and 
resolution.   
The reference to ‘an officer or an employee’ in s 1043F of the Corporations Act also creates 
a further gap in the application of the defence, because though s 769B(3) of the 
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Corporations Act can apply so that a corporation may have liability for insider trading where 
information is possessed by an agent, the Chinese Wall defence will not be available if that 
agent is not also an officer or employee of the corporation.  
There is additional uncertainty created by the fact that the Chinese Wall defence does not 
extend to the procuring of trading, but only the actual act of trading.  This occurs because 
the Chinese Wall defence only applies to a corporation’s ‘decision to enter a transaction or 
agreement’ made ‘on its behalf’ by an employee or officer.  A person who procures trading 
by another is not necessarily the person who makes the ultimate ‘decision to enter a 
transaction or agreement’ on that other person’s behalf unless they are also the ultimate 
decision-maker for that other person (for example, if the other person is a corporation 
controlled by that person).  A person who merely ‘encourages’ another person to trade in 
securities will be regarded as procuring that other person to trade,10 but the ultimate decision 
is still made by that other person.  As there appears to be no rationale for applying the 
Chinese Wall defence to trading only, and not the procuring of trading, and the gap appears 
to be ‘the result of a legislative oversight’,11 this inconsistency, along with the other 
uncertainties in the application of the Chinese Wall defence, needs to be corrected. 
 
The uncertainty resulting from the confusion as to which mechanisms are to be used to 
apply the elements of the insider trading offence to corporations, the differing nature of the 
tests applied by those various mechanisms, and the lack of clarity as to the application and 
availability of the Chinese Wall defence, is detrimental to the accepted rationale for the 
prohibition of insider trading, being the protection and maintenance of market integrity. The 
uncertainty that these various factors create is problematic, not only for those corporations 
which may be accused of having engaged in insider trading, but also for regulators 
responsible for supervising securities markets and taking action against market misconduct, 
as well as the many participants in the securities market who are entitled to have confidence 
10 Section 1042F of the Corporations Act defines ‘procure’ as follows: For the purposes of this Division, but 
without limiting the meaning that the expression procure has apart from this section, if a person incites, 
induces, or encourages an act or omission by another person, the first-mentioned person is taken to procure 
the act or omission by the other person. 
11 CAMAC, Insider Trading Report (2003), 2 and 7. 
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in the integrity of that market.  As noted earlier in this thesis, insider trading damages market 
integrity because it prevents the market from operating freely and fairly, with ‘all parties 
having equal access to relevant information.’12  A belief by potential investors and market 
participants that insiders have an informational advantage and unfair opportunities to trade 
in securities reduces investor confidence in market integrity, and therefore may also reduce 
investor participation in securities markets.13  Thus, the particular statutory provisions which 
regulate insider trading and apply the prohibition to corporations should also be directed to 
the aim of protecting and maintaining market integrity.  This requires that there be certainty 
for all affected and interested parties as to the manner in which insider trading laws apply to 
corporations.  Unfortunately, this is not currently the case.  As has been noted by CAMAC: 
 
Insider trading laws also need to be clear and workable, so that all parties know where 
they stand. For instance, corporate managers, financial services providers and legal 
advisers should not be subject to undue uncertainty in their ability to deal in securities in 
conformity with the law, or advise on that law. Lack of clarity may result in reduced 
compliance as well as unproductive uncertainty for the market.14 
 
While CAMAC was referring to the general operation of Australian insider trading laws, these 
comments are particularly relevant to the application of those laws to corporations, which 
has been demonstrated to be unclear and uncertain.  Additionally, in order for there to be 
appropriate oversight of securities markets, and to enable the detection and prosecution of 
unlawful conduct, regulators must also have certainty as to the application of insider trading 
laws to corporations.  The protection and maintenance of market integrity will also ensure 
that Australia’s securities markets remain internationally competitive. 
12 Mansfield and Kizon v R (2012) 87 ALJR 20, [45] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) as identified in 1981 
in the Campbell Inquiry Report, 382, and approved in 1989 in the Griffiths Report, 17. 
13 See, for example, ASIC, Consultation Paper 68 ‘Competition for Market Services – Trading in Listed 
Securities and Related Data’ (2007); Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, ‘The World Price of Insider 
Trading’ (2002) 57 Journal of Finance 75;  Laura Nyantung Beny, ‘Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets 
Around the World: An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate’ (2007) 32 Journal 
of Corporation Law 237.   
14 CAMAC, Insider Trading Discussion Paper (2001) [0.5]. 
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Accordingly, I propose that the current regulatory regime prohibiting insider trading be 
amended so that it applies to corporations in the following ways: (i) the operation of the 
general law should be expressly excluded; (ii) new statutory provisions which apply the 
elements of insider trading - the possession of information, the requisite knowledge and the 
necessary conduct - to corporations are to replace the current provisions of the Corporations 
Act; and (iii) the Chinese Wall defence to insider trading should be redrafted.   
 
Proposed New Provisions of the Corporations Act 
 
In order to address the identified flaws in the current regulatory regime relating to corporate 
criminal liability for insider trading, I propose that the following amendments be made to the 
Corporations Act:  
 
(a) Section 1042G of the Corporations Act, entitled ‘Information in possession of a 
body corporate’, should be amended by deleting paragraphs (a), (b) and (c).  
Paragraph (d) relates only to s 1043M(2)(b), so this paragraph should be moved to 
become a new paragraph (4) of s 1043M, with some amendments.15 
 
(b) Section 1042G of the Corporations Act should be renamed ‘Liability of Bodies 
Corporate’, the existing paragraphs should be deleted, and new paragraphs 
should be inserted. 
 
15 As noted earlier in this thesis, s 1043M of the Corporations Act sets out several defences to a prosecution for 
insider trading and s 1043M(2) provides that: 
In a prosecution brought against a person for an offence based on subsection 1043A(1) because 
the person entered into, or procured another person to enter into, a transaction or agreement at a 
time when certain information was in the first mentioned person’s possession: 
…(b) it is a defence if the other party to the transaction or agreement knew, or ought 
reasonably to have known, of the information before entering into the transaction or 
agreement.  
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(c) Section 1043F of the Corporations Act, entitled ‘Chinese Wall arrangements by 
bodies corporate’ should be amended by deleting the existing paragraphs and 
inserting new paragraphs. 
 
To the maximum extent possible, for the purposes of consistency and ease of reference, I 
have used language similar to that already employed within the Corporations Act.  It is 
proposed that the new amendments would read as follows: 
 
Section 1043M: 
 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b), a body corporate is taken to have known, or 
to ought reasonably to have known, of the relevant information if an officer, 
employee or agent of the body corporate who was aware of the body corporate’s 
entry into the transaction or agreement knew or ought reasonably to have known 
of the relevant information. 
  
Section 1042G:  
Liability of Bodies Corporate 
 
(1) This section sets out the only means by which a body corporate will be liable for 
the purposes of the prohibitions in section 1043A.  For the avoidance of doubt, 
section 769B of this Act and Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code do not apply in relation 
to the prohibitions in section 1043A.   
 
(2) A body corporate is taken to possess information for the purposes of section 
1043A(1) and (2) if an officer, employee or agent of the body corporate possesses 
the information. 
 
(3) A body corporate is taken to know, or to ought reasonably to know, that the 
matters specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of inside information in 
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section 1042A are satisfied in relation to the information if an officer, employee or 
agent of the body corporate knows, or ought reasonably to know, those matters. 
 
(4) A body corporate is taken to engage in the conduct set out in section 1043A(1)(c) 
or (d), or section 1043A(2)(c) or (d), if: 
 
(a) an officer, employee or agent of the body corporate engages in the 
conduct on behalf of the body corporate within the scope of his or her 
actual or apparent authority; or 
 
(b) any person engages in the conduct on behalf of the body corporate with 
the authorisation of an officer, employee or agent of the body corporate.  
 
(5) For the purposes of paragraph (4), conduct is taken to be authorised by an officer, 
employee or agent of a body corporate if the conduct is undertaken at that 
person’s direction, or with that person’s consent or agreement (whether express or 
implied) where the giving of the direction, consent or agreement is within the 
scope of the actual or apparent authority of that person. 
 
(6) A body corporate will only be in breach of a prohibition in section 1043A if a 
person who possesses inside information which the body corporate is taken to 
possess pursuant to paragraph (2) also: 
 
(a)  knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the matters specified in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of inside information in section 
1042A are satisfied in relation to the information so that the body 
corporate would be taken to know, or to ought reasonably to know, those 
matters in accordance with paragraph (3); and  
 
(b) either: 
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(i) engages in the conduct on behalf of the body corporate in 
accordance with paragraph (4)(a);  
  
(ii) authorises another person to engage in the conduct on behalf of 
the body corporate in accordance with paragraph (4)(b); or 
 
(iii)  gives advice about the conduct to a person: 
 
(A) who engages in the conduct on behalf of the body 
corporate in accordance with paragraph (4)(a); or 
 
(B) authorises another person to engage in the conduct on 
behalf of the body corporate in accordance with 
paragraph (4)(b).   
 
Section 1043F  
Chinese Wall Arrangements by Bodies Corporate 
 
A body corporate does not contravene subsection 1043A(1) or (2) by engaging in the 
conduct set out in section 1043A(1)(c) or (d), or section 1043A(2)(c) or (d) at a time when 
inside information is possessed by an officer, employee or agent of the body corporate if: 
 
(a) the decision to engage in the conduct was made by a person who did not possess 
the inside information; 
 
(b) it had in operation at the time arrangements that could reasonably be expected to 
ensure that the inside information was not communicated to the person who 
decided to engage in the conduct; and 
 
(c) no advice about the conduct was given to the person who decided to engage in 
the conduct by a person who possessed the inside information. 
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Nature of the Proposed Reforms  
 
A detailed explanation of the nature of each of the proposed amendments follows, including 
a description of the relevant statutory provision, the ways in which it will change the state of 
the current law and the reasons why the amendment is necessary.   
 
Exclusion of the General Law  
 
Some of the current confusion regarding which mechanisms are to be used to apply the 
elements of the insider trading offence to corporations would be alleviated by excluding the 
application of the general law.  This would be done by codifying the insider trading offence in 
relation to corporations, to make it clear that only particular statutory provisions of the 
Corporations Act apply in relation to corporate liability for insider trading.  While this might 
initially appear to narrow the scope of the application of the insider trading laws, it is also 
proposed to redraft the statutory provisions to widen their current application.  Thus, greater 
certainty would be provided without reducing the potential to apply the law to corporations 
where appropriate.  In particular, it would be clear that general law principles of agency and 
the identification doctrine would not be available to be utilised as separate mechanisms for 
determining when a corporation has engaged in insider trading, and the demonstrated 
difficulties in attempting to apply those general law rules would therefore be avoided.  
 
Even though there are other areas of the law which do not exclude the general law and allow 
the statutory and general law rules to operate concurrently – as has been indicated by a 
review of other pieces of legislation which use the same or similar wording as the current 
provisions of the Corporations Act – this does not mean that the insider trading regime must 
continue to allow the general law to apply.  While it would not necessarily be desirable for 
insider trading laws to exclude the general law when other pieces of legislation which use 
the same statutory provisions allow the general law to apply, clear language would avoid any 
difficulties of interpretation and, in the interests of clarity and certainty, a more definitive 
regime is required for corporate criminal liability for insider trading. 
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The proposed amendments would result in only one set of statutory provisions to be used to 
apply the elements of the insider trading offence to corporations.  Currently there are 
multiple statutory provisions which may apply, which causes significant confusion and 
uncertainty.  The general principles of corporate criminal responsibility contained in the 
Criminal Code are currently excluded and therefore do not apply to the operation of the 
present insider trading provisions.  Under the proposed new provisions, the Criminal Code 
provisions relating to corporate criminal liability would continue to be excluded and the 
provisions in s 769B of the Corporations Act would also be excluded. 
    
Continued Exclusion of the Criminal Code 
 
I argue that it is not appropriate to adopt the currently excluded provisions of Part 2.5 of the 
Criminal Code relating to corporate criminal liability for insider trading.  As has been noted 
earlier in this thesis, in relation to physical elements - with the physical element for the 
insider trading offence being the possession of information16 - the Criminal Code provides 
that: 
 
If a physical element of an offence is committed by an employee, agent or officer of a 
body corporate acting within the actual or apparent scope of his or her employment, or 
within his or her actual or apparent authority, the physical element must also be attributed 
to the body corporate.17 
 
This provision, while it differs from the other mechanisms available to determine when a 
corporation is in possession of inside information, would still import some concepts which 
have been identified as causing uncertainty – for example, that the relevant employee, agent 
or officer must come into possession of the information within the scope of his or her 
employment or within his or her actual authority.     
 
16 Corporations Act, s 1043A(3). 
17 Criminal Code, s 12.2. 
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In relation to fault elements - with the fault element for the insider trading offence being the 
knowledge that certain information is inside information18 - the Criminal Code provides that: 
 
If intention, knowledge or recklessness is a fault element in relation to a physical element 
of an offence, that fault element must be attributed to a body corporate that expressly, 
tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the offence.19 
 
It then sets out a variety of ways in which such authorisation or permission might occur. 20 
However, as with the physical element, the adoption of such provisions for insider trading 
would not improve the position of uncertainty which currently exists, as it is not clear how it 
would be demonstrated, for example, that a corporate culture existed that ‘directed, 
encouraged, tolerated or led to’ insider trading.  Instead, my proposed model specifically 
sets out the way in which the fault element would be proved for insider trading.   As the 
insider trading laws are intended to maintain and protect market integrity, it is most 
appropriate to ultilise a particular set of provisions focused on achieving that rationale, rather 
than relying on the general statutory provisions applicable to the majority of Commonwealth 
criminal offences, which do not necessarily have similar aims or appropriate application to 
the insider trading offence. 
 
18 Corporations Act, s 1043A(3). 
19 Criminal Code, s 12.3(1). 
20 Section 12.3(2) of the Criminal Code provides as follows: 
The means by which such an authorisation or permission may be established include:  
(a) proving that the body corporate's board of directors intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
carried out the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted 
the commission of the offence; or  
(b) proving that a high managerial agent of the body corporate intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly engaged in the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or 
permitted the commission of the offence; or  
  (c) proving that a corporate culture existed within the body corporate that directed, 
encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision; or  
(d) proving that the body corporate failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that 
required compliance with the relevant provision.  
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Exclusion of section 769B of the Corporations Act  
 
The provisions of s 769B will be excluded in order to allow for a single set of mechanisms 
within the Corporations Act to apply liability for insider trading to corporations.  It has been 
noted throughout this thesis that the operation of multiple different mechanisms for 
attributing liability for insider trading liability to corporations causes significant uncertainty 
and confusion.  Instead of continuing to allow the provisions in s 769B to operate in addition 
to those contained in the current s 1042G of the Corporations Act, relevant aspects of s 
769B would be incorporated into the new provisions to be contained in the new amended s 
1042G.          
 
No Requirement for Nexus with Role or Position for Information or Knowledge  
 
A link or nexus with the person’s role within the corporation would not be required in relation 
to the possession of information or knowledge.  It is consistent with the protection and 
maintenance of market integrity that the new statutory provisions for corporate criminal 
liability for insider trading should not contain any requirement for a link or nexus with the role 
or responsibilities of the natural person within a corporation whose information or knowledge 
is being attributed to the corporation.  If an officer, employee or agent of a corporation 
possesses inside information, the corporation should not be able to benefit from the use of 
that information, regardless of the manner in which they came to possess it.  It is irrelevant 
whether they acquired the information in a private or professional capacity if the corporation 
is to potentially receive an advantage.  Natural persons who come to possess inside 
information cannot use it for their own benefit, or that of another person, if they came to 
possess the information in a personal rather than professional capacity, and corporations 
should be placed in the same position for consistency and clarity.    
 
Attribution is Possible for all Officers, Employees and Agents of a Corporation 
 
The new rules would apply to all officers, employees and agents of a corporation, and would 
not be limited to executives or senior management within a corporation. This is a significant 
233 
 
extension from the current provisions of s 1042G of the Corporations Act, which currently 
only provides that a corporation will possess information if it is possessed by an officer.  
However, s 769B of the Corporations Act attributes a’ state of mind’ to a corporation under s 
769B(3) if an officer, employee or agent had the state of mind and engaged in the relevant 
conduct.  Similarly, s 769B(1) applies the conduct of an officer, employee or agent acting 
with authority or authorisation to a corporation.    
 
The new statutory provisions would make no distinction between the different positions that 
a person might hold within an organisation.  This is to ensure that the operation of the law is 
not avoided by ensuring that certain activities are only carried out by junior employees or 
agents of a corporation, or by the altering of position descriptions or job titles.  Since the 
intent of the law is to maintain and protect market integrity, the relevant consideration is 
whether a corporation obtains an informational advantage, to which the position that a 
person within the organisation might hold is irrelevant.  Corporations would be protected 
from liability for the actions of ‘rogue’ employees, or those who might carry out activities 
beyond their limits of authority by a requirement that the relevant trading conduct occur 
within the scope of a person’s authority (regardless of whether they are an officer, employee 
or agent of the corporation) or with the authorisation of another person who is acting with 
appropriate authority.    
 
Conduct Must Occur within the Scope of Authority or with Authorisation of a Person 
with Authority, on Behalf of Corporation 
 
Although information possessed by an officer, employee or agent of a corporation would no 
longer need to have been acquired in circumstances which have a nexus with the position or 
role of that person, the trading element would maintain a requirement that the conduct 
occurred within the scope of the authority of the relevant officer, employee or agent (or was 
undertaken with the authorisation of a person with authority) on behalf of the corporation.  
This mirrors the conduct requirements which currently exist in s 769B(1) of the Corporations 
Act which, for the sake of clarity and certainty, will be excluded from the operation of the 
insider trading provisions as a result of the proposed reforms.  As noted above, this 
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requirement would ensure that corporations would be protected from liability for the actions 
of ‘rogue’ employees, or those acting without authority or authorisation, while still ensuring 
that a corporation has liability where it would obtain an unfair informational advantage.  As 
with the other proposed amendments, this requirement is consistent with the maintenance 
and protection of market integrity. 
 
Link Between the Possession of Information, Knowledge and Conduct 
 
The new provisions would require a link between possession of information, knowledge and 
conduct – there would only be liability for insider trading by a corporation where the same 
officer, employee or agent who possesses inside information also knows, or ought 
reasonably to know, that it is inside information and either carries out or authorises the 
relevant conduct.  If one person within a corporation possesses inside information but does 
not use it, and another person elsewhere in the corporation does not possess or know about 
the inside information but does trade in affected securities on the corporation’s behalf, 
neither person has sought to obtain an unfair advantage for the corporation, and the 
corporation cannot be said to have obtained such an advantage.  If a natural person who 
trades (or decides to trade) on a corporation’s behalf has no inside information, and 
therefore no unfair informational advantage, the rationale for the prohibition of insider trading 
is not infringed.  However, if a person who possesses inside information gives advice to a 
person who trades (or decides to trade) on a corporation’s behalf, the corporation receives 
the benefit of the information and there is a loss of market fairness – accordingly, this would 
also be regarded as conduct which should be caught by the application of insider trading 
laws to corporations.   
 
Direct Model of Corporate Criminal Liability for Insider Trading 
 
The codified and clearer tests described above which would be used to attribute the 
possession of information, knowledge and conduct to corporations under the proposed 
amendments would make it easier to determine when that attribution is likely to occur and 
therefore when a corporation would be in breach of the insider trading prohibition.  A direct 
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model of corporate criminal liability would be utilised, so that the possession of information, 
knowledge and conduct of the relevant officer, employee or agent would be taken to be that 
of the corporation.  A direct model of liability has been chosen because it is consistent with 
the underlying rationale for the insider trading prohibition, being the protection and 
maintenance of market integrity, rather than a model reliant on principles of vicarious liability 
or aggregation.    
 
Under the direct model proposed, a corporation would have liability for insider trading where 
it is regarded as having engaged in the prohibited conduct itself through the information, 
knowledge and conduct of an authorised officer, employee or agent.  It is only in these 
circumstances that a corporation can be considered to obtain an unfair advantage over other 
participants in securities markets.  The resulting amendments would give much greater 
certainty in the application of the insider trading laws to corporations. 
     
Redrafting of the Chinese Wall Defence 
 
The identified problems with the Chinese Wall defence in s 1043F of the Corporations Act 
require a redrafting of this provision.   
 
The redrafted s 1043F would apply as a defence to both trading and the procuring of trading, 
if the relevant requirements are satisfied, closing the previous loophole which did not extend 
the application of the defence to the procuring of trading.  Having proposed amendments to 
s 1042G of the Corporations Act in relation to the liability of bodies corporate for insider 
trading, the previous problem of s 1042G referring to information in the possession of 
‘officers and employees’ and s 1043F referring only to information in the possession of 
‘officers’ would be resolved, as the new provisions will apply to information in the possession 
of officers, employee or agents, so long as they also have the requisite knowledge and are 
carrying out the relevant conduct within his or her authority, or with authorisation from a 
person with authority.   
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The Chinese Wall defence would apply so long as the person who made the decision to 
engage in the conduct (that is, the decision that the corporation engage in the relevant 
trading conduct) did not possess inside information; sufficient Chinese Wall arrangements 
were in place; and no advice about the conduct was given to the person who made that 
decision by a person who possessed inside information.  The defence provides an additional 
protection to corporations where a person within a corporation may possess information 
which they know to be inside information and may trade or procure trading in relevant 
financial products on a corporation’s behalf, but do so only at the direction of another person 
who does not possess the information.  Even if they engage in trading at the direction of 
another person who does not possess the inside information, there would be no liability for 
the corporation if appropriate Chinese Wall arrangements are in place and no advice is 
given by the person who possesses the inside information.  This is consistent with the 
market integrity rationale for the prohibition of insider trading, because the corporation is 
receiving no benefit or unfair advantage as a result of the person possessing the 
information.   
 
Amendments concerning section 1043M of the Corporations Act 
 
A final amendment is needed in relation to s 1043M of the Corporations Act, which provides 
a defence to insider trading where the other party to a trade was also aware of the relevant 
inside information.  It has been noted in this thesis that it is very difficult to demonstrate that 
a person ‘ought reasonably to know’ something because of their position.  Consistent with 
the amendments already described, it should not be relevant how a person comes to know 
certain inside information, but the person who knows or ought reasonably to know of the 
inside information should also have to be aware of the corporation’s entry into the relevant 
transaction or agreement, in order for such a defence to apply.  Accordingly, it is proposed 
that the new s 1043M(2) be adopted to incorporate the concepts previously contained in s 
1042G(1)(d) but to provide that a corporation will be taken to know or to ought reasonably to 
know of the relevant inside information if an officer, employee or agent who was aware of 
the corporation’s entry into the relevant transaction or agreement knew or ought reasonably 
to have known of the relevant information.  This will make the various statutory provisions 
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relating to corporate criminal liability for insider trading and the applicable defences 
consistent.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The detailed study of the application of Australian insider trading laws to corporations 
undertaken throughout this thesis has revealed a number of flaws in the current regime, in 
the form of inconsistencies, issues of uncertainty, difficulties of interpretation and 
unnecessary complexities.  Australia’s insider trading laws are generally considered to be 
overly complex and legalistic, and the application of those laws to corporations is equally 
difficult, if not more so.  It has been demonstrated in this thesis that the insider trading laws 
of Australia, and those of a number of other jurisdictions, are intended to safeguard market 
integrity, but the uncertainty which exists under the current application of insider trading laws 
to corporations makes it difficult to have the necessary confidence that such laws are 
serving their purpose, particularly in light of the absence of a successful set of insider trading 
proceedings against a corporation.   
 
The primary flaws of the current regime have been shown to be the uncertainty as to which 
of the various statutory and general law mechanisms are to be applied in respect of the 
various elements of the insider trading offence, and the widely varying tests which are used 
for each of the different mechanisms, making it difficult to determine when a corporation 
engages in insider trading, compounded by the lack of clarity as to the availability of the 
Chinese Wall defence for corporations.  This chapter has set out my proposals for the reform 
of Australia’s insider trading laws, to improve their application to corporations in a manner 
that is consistent with the market integrity rationale for the prohibition of insider trading.  The 
three key reforms which I have proposed – the exclusion of the general law, the 
implementation of a new set of exclusive statutory mechanisms for applying insider trading 
laws to corporations, and the adoption of an amended Chinese Wall defence – remove the 
existing uncertainty and create a new model of applying insider trading laws that is more 
certain, but less complex, than the current provisions.   
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As well as applying the elements of the insider trading offence to corporations more 
effectively and appropriately, the reforms proposed in this thesis have the potential to bring 
additional benefits.  Despite the fact that 42 individuals have been convicted of insider 
trading, there have been no successful proceedings brought against a corporation in 
Australia.  Worldwide, there has been no corporation convicted of insider trading.  While 
there may be various reasons for the absence of any such conviction, it is unlikely that it is 
due to a lack of any criminal conduct by or within corporations.  It is more likely that 
uncertainties as to the operation and effect of insider trading laws deter prosecutors and 
regulators from bringing such actions, and instead choose to focus their enforcement 
activities on individual offenders.  While the proposed reforms are not intended to lead to a 
greater number of insider trading prosecutions against corporations for their own sake, the 
resulting improvements in the clarity and certainty of the content of insider trading laws as 
they apply to corporations will better enable regulators to contemplate bringing enforcement 
action against corporations where appropriate.  If corporations are seen to be the subject of 
insider trading enforcement action, the deterrent effect for all potential offenders, whether 
natural persons or legal persons, is more likely to be increased.  
 
If the reforms proposed in this thesis were adopted, it would also result in Australia having a 
model system of insider trading laws for corporations of international significance and 
relevance which would demonstrate ‘best practice’ in insider trading regulation.  In an 
increasingly globalised world, in which trans-national corporations are able to conduct 
businesses across many countries, insider trading is not necessarily limited to national 
borders or conducted locally.  As almost all jurisdictions with established securities 
exchanges prohibit insider trading, and apply that prohibition to corporations, Australia’s new 
regime could serve as a best practice example for other jurisdictions.  Additionally, as the 
new laws have been developed with the objective of maintaining and protecting market 
integrity, Australia’s securities markets would be better safeguarded, enabling Australia to 
remain competitive in the global economy.    
 
The impact of the possible adoption of the proposed reforms on corporations themselves 
should not be forgotten.  All who operate within our securities markets are entitled to the 
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benefit of market integrity and certainty as to the operation and application of the relevant 
laws, including corporate participants.  Corporations will be better placed to take action to 
ensure that their officers, employees and agents comply with the law, and do not engage in 
any conduct which would result in the corporation committing an offence, if the operation 
and application of the law is made more certain.   
 
While completing this thesis, it became increasingly clear to me that the flaws in Australia’s 
system of insider trading regulation are not limited to the application of those laws to 
corporations.  Indeed, there are a number of issues identified in this thesis that were beyond 
the scope of the topic considered, but which would lend themselves to future research and 
law reform proposals – the nature of the ‘possession’ of inside information; the divergence 
between the concept of ‘awareness’ under insider trading laws and continuous disclosure 
obligations; and the determination of the ‘materiality’ of information.   
 
The current legislative provisions state that insider trading occurs when a person 
‘possesses’ inside information, yet it is clear from relevant case law that an ‘element of 
awareness’ is necessary before an offence is committed.  As ordinary criminal law concepts 
of possession do not necessarily import a notion of awareness, should the legislation 
continue to be framed in terms of the ‘possession’ of information, or is it time to recraft this 
element of the offence? 
 
It is clear that insider trading laws and continuous disclosure obligations are both intended to 
contribute to the integrity of securities markets.  However, the two systems of regulation do 
differ in their treatment of the concept of ‘awareness’.  Under the ASX Listing Rules, a 
corporation is regarded as being ‘aware’ of information where an officer of the corporation 
‘ought reasonably to have come into possession of the information’ but the insider trading 
laws require there to be actual awareness of the information.  Should both sets of rules be 
reviewed with a view to achieving greater consistency of application as well as purpose? 
 
The tests for determining when a person would expect information to have a ‘material’ effect 
are clumsy and convoluted.  How is a person to know, or to ought reasonably to know, what 
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a reasonable person would expect the effect of certain information to be on the price or 
value of financial products?  With the knowledge element of the offence acknowledged as 
one of the key difficulties in prosecuting insider trading, would a reconsideration of the 
concept of a ‘reasonable investor’ be timely?  
 
The adoption of the reforms proposed in this thesis would not resolve the further questions 
posed, but would create an opportunity and impetus for additional reform of insider trading 
laws.  It is hoped that the ideas expounded in this thesis will lead to a renewed interest in 
corporate criminal liability for insider trading, and the regulation of insider trading in general, 
and stimulate further academic discussion and research on a significant, but challenging and 
complex topic.  
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APPENDIX 1 
AUSTRALIAN INSIDER TRADING LAWS 
EXTRACTS FROM THE CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 (CTH) 
 
Section 1042A - Definitions   
 
In this Division:  
 
“able to be traded” has a meaning affected by section 1042E.  
 
“Division 3 financial products” means:  
                     (a)  securities; or  
                     (b)  derivatives; or  
                     (c)  interests in a managed investment scheme; or  
                    (ca) debentures, stocks or bonds issued or proposed to be issued by a government; or  
                     (d)  superannuation products, other than those prescribed by regulations made for the 
purposes of this paragraph; or  
                     (e)  any other financial products that are able to be traded on a financial market.  
 
“generally available”, in relation to information, has the meaning given by section 1042C.  
 
“information” includes:  
                     (a)  matters of supposition and other matters that are insufficiently definite to warrant being 
made known to the public; and  
                     (b)  matters relating to the intentions, or likely intentions, of a person.  
 
“inside information” means information in relation to which the following paragraphs are satisfied:  
                     (a)  the information is not generally available;  
                     (b)  if the information were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a 
material effect on the price or value of particular Division 3 financial products.  
 
“material effect”, in relation to a reasonable person’s expectations of the effect of information on the 
price or value of Division 3 financial products, has the meaning given by section 1042D.  
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“procure” has a meaning affected by section 1042F.  
 
“relevant Division 3 financial products”, in relation to particular inside information, means the 
Division 3 financial products referred to in paragraph (b) of the definition of inside information.  
 
Section 1042C - When information is generally available 
  
(1) For the purposes of this Division, information is generally available if:  
 
(a)  it consists of readily observable matter; or  
 
(b)   both of the following subparagraphs apply:  
 
(i) it has been made known in a manner that would, or would be likely to, 
bring it to the attention of persons who commonly invest in Division 3 
financial products of a kind whose price might be affected by the 
information; and 
(ii) since it was made known, a reasonable period for it to be disseminated 
among such persons has elapsed; or 
 
(c) it consists of deductions, conclusions or inferences made or drawn from either or 
both of the following: 
 
(i) information referred to in paragraph (a); 
(ii) information made known as mentioned in subparagraph (b)(i).  
 
(2) None of the paragraphs of subsection (1) limits the generality of any of the other paragraphs 
of that subsection.  
 
Section 1042D - When a reasonable person would take information to have a material effect 
on price or value of Division 3 financial products  
 
For the purposes of this Division, a reasonable person would be taken to expect information to have 
a material effect on the price or value of particular Division 3 financial products if (and only if) the 
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information would, or would be likely to, influence persons who commonly acquire Division 3 financial 
products in deciding whether or not to acquire or dispose of the first-mentioned financial products.  
 
Section 1042F - Inciting, inducing or encouraging an act or omission constitutes procuring 
the omission  
 
(1) For the purposes of this Division, but without limiting the meaning that the expression 
procure has apart from this section, if a person incites, induces, or encourages an act or 
omission by another person, the first-mentioned person is taken to procure the act or 
omission by the other person.  
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not limit the application in relation to provisions in this Division of:  
(a) section 6 of the Crimes Act 1914; or 
(b)   section 11.1, 11.2, 11.2A, 11.4 or 11.5 of the Criminal Code.  
 
Section 1042G - Information in possession of officer of body corporate  
 
(1) For the purposes of this Division:  
 
(a) a body corporate is taken to possess any information which an 
officer of the body corporate possesses and which came into his or 
her possession in the course of the performance of duties as such 
an officer; and  
 
(b) if an officer of a body corporate knows any matter or thing because 
he or she is an officer of the body corporate, it is to be presumed 
that the body corporate knows that matter or thing; and 
 
(c) if an officer of a body corporate, in that capacity, is reckless as to a 
circumstance or result, it is to be presumed that the body corporate 
is reckless as to that circumstance or result; and  
 
(d)  for the purposes of paragraph 1043M(2)(b), if an officer of a body 
corporate ought reasonably to know any matter or thing because he 
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or she is an officer of the body corporate, it is to be presumed that 
the body corporate ought reasonably to know that matter or thing. 
 
(2) This section does not limit the application of section 769B in relation to this Division.  
 
Section 1043A - Prohibited conduct by person in possession of inside information  
 
(1) Subject to this Subdivision, if:  
 
(a) a person (the insider ) possesses inside information; and 
  
(b)  the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the matters specified in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of inside information in section 1042A are 
satisfied in relation to the information;  
 
the insider must not (whether as principal or agent):  
 
(c) apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products, or enter into an 
agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products; or 
 
(d) procure another person to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial 
products, or enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant 
Division 3 financial products. 
  
(2) Subject to this Subdivision, if:  
 
(a) a person (the insider ) possesses inside information; and  
 
(b) the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the matters specified in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of inside information in section 1042A are 
satisfied in relation to the information; and 
 
                     (c)  relevant Division 3 financial products are able to be traded on a financial market 
operated in this jurisdiction;  
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the insider must not, directly or indirectly, communicate the information, or cause the information to 
be communicated, to another person if the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the other 
person would or would be likely to:  
 
                     (d) apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial products, or enter   
into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial 
products; or  
                  
                     (e)  procure another person to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant Division 3 financial 
products, or enter into an agreement to apply for, acquire, or dispose of, relevant 
Division 3 financial products.  
              
(3) For the purposes of the application of the Criminal Code in relation to an offence based on 
subsection (1) or (2):  
 
(a) paragraph (1)(a) is a physical element, the fault element for which is as specified in 
paragraph (1)(b); and  
 
                     (b) paragraph (2)(a) is a physical element, the fault element for which is as specified in 
paragraph (2)(b).  
 
Section 1043F - Chinese Wall arrangements by bodies corporate  
 
A body corporate does not contravene subsection 1043A(1) by entering into a transaction or  
agreement at any time merely because of information in the possession of an officer or employee of 
the body corporate if:  
 
(a) the decision to enter into the transaction or agreement was taken on its behalf by a 
person or persons other than that officer or employee; and  
 
(b) it had in operation at that time arrangements that could reasonably be expected to 
ensure that the information was not communicated to the person or persons who made 
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the decision and that no advice with respect to the transaction or agreement was given to 
that person or any of those persons by a person in possession of the information; and 
  
                     (c)  the information was not so communicated and no such advice was so given.  
 
Section 1043M – Defences to prosecution for an offence  
 
(1) In a prosecution of a person for an offence based on subsection 1043A(1) or (2), it is not 
necessary for the prosecution to prove the non-existence of facts or circumstances which, 
if they existed, would, by virtue of section 1043B, 1043C, 1043D, 1043E, 1043F, 1043G, 
1043H, 1043I, 1043J or 1043K, preclude the act or omission from constituting a 
contravention of subsection 1043A(1) or (2), as the case may be, but it is a defence if the 
facts or circumstances existed.  
 
(2) In a prosecution brought against a person for an offence based on subsection1043A(1) 
because the person entered into, or procured another person to enter into, a transaction 
or agreement at a time when certain information was in the first-mentioned person's 
possession:  
 
(a) it is a defence if the information came into the first-mentioned person's 
possession solely as a result of the information having been made known as 
mentioned in subparagraph 1042C(1)(b)(i); and  
 
(b) it is a defence if the other party to the transaction or agreement knew, or ought 
reasonably to have known, of the information before entering into the transaction 
or agreement.  
 
(3) In a prosecution against a person for an offence based on subsection 1043A(2) because the 
person communicated information, or caused information to be communicated, to another 
person:  
 
(a) it is a defence if the information came into the first-mentioned person's 
possession solely as a result of the information having been made known as 
mentioned in subparagraph 1042C(1)(b)(i); and  
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(b) it is a defence if the other person knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of 
the information before the information was communicated.  
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APPENDIX 2 
INSIDER TRADING LAWS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
EXTRACTS FROM RELEVANT STATUTES AND LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
REGULATION (EU) 596/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL OF 16 APRIL 2014 ON MARKET ABUSE 
 
Article 7 - Inside Information 
 
1. For the purposes of this regulation, inside information shall include the following types of 
information: 
 
(a) information of a precise nature, which has not been made public, relating, directly 
or indirectly, to one or more issuers or to one or more financial instruments, and 
which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial 
instruments.  
 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, information shall be deemed to be of a precise nature if it 
indicates a set of circumstances which exists or may reasonably be expected to come into 
existence, or an event has occurred or which may reasonably be expected to occur, where 
it is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of that set 
of circumstances or event on the prices of the financial instruments or the related derivative 
financial instruments, the related spot commodity contracts, or the auctioned products 
based on the emission allowances.  In this respect in the case of a protracted process that 
is intended to bring about, or that results in, particular circumstances or a particular event, 
those future circumstances or that future event, and also the intermediate steps of that 
process which are connected with brining about or resulting in those future circumstances or 
that future event, may be deemed to be precise information.  
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Article 8 - Insider dealing 
 
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, insider dealing arises where a person possesses 
inside information and uses that information by acquiring or disposing of, for its own 
account or for the account of a third party, directly or indirectly, financial instruments to 
which that information relates.  The use of inside information by cancelling or amending 
an order concerning a financial instrument to which the information relates where the 
order was placed before the person concerned possessed the inside information, shall 
also be considered to be insider dealing.  In relation to auctions of emission allowances or 
other auctioned products based thereon that are held pursuant to Regulation (EU) 
No 1031/2010, the use of inside information shall also comprise submitting, modifying or 
withdrawing a bid by a person for its own account or for the account of a third party. 
 
DIRECTIVE 2014/57/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 
16 APRIL 2014 ON CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR MARKET ABUSE, OJ 2014 L 173.179  
 
Recital (18): 
 
In order to ensure effective implementation of the European policy for ensuring the integrity of the 
financial markets set out in this Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, Member States should extend liability 
for the offences provided for in this Directive to legal persons through the imposition of criminal or 
non-criminal sanctions or other measures which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive, for 
example those provided for in Regulation (EU) No 596.2014.  Such sanctions or other measures may 
include the publication of a final decision on a sanction, including the identity of the liable legal 
person, taking into account fundamental rights, the principle of proportionality and the risks to the 
stability of the financial markets and ongoing investigations. Members States should, where 
appropriate and where national law provides for criminal liability of legal persons, extend such 
criminal alibility, in accordance with national law, to the offences provided for in this Directive.  This 
Directive should not prevent Members States from publishing final decisions on liability or sanctions.         
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GERMANY 
 
WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ [SECURITIES TRADING ACT] (WpHG).   
 
Section 13- Inside Information 
 
(1) Inside information is any specific information about circumstances which are not public 
knowledge relating to one or more issuers of insider securities, or to the insider securities 
themselves, which, if it became publicly known, would likely have a significant effect on 
the stock exchange or market price of the insider security. Such a likelihood is deemed to 
exist if a reasonable investor would take the information into account for investment 
decisions. The circumstances within the meaning of sentence 1 also apply to cases which 
may reasonably be expected to come into existence in the future. Specifically, inside 
information refers to information about circumstances which are not public knowledge 
within the meaning of sentence 1, which: 
1. is related to orders by third parties for the purchase or sale of financial instruments 
or 
2. is related to derivatives within the meaning of section 2 (2) no. 2 relating to 
commodities and which market participants would expect to receive in accordance 
with the accepted practice of the markets in question. 
 
(2) A valuation based solely on information about publicly known circumstances is not inside 
information, even if it could have a significant effect on the price of insider securities. 
 
Section 14 - Prohibition of Insider Dealing 
 
(1) It is prohibited: 
1. to make use of inside information to acquire or dispose of insider securities for own 
account or for the account or on behalf of a third party; 
2. to disclose or make available inside information to a third party without the authority 
to do so; or 
3. to recommend, on the basis of inside information, that a third party acquire or dispose 
of insider securities, or to otherwise induce a third party to do so. 
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(2) Trading with own shares within the framework of a buy-back programme and price 
stabilisation measures for financial instruments shall in no case constitute a contravention of 
the prohibition pursuant to subsection (1), provided that this is performed in compliance with 
the provisions of Commission Regulation no. 2273/2003 of 22 December 2003 
implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and the Council - as regards 
exemptions for buy-back programmes and stabilisation of financial instruments (OJ EC No. 
L 336 p. 33).  For financial instruments included in the regulated unofficial market or 
regulated market, the provisions of Commission Regulation no. 2273/2003 apply mutatis 
mutandis. 
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HONG KONG 
 
SECURITIES AND FUTURES ORDINANCE (HONG KONG) CAP 571 
 
Section 245 – Interpretation 
 
“inside information”, in relation to a corporation, means specific information that –  
 
(a)  is about –  
 
 (i) the corporation; 
 (ii) a shareholder of the corporation; or 
 (iii) the listed securities of the corporation or their derivatives; and 
 
(b) is not generally known to the persons who are accustomed to or would be likely to deal in 
the listed securities of the corporation but would if generally known to them be likely to 
materially affect the price of the listed securities.   
     
Section 247 – Connected with a Corporation (Insider Dealing) 
 
(1) For the purposes of Division 4, a person shall be regarded as connected with a 
corporation if, being an individual –  
 
(a) he is a director or employee of the corporation or a related corporation of the 
corporation; 
 
(b)  he is a substantial shareholder of the corporation or a related corporation of the 
corporation;  
 
(c) he occupies a position which may reasonably be expected to give him access to 
inside information in relation to the corporation by reason of –  
 
   (i) a professional or business relationship existing between –  
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(A) himself, or his employer, or a corporation of which he is a 
director, or a firm of which he is a partner; 
(B) the corporation, a related corporation of the corporation, or an 
officer or substantial shareholder of either corporation; or 
 
(ii) his being a director, employee or partner of a substantial shareholder of 
the corporation or a related corporation of the corporation; 
    
(d) he has access to inside information in relation to the corporation and –  
 
(i) he has such access by reason of his being in such a position that he 
would be regarded as connected with another corporation by virtue of 
paragraph (a), (b) or (c); and 
 
(ii) the inside information relates to a transaction (actual or contemplated) 
involving both those corporations or involving  one of them and the 
listed securities of the other or their derivatives, or to the fact that the 
transaction is no longer contemplated; or 
 
(e) he was, at any time within the 6 months preceding any insider dealing in relation 
to the corporation, a person who would be regarded as connected with the 
corporation by virtue of paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d).  
 
(2) For the purposes of Division 4, a corporation shall be regarded as a person connected with 
another corporation so long as any of its directors or employees is a person who would be 
regarded as connected with that other corporation by virtue of subsection (1).   
 
Section 270 – Insider Dealing 
 
(1) Insider dealing in relation to a listed corporation takes place: 
  
(a)  when a person connected with the corporation and having information which he 
knows is inside information in relation to the corporation -  
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(i) deals in the listed securities of the corporation or their derivatives, or in 
the listed securities of a related corporation or their derivatives; or 
 
(ii) counsels or procures another person to deal in such listed securities or 
derivatives, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the 
other person will deal in them; 
 
(b) when a person who is contemplating or has contemplated making, whether with 
or without another person, a take-over offer for the corporation and who knows 
that the information that the offer is contemplated or is no longer contemplated is 
inside information in relation to a corporation –  
 
(i) deals in the listed securities of the corporation or their derivatives, or in 
the listed securities of a related corporation or their derivatives, 
otherwise than for the purpose of the take-over; or 
 
(ii) counsels or procures another person to deal in such listed securities or 
derivatives, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the 
other person will deal in them, otherwise than for the purpose of the 
take-over;       
 
(c) when a person connected with the corporation and knowing that any information 
is inside information in relation to the corporation, discloses the information, 
directly or indirectly, to another person, knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that the other person will make use of the information for the purpose of 
dealing, or of counseling or procuring another person to deal, in the listed 
securities of the corporation or their derivatives, or in the listed securities of a 
relation corporation or their derivatives;  
 
(d) when a person who is contemplating or has contemplated making, whether with 
or without another person, a take-over offer for the corporation and who knows 
that the information that the offer is contemplated or is no longer contemplated is 
inside information in relation to a corporation discloses the information, directly or 
indirectly, to another person, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that 
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the other person will make use of the information for the purpose of dealing, or of 
counseling or procuring another person to deal, in the listed securities of the 
corporation or their derivatives, or in the listed securities of a relation corporation 
or their derivatives; 
 
(e)  when a person has information which he knows is inside information in relation to 
the corporation and which he received, directly or indirectly, from a person whom 
he knows is connected with the corporation and whom he knows or has 
reasonable cause to believe held the information as a result of being connected 
with the corporation –  
 
 (i) deals in the listed securities of the corporation or their derivatives, or in 
the listed securities of a related corporation or their derivatives; or 
 
(ii) counsels or procures another person to deal in such listed securities or 
derivatives; 
 
(f) when a person having received, directly or indirectly, from a person whom he 
knows or has reasonable cause to believe is contemplating or is no longer 
contemplating making a take-over for the corporation, information to that effect 
which he knows is inside information in relation to the corporation –  
 
(i) deals in the listed securities of the corporation or their derivatives, or in 
the listed securities of a related corporation or their derivatives; or 
 
(ii) counsels or procures another person to deal in such listed securities or 
derivatives. 
 
Section 271 – Insider Dealing: Certain Persons not to be Regarded As Having Engaged in 
Market Misconduct 
 
(2) A corporation shall not be regarded as having engaged in market misconduct by reason of 
an insider dealing taking place through its dealing in or counseling or procuring another 
person to deal in listed securities or derivatives if it establishes that –  
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(a) although one or more of its directors or employees had the inside information in 
relation to the corporation the listed securities of which were, or the derivatives of 
the listed securities or which were, the listed securities or derivatives in question, 
each person who took the decision for it to deal in or counsel or procure the other 
person to deal in such listed securities or derivatives (as the case may be) did 
not have the inside information up to (and including) the time when it dealt in or 
counseled or procured the other person to deal in such listed securities or 
derivatives (as the case may be); 
 
(b) arrangements then existed to secure that –  
 
(i) the inside information was up to (and including) the time when it dealt in 
or counseled or procured the other person to deal in listed securities or 
derivatives (as the case may be), not communicated to any person who 
took the decision; and      
 
(ii) none of its directors or employees who had the inside information gave 
advice concerning the decision to any person who took the decision at 
any time before it dealt in counselled or procured the other person to 
deal in such listed securities or derivatives (as the case may be); and     
 
(c) the inside information was in fact not so communicated to any person who took 
the decision and none of its directors or employees who had the inside 
information in fact so gave the advice to any person who took the decision.  
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NEW ZEALAND 
 
FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT ACT 2013 (NZ)   
 
Section 234 – Meaning of Information Insider, Inside Information and Adviser 
 
(1) In this Part, a person is an information insider of a listed issuer if that person – 
 
(a) has material information relating to the listed issuer that is not generally available 
to the market; 
 
(b) knows or ought reasonably to know that the information is material information; 
and 
 
(c) knows or ought reasonably to know that the information is not generally available 
to the market. 
 
(2) A listed issuer may be an information insider of itself. 
 
(3) In this Part, a person is an information insider in relation to quoted derivatives if that 
person – 
 
(a) has material information in relation to any of the following that is not generally 
available to the market: 
  (i) the derivatives; 
  (ii) the underlying financial product; 
  (iii) the issuer of a financial product underlying the derivatives; and 
 
(b) knows or ought reasonably to know that the information is material information; 
and 
 
(c) knows or ought reasonably to know that the information is not generally available 
to the market. 
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(4) In this Part, inside information means – 
 
(a) the information in respect of which a person is an information insider of the listed 
issuer in question; 
 
(b) in the case of quoted derivatives, the information in respect of which a person is 
an information insider in relation to the derivatives in question.  
 
Section 241 – Information Insider Must Not Trade 
 
(1) An information insider of a listed issuer must not trade quoted financial products of the 
listed issuer. 
 
(2) An information insider in relation to quoted derivatives must not trade the derivatives. 
 
 Section 243 – Information Insider Must Not Advise or Encourage Trading  
 
(1) An information insider (A) of a listed issuer must not – 
 
(a) advise or encourage another person (B) to trade or hold quoted financial 
products of the listed issuer; or 
 
(b) advise or encourage B to advise or encourage another person (C) to trade or 
hold those financial products. 
 
(2) An information insider (A) in relation to quoted derivates must not – 
 
(a) advise or encourage another person (B) to trade or hold the derivatives; or 
 
(b) advise or encourage B to advise or encourage another person (C) to trade or 
hold those derivatives.   
 
259 
 
Section 261 - Chinese Wall defence 
 
(1) In any proceedings against a person (A) for contravention of section 241 or 243, it is a 
defence if –  
 
(a) A had in place arrangements that could reasonably be expected to ensure that 
no individual who took part in the decision to trade the financial products or to 
advise or encourage (as the case may be) received or had access to, the inside 
information or  was influenced, in relation to that decision, by an individual who 
had the information; and 
 
(b) no individual who took part in the decision received, or had access to, the inside 
information, or was influenced, in relation to that decision, by an individual who 
had the information; and 
 
(c) every individual who had the information and every individual who took part in 
that decision acted in accordance with the arrangements referred to in paragraph 
(a).    
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SINGAPORE  
 
SECURITIES AND FUTURES ACT 2001 (SINGAPORE) 
 
Section 218 - Prohibited conduct by connected person in possession of inside information 
 
(1)   Subject to this Division, where — 
 
(a) a person who is connected to a corporation possesses information concerning 
that corporation that is not generally available but, if the information were 
generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a material effect 
on the price or value of securities of that corporation; and 
 
(b) the connected person knows or ought reasonably to know that — 
 
(i) the information is not generally available; and 
(ii) if it were generally available, it might have a material effect on the price 
or value of those securities of that corporation, 
 
subsections (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) shall apply. 
 
(1A) Subject to this Division, where — 
 
(a) a person who is connected to any corporation, where such corporation — 
 
(i) in relation to a business trust, acts as its trustee or manages or 
operates the business trust; or  
(ii)  in relation to a collective investment scheme that invests primarily in 
real estate and real estate-related assets specified by the Authority in 
the Code on Collective Investment Schemes and all or any units of 
which are listed on a securities exchange, is the trustee or manager of 
the scheme, possesses information concerning that corporation, 
business trust or scheme, as the case may be, that is not generally 
available but, if the information were generally available, a reasonable 
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person would expect it to have a material effect on the price or value of 
securities of that corporation, of securities of that business trust or of 
units in that scheme, as the case may be; and 
 
(b) the connected person knows or ought reasonably to know that — 
 
(i) the information is not generally available; and 
(ii) if it were generally available, it might have a material effect on the price 
or value of those securities of that corporation, of those securities of that 
business trust or of those units in that scheme, as the case may be, 
 
subsections (2), (3), (4A), (5) and (6) shall apply. 
 
(2) The connected person must not (whether as principal or agent) — 
 
(a) subscribe for, purchase or sell, or enter into an agreement to subscribe for, 
purchase or sell, any such securities referred to in subsection (1) or (1A), as the 
case may be; or 
 
(b) procure another person to subscribe for, purchase or sell, or to enter into an 
agreement to subscribe for, purchase or sell, any such securities referred to in 
subsection (1) or (1A), as the case may be. 
 
(3) Where trading in the securities referred to in subsection (1) or (1A) is permitted on the 
securities market of a securities exchange or futures market of a futures exchange, the 
connected person must not, directly or indirectly, communicate the information, or cause 
the information to be communicated, to another person if the connected person knows, or 
ought reasonably to know, that the other person would or would be likely to — 
 
(a) subscribe for, purchase or sell, or enter into an agreement to subscribe for, 
purchase or sell, any such securities; or 
 
(b)  procure a third person to subscribe for, purchase or sell, or to enter into an 
agreement to subscribe for, purchase or sell, any such securities. 
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(4) In any proceedings for a contravention of subsection (2) or (3) against a person 
connected to a corporation referred to in subsection (1), where the prosecution or plaintiff 
proves that the connected person was at the material time — 
 
(a) in possession of information concerning the corporation to which he was 
connected; and 
 
(b)  the information was not generally available, 
 
it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the connected person knew at the 
material time that — 
 
(i)  the information was not generally available; and 
(ii)  if the information were generally available, it might have a material 
effect on the price or value of securities of that corporation. 
 
(4A)   In any proceedings for a contravention of subsection (2) or (3) against a person 
connected to a corporation which — 
 
(a) in relation to a business trust, acts as its trustee or manages or operates the 
business trust; or 
 
(b) in relation to a collective investment scheme, is the trustee or manager of the 
scheme, 
 
as the case may be, referred to in subsection (1A), where the prosecution or plaintiff 
proves that the connected person was at the material time — 
 
(i) in possession of information concerning the corporation, business trust 
or scheme, as the case may be; and 
(ii) the information was not generally available, 
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it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the connected person knew at the 
material time that — 
 
(A) the information was not generally available; and 
(B)  if the information were generally available, it might have a 
material effect on the price or value of securities of that 
corporation, of securities of that business trust or of units in the 
scheme, as the case may be. 
 
(5) In this Division — 
 
(a) “connected person” means a person referred to in subsection (1) or (1A) who is 
connected to a corporation; and 
 
(b) a person is connected to a corporation if — 
 
(i) he is an officer of that corporation or of a related corporation; 
(ii) he is a substantial shareholder in that corporation or in a related 
corporation; or 
(iii) he occupies a position that may reasonably be expected to give him 
access to information of a kind to which this section applies by virtue 
of — 
 
(A) any professional or business relationship existing between 
himself (or his employer or a corporation of which he is an 
officer) and that corporation or a related corporation; or 
(B)  being an officer of a substantial shareholder in that corporation 
or in a related corporation. 
 
(6) In subsection (5), “officer”, in relation to a corporation, includes — 
 
(a) a director, secretary or employee of the corporation; 
 
(b) a receiver, or receiver and manager, of property of the corporation; 
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(c) a judicial manager of the corporation; 
 
(d) a liquidator of the corporation; and 
 
(e) a trustee or other person administering a compromise or arrangement made 
between the corporation and another person. 
 
Section 226 - Attribution of knowledge within corporations 
 
(1) For the purposes of this Division -  
 
(a) a corporation is taken to possess any information which an officer of the 
corporation possesses and which came into his possession in the course of the 
performance of duties as such an officer; and  
 
(b) if an officer of a corporation knows or ought reasonably to know any matter or 
thing because he is an officer of the corporation, it is to be presumed, until the 
contrary is proved, that the corporation knows or ought reasonably to know that 
matter or thing. 
 
(2)  A corporation does not contravene section 218(2) or 219(2) by entering into a transaction 
or agreement at any time merely because of information in the possession of an officer of 
the corporation if — 
 
(a) the decision to enter into the transaction or agreement was taken on its behalf by 
a person other than that officer; 
 
(b) it had in operation at that time arrangements that could reasonably be expected 
to ensure that the information was not communicated to the person who made 
the decision and that no advice with respect to the transaction or agreement was 
given to that person by a person in possession of the information; and 
 
(c) the information was not so communicated and no such advice was so given. 
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Section 236B - Liability of corporation when employee or officer commits contravention with 
consent or connivance of corporation 
 
(1) Where an offence of contravening any provision in this Part is proved to have been 
committed by an employee or an officer of a corporation (referred to in this section as the 
contravening person) — 
(a) with the consent or connivance of the corporation; and 
(b)  for the benefit of the corporation, 
the corporation shall be guilty of that offence as if the corporation had committed the 
contravention, and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 
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SOUTH AFRICA 
 
FINANCIAL MARKETS ACT 2012 (SOUTH AFRICA) 
 
Section 77 - Definitions 
 
“inside information” means specific or precise information, which has not been made public and 
which –  
 
(a) is obtained or learned as an insider; and 
 
(b)  if it were made public, would be likely to have a material effect on the price or value of any 
security listed on a regulated market. 
 
“insider” means a person who has inside information –  
 
 (a) through – 
 
(i) being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities listed on a 
regulated market to which the inside information relates; or 
(ii) having access to such information by virtue of employment, office or profession; 
or 
 
(b) where such person knows that the direct or indirect source of the information was a 
person contemplated in paragraph (a). 
 
“person” includes a partnership and any trust, and any body of persons corporate or unincorporated. 
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Section 78 – Insider Trading 
 
(1)(a)  An insider who knows that he or she has inside information and who deals directly or 
indirectly or through an agent for his or her own account in the securities listed on a 
regulated market to which the inside information relates or which are likely to be affected 
by it, commits an offence. 
 
(2) (a)  An insider who knows that he or she has inside information and who deals directly or 
indirectly or through an agent for any other person in the securities listed on a regulated 
market to which the inside information relates or which are likely to be affected by it, 
commits an offence. 
 
(3)(a)  Any person who deals for an insider directly or indirectly through an agent in the securities 
listed on a regulated market to which the inside information possessed by the insider 
relates or which are likely to be affected by it, who knew that such a person was an 
insider, commits an offence. 
 
(4)(a)  Any insider who knows that he or she has inside information and who discloses the inside 
information to another person, commits an offence. 
 
(5)(a)  Any insider who knows that he or she has inside information and who encourages or 
causes another person to deal or discourages or stops another person from dealing in 
securities listed on a regulated markets to which the information relates or which are likely 
to be affected by it, commits an offence. 
 
Section 82 – Liability Resulting from Insider Trading 
 
(8) The common law principles of vicarious liability apply to the liability established by this 
section.  
 
  
268 
 
THE UNITED KINDGOM 
 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1993 (UK) c 36 
 
Section 52 - The Offence 
 
(1)  An individual who has information as an insider is guilty of insider dealing if, in the 
circumstances mentioned in subsection (3), he deals in securities that are price-affected 
securities in relation to the information. 
 
(2) An individual who has information as an insider is also guilty of insider dealing if - 
 
(a) he encourages another person to deal in securities that are (whether or not that 
other knows it) price-affected securities in relation to the information, knowing or 
having reasonable cause to believe that the dealing would take place in the 
circumstances mentioned in subsection (3); or 
 
(b) he discloses the information, otherwise than in the proper performance of the 
functions of his employment, office or profession, to another person. 
 
(3) The circumstances referred to above are that the acquisition or disposal in question 
occurs on a regulated market, or that the person dealing relies on a professional 
intermediary or is himself acting as a professional intermediary. 
 
Section 53 - Defences 
 
(1) An individual is not guilty of insider dealing by virtue of dealing in securities if he shows— 
 
(a) that he did not at the time expect the dealing to result in a profit attributable to 
the fact that the information in question was price-sensitive information in relation 
to the securities, or 
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(b) that at the time he believed on reasonable grounds that the information had been 
disclosed widely enough to ensure that none of those taking part in the dealing 
would be prejudiced by not having the information, or 
 
(c) that he would have done what he did even if he had not had the information. 
 
Section 56- Inside information 
 
(1) For the purposes of this section and section 57, “inside information” means information 
which –  
 
(a) relates to particular securities or to a particular issuer of securities or to particular 
issuers of securities and not to securities generally or to issuers of securities 
generally; 
 
(b) is specific or precise; 
 
(c) has not been made public; and 
 
(d) if it were made public would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of 
any securities. 
 
(2) For the purposes of this Part, securities are “price-affected securities” in relation to inside 
information, and inside information is “price-sensitive information” in relation to securities, 
if and only if the information would, if made public, be likely to have a significant effect on 
the price of the securities. 
 
(3) For the purposes of this section “price” includes value. 
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FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT 2000 (UK) c 8 
 
Section 118 - Market Abuse 
 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, market abuse is behaviour (whether by one person alone or 
by two or more persons jointly or in concert) which - 
 
(a) occurs in relation to - 
 
(i) qualifying investments admitted to trading on a prescribed market, 
 
(ii) qualifying investments in respect of which a request for admission to 
trading on such a market has been made, or 
 
(iii) in the case of subsection (2) or (3) behaviour, investments which are 
related investments in relation to such qualifying investments, and 
 
(b) falls within any one or more of the types of behaviour set out in subsections (2) to 
(8). 
 
(2) The first type of behaviour is where an insider deals, or attempts to deal, in a qualifying 
investment or related investment on the basis of inside information relating to the 
investment in question. 
 
Section 118B - Insiders 
 
For the purposes of this Part an insider is any person who has inside information - 
 
(a) as a result of his membership of an administrative, management or supervisory body of 
an issuer of qualifying investments, 
 
(b) as a result of his holding in the capital of an issuer of qualifying investments, 
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(c) as a result of having access to the information through the exercise of his employment, 
profession or duties, 
 
(d) as a result of his criminal activities, or 
 
(e) which he has obtained by other means and which he knows, or could reasonably be 
expected to know, is inside information. 
 
Section 118C - Inside information 
 
(1) This section defines “inside information” for the purposes of this Part. 
 
(2) In relation to qualifying investments, or related investments, which are not commodity 
derivatives, inside information is information of a precise nature which - 
 
(a) is not generally available, 
 
(b) relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of the qualifying investments 
or to one or more of the qualifying investments, and 
 
(c) would, if generally available, be likely to have a significant effect on the price of 
the qualifying investments or on the price of related investments. 
 
(3) In relation to qualifying investments or related investments which are commodity 
derivatives, inside information is information of a precise nature which - 
 
(a) is not generally available, 
 
(b) relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more such derivatives, and 
 
(c) users of markets on which the derivatives are traded would expect to receive in 
accordance with any accepted market practices on those markets. 
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(4) In relation to a person charged with the execution of orders concerning any qualifying 
investments or related investments, inside information includes information conveyed by a 
client and related to the client's pending orders which - 
 
(a) is of a precise nature, 
 
(b) is not generally available, 
 
(c) relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of qualifying investments or 
to one or more qualifying investments, and 
 
(d) would, if generally available, be likely to have a significant effect on the price of 
those qualifying investments or the price of related investments. 
 
(5) Information is precise if it - 
 
(a) indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonably be expected to come into 
existence or an event that has occurred or may reasonably be expected to occur, 
and 
 
(b) is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of 
those circumstances or that event on the price of qualifying investments or 
related investments. 
 
(6) Information would be likely to have a significant effect on price if and only if it is 
information of a kind which a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the 
basis of his investment decisions. 
 
(7) For the purposes of subsection (3)(c), users of markets on which investments in 
commodity derivatives are traded are to be treated as expecting to receive information 
relating directly or indirectly to one or more such derivatives in accordance with any 
accepted market practices, which is - 
 
(a) routinely made available to the users of those markets, or 
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(b) required to be disclosed in accordance with any statutory provision, market rules, 
or contracts or customs on the relevant underlying commodity market or 
commodity derivatives market. 
 
(8) Information which can be obtained by research or analysis conducted by, or on behalf of, 
users of a market is to be regarded, for the purposes of this Part, as being generally 
available to them. 
 
Section 147 - Control of information rules 
 
(1) The Authority may make rules (“control of information rules”) about the disclosure and use 
of information held by an authorised person (“A”). 
 
(2) Control of information rules may - 
 
(a) require the withholding of information which A would otherwise have to disclose 
to a person (“B”) for or with whom A does business in the course of carrying on 
any regulated or other activity; 
 
(b) specify circumstances in which A may withhold information which he would 
otherwise have to disclose to B; 
 
(c) require A not to use for the benefit of B information A holds which A would 
otherwise have to use in that way; 
 
(d) specify circumstances in which A may decide not to use for the benefit of B 
information A holds which A would otherwise have to use in that way. 
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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, 15 USC § 78a (1934).   
 
Section 10 – Regulation of the Use of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange –  
 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based 
swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.     
 
SEC Rule 10b5-1 - Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Practices 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,  
 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
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SEC Rule 10b5-1(c)(2) - Trading “on the basis of” material nonpublic information in insider 
trading cases 
     
A person other than a natural person also may demonstrate that a purchase or sale of securities is 
not “on the basis of” material nonpublic information if the person demonstrates that: 
 
(i) The individual making the investment decision on behalf of the person to purchase or sell 
the securities was not aware of the information; and 
 
(ii) The person had implemented reasonable policies and procedures, taking into 
consideration the nature of the person's business, to ensure that individuals making 
investment decisions would not violate the laws prohibiting trading on the basis of material 
nonpublic information. These policies and procedures may include those that restrict any 
purchase, sale, and causing any purchase or sale of any security as to which the person 
has material nonpublic information, or those that prevent such individuals from becoming 
aware of such information. 
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Journal of Business Law 241-257 
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